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.ABSTRACT 
At broad level it can be said that Pakistan and China have forged a 
robust strategic entente since the early 1960's. For Beijing, its relationship 
with Pakistan has at various times constituted a foothold in South Asia, a 
pillar of China's strategy of containing India, and a means of contesting 
Russian dominance over Central Asia. For Islamabad, China has been 
Pakistan's most steadfast international friend, providing it with military 
assistance, economic aid, and strategic reassurance regarding India. China 
* 
has been especially helpful to Pakistan in the area of nuclear related material 
and ballistic missile transfers, which have allowed Islamabad to maintain 
rough nuclear perity with New Delhi. The essential glue of the Beijing-
Islamabad entente has always been the mutual desire to prevent India from 
expanding its territory and influence in the region. Thus the relations 
between the two countries without any doubt had raised security concerns 
for India. 
In this study an effort has been made to survey and analyse the main 
factors that contributed in shaping the strategic axis between China and 
Pakistan with particular reference to the implication this relationship had on 
India's security. 
The preceding study reveals that how certain factors influenced the 
leadership of China and Pakistan to come close to each other. Pakistan's 
attitude towards China has been determined by its geographical position, 
economic constraints, domestic compulsions and the regional and 
international situation. The fragmented shape of Pakistan - its two wings 
upto 1971 has largely contributed in a way, to the establishment of 
Pakistan's relations with China. 
Regionally Pakistan has always viewed India a threat to its national 
identity and security. There is no fear in saying that Pakistan's foreign 
policy towards other countries is largely governed by India's threat 
perception. It can be said India was the key factors behind the Pakistan's 
understanding of China policy. From the day of her birth, Pakistan 
considered India a real menace and a great threat. To counteract that threat 
and to cut India to size remained the central theme of Pakistan long term 
foreign policy objectives, her China policy had been largely conditioned by 
this theme. 
Infact Pakistan throughout is seen to have followed a policy, the 
purpose of which vv'as to keep China, as far as possible unalienated. The 
words of assurances were transmitted by Pakistan before and after joining 
US sponsored military alliances, assuring China that Pakistan had no animus 
against her communist neighbour and she desired good relations with 
Peking. It was ofcourse the stark reality of geopolitical position of China 
vis-a-vis Indian subcontinent which Pakistani leaders have taken note of 
when the People's Republic of China came into power. That is why Pakistan 
from the beginning of China's emergence adopted a pragmatic approach 
towards Peking giving no importance to latters communist ideology. 
China can bolster Pakistan's security vis-a-vis its other neighbours. 
Pakistan understood it that the location of Tibet and Sinkiang on the north of 
Indian sub-continent places China in a position to intervene militarily in a 
confrontation between India and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. * 
Chinese interest in Pakistan in terms of power were not economic but 
political and strategic. The fact Sinkiang and Tibet the two autonomous 
regions of anxiety and their proximity to Soviet Union and Indian sub-
continent booms large in the geopolitics of China. Chinese strategic interest 
in Pakistan increased because of the possession of certain areas of Kashmir 
by it. The location of this part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir in a region 
where the former Soviet Union, China, India and Afghanistan meet together. 
China saw Pakistan as a useful tool against the Soviet Union and India. 
Although Pakistan was not potential threat to Chinese security in terms of an 
armed clash. However China had not ruled out Pakistan's potential of 
carrying out subversive activities in its Muslim majority province Sinkiang. 
Moreover China averted the situation whereby Pakistan could have been 
utilized against it by Soviet Union. Thus Pakistan figured in the defence of 
China's southern flank. 
Moreover it was in China's long term policy to be a super power and 
for that the first step was to become the leader of Asia. In the Chinese eyes 
India appeared as their main rival for leadership in Asia. So China set before 
itself an objective making use of Pakistan to undermine India's influence 
and power in Asia. China had earlier visualized the emerging power politics 
in the Indian sub-continent, involving India Pakistan and China and in 
advance planned the strategy of keeping Pakistan on the list of those 
countries with whom China might have to maintain apparently good 
relations out of sheer diplomatic necessity. 
The decision makers in China were fully conscious that in view of its 
worsening relations with India, Pekings stake in the friendship of Pakistan, 
the only power in the sub-continent which had access to Indian ocean, was 
naturally high and under no circumstances, it could allow Pakistan by its 
hostile posture to go closer to India and to form a joint axis against China. 
Peking thought that neither logic nor diplomacy would suggest alienation 
from a neighbour who was India's enemy. 
Sino-Indian war had been a watershed and starting point in Pakistan 
China closer relations. It brought a meaningful understanding between the 
two countries Pakistan's sanction to Sino-Indian war and its sidedness with 
China had an impact on the future strategic axis between the two countries. 
After Sino-Indian war Ayub Khan felt that by drawing close to China, 
Pakistan could realize its objective of securing Kashmir with or without the 
western support. Within this framework Pakistan formulated its China 
policy. 
The conclusion of Border Agreement between China and Pakistan in 
1963 made India exposed to severe implications. The agreement enabled 
China to promote Pakistan against India which further heightened the 
hostility between China and India. China's stand on Kashmir which was till 
then non-committal came fully supportive of Pakistan stance on Kashmir. 
The agreement was a clear interference in India's sovereignty over 
Kashmir. There was territorial loss also for India by Pakistan's surrender of 
a large chunk of Indian territory to China. This agreement had removed the 
only irritant in China Pakistan ties and extended the legitimacy to Pakistan's 
occupation of parts of Kashmir. 
So the agreement turned a new leaf in Sino-Pak relations and India 
was being viewed as the "common enemy". What was more startling to 
India, was the Chinese offer of military protection to Pakistan in the event of 
an Indian attack. After the conclusion of border agreement the Pakistani 
leaders many times threatened India of severe consequences if it did the 
mischief of attacking Pakistan, as it will involve the territorial integrity and 
security of largest state in Asia. 
China took a distinct pro-Pakistan stand in Indo-Pak war of 1965, 
although this support did not widen into an open commitment on the part of 
China to militarily engage with India. However, it showed the depth of Sino-
Pak relations. China gave a moral boost to Pakistani soldiers and created 
tension for India on two fronts. Actually Pakistani leadership had started the 
war in 1965 having hope that with or without Chinese support, it would be 
possible for Pakistan to grab Kashmir from India. Pakistani's were actually 
excited by the Chinese fed arms and ammunition. Pakistan continued to 
pursue war as a prolongation of politics by different means, China chose the 
threat of war as an equally effective foreign policy posture against India. 
The bonds of friendship between the China and Pakistan were also 
built by the construction of Karakoram Highway. This highway also vitiated 
the security environment of India. It has been the geocentric place of 
Chinese economic and military aid to Pakistan. China used the Karakoram 
Highway as a form of stadium diplomacy and simultaneously strengthened 
ties with the enemy of its enemy. The Highway that runs through Pakistani 
occupied Kashmir greatly effected India's security. This Highway, by 
connecting Gilgit with Sinkiang, provides China with the scope of 
intervention in the event of any major crisis. On account of this Srinagar 
becomes vulnerable as China can rapidly move her forces from Tibet to 
Northern Kashmir during a military confrontation with India. 
The study reveals that the 1971 India Pakistan war had come when 
China was completely obliged to Pakistan's role in Henry Kissingers secret 
mission to Beijing during July 1971, which facilitated the historic China-US 
detent. India felt greatly insecured over the new consensus. The insecurity 
was exacerbated in view of the Chinese military supplies to Pakistan, its 
domestic insurrections in India's northern area and its support to the 
Pakistan's demand for the right of self determination to the people of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Consequent upon these developments the indo Soviet relations 
developed rapidly. India signed a Treaty of friendship with Soviet Union 
which acted as a counterweight against Sino-US pressure and brought 
psychological relief and vigour to India. Pakistan conferred strategic 
advantages to China and received, in turn, Chinese support on Kashmir 
issue. 
Since the Defence policy of Pakistan has largely been India oriented, 
its cordiality with China deepended upon its estimates of Chinese capacity 
and willingness to advance its power equations. 
For China the dismemberment of Pakistan had not only made India 
the most powerful country in South Asia but nullified their unique leverage 
of countering India from two sides i.e. East and West Pakistan. Followed by 
Indo-Soviet Treaty and India's nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974, all this 
was to compel Beijing to enhance its indulgence with weakened west 
Pakistan and finally conceding to persistent Pakistani requests for assistance 
in building nuclear weapons and missiles which was formalized in an 
agreement of September 1974. 
China served as a secure source of arms supplier to Pakistan when 
other potential sources could not be relied on for continuous unimpeded 
access to their arms markets which is evident from the statistics in the thesis, 
obtaining arms from China was considered a vital achievement of Pakistan's 
China policy in the light of the flow of Soviet modern weapons system and 
technology to India especially since the later has not been threatened by 
embargo. The Defence Cooperation has been sustained by the two countries 
long standing problems with India Chinese arms supplies to a great extent 
narrowed the gap in conventional balance of power between India and 
Pakistan. This without doubt created problems for India. Search for security 
and parity with New Delhi has been the most important factors motivating 
Pakistan to strengthen its defence capabilities. In this process Beijing has 
without any doubt played god father. 
China strengthened the Pakistani Army by helping to set up 
production lines at the Heavy Rebuilding factory (HRF) at Taxila which has 
capability of overhauling and upgrading Chinese T-59 tanks. The 
aeronautical complex at Kamara comprising of the Mirage Rebuild Factory, 
the Light aircraft manufacturing factory, Fighter-6 (F-6) Rebuild Factory 
and F-16 (Mig-19) Rebuild Factory are the few examples where the Chinese 
help is involved. All this indicates that Chinese weapons system formed the 
backbone of Pakistan's arsenal, and without doubt China v/as endeavouring 
to make Pakistan self sufficient in defence products. A London based 
International Institute figures say that by 1982 these were about 75% of 
Pakistans tank force, 65% of its military aircrafts of Chinese origin. 
According to SIPRI Yearbook from 1981-84 China supplied to Pakistan 
about 200 T-:59 tanks, 60 fighter ground attack aircraft, 4 Huangfen class 
and 10 Haiying 2 class submarines. 
There are many other defence related collaborations between China 
and Pakistan which have provided the basic materials for their defence joint 
venture projects. The major joint ventures are like Al-Khalid MBT (Main 
Battle Tank) Karakoram-8 Trainer/Fighter, Super-7 (FC-1) Fighter and 
Naval Cooperation. The domestic production, direct procurement of 
weapons and the existence of joint ventures has surely facilitated Pakistan's 
long standing quest for military parity with New Delhi. The defence 
cooperation naturally increased Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India and 
provided it with a much needed feeling of confidence and self worth. 
India's security was deeply threatened by Chinese arms supplies to 
Pakistan. India was sure that these arms will be used not against any other 
country but against it. Excited by Chinese fed arms Pakistan began to abet 
the terrorists in Punjab, Kashmir and also in North East of India by 
supplying the arms assistance and thus vitiated the internal security 
environment of India. All the developments in Pakistan's defence by 
Chinese help eroded many advantages Indian forces were having on 
Pakistan and also raised the defence expenditure of the later to a great 
extent. 
The most important security dimension of Sino-Pakistan collaboration 
vis-a-vis India is their nuclear cooperation. The two country's shared fear of 
India's military potential have made Sino-Pakistani nuclear collaboration 
integral to the national security policy framework of both Beijing and 
Islamabad. India's test of a nuclear device changed the context of Sino-
Pakistani ties and it was during Bhutto's third visit to China that the first 
important Sino-Pakistani nuclear Agreement was put into black and white. It 
was this agreement that secured to lay the foundation for Sino-Pakistani 
cooperation in nuclear missile technologies. This cooperation between the 
two countries has the most profound visible impact on India's security ever 
since. Bhutto has regarded this agreement the greatest achievement and 
contribution to the survival of his people and nation. 
On the nature of China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan, a spate of 
reports have been appearing in the media most of them came from US 
intelligence sources. China had supplied Pakistan with a variety of nuclear 
products and services ranging from uranium enrichment technology to 
research and power reactors. With the assistance of Chinese nuclear 
scientists at Kahuta, Pakistans nuclear weapons efforts picked up 
momentum. 
Reports surfaced during 1995 about China's supply of a 40 MW 
heavy water research reactor for Pakistan's reset enrichment facility at 
Kushab. This facility is expected to take Pakistan from the stage of 
conventional uranium bombs to the production of plutonium and tritium, 
which will make possible for it to develop more advanced compact nuclear 
warheads for their missiles. In February 1996, US intelligence sources 
reported that 5000 ring magnets were being supplied by China to Pakistan 
for A.K. Khan's Research Laboratories in Kahuta. 
However, at every time both China and Pakistan had refuted the 
charges of strategic collaboration against India. The extent of Sino-Pakistani 
collaboration became clearer following Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998. 
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China's reaction as expected was muted to Pakistani tests as compared to its 
sharp reaction to India's tests. It seems that Beijings motivations in 
transferring nuclear and missile materials and technology to Pakistan derive 
largely from Chinese concerns about the regional balance of power and are a 
part of Chinese efforts to pursue a strategy of containment in its enduring 
rivalry with India. China wants to limit India's power capabilities to South 
Asia and thereby constrain New Delhi's aspiration's to become a major 
power in Asia. 
India's security concerns vis-a-vis Sino-Pak collaboration are high. 
Right from the 1962 India is being perceived as a common enemy. In Indian 
eyes, the China-Pakistan relationship appears as an alliance between two 
evil entities which had come together to perform wicked deeds in South 
Asia. This relationship is routinely referred as the Sino-Pak Axis, its focus, 
it is believed, is to keep India destabilized; to get India's neighbours to 
gangup against it by providing them arms and technology. It tried to prevent 
India from emerging as a pre-eminent power in the sub-continent, in Asia, 
and in the world. 
The Sino-Pak collaboration has created several security and strategic 
dilemmas for India. India was compelled to accelerate its nuclear weapons 
programme and to conduct open nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 because 
of this evil axis at its neighbourhood. By the same contingency India had to 
shift towards more capable and transparent nuclear posture. It became 
prudent for India to create a nuclear deterrent to insulate itself against 
Chinese or Pakistani nuclear coercion. 
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More importantly Sino-Pakistan collaboration has created a nuclear 
threat environment in Indian sub-continent. Pakistan's repeated threat of use 
nuclear weapons against India is a matter that has to be taken seriously. 
Pakistan wishes to utilize its nuclear capability to its advantage for political 
survivability. It also wishes to resolve the Kashmir problem by showing the 
same as flashpoint for the use of nuclear weapons. 
Sino-Pak collaboration without any doubt imposed a heavy defence 
burden upon India. The overall strategic perspective, the danger from China 
and Pakistan had to be taken into account. Though the government 
proclaimed that it stood, firmly by its policies of non-alignment and 
peaceful cooperation, the defence ministry could not relax in its effort and 
kept revising and updating its defence plans. India had made its defence 
production more technology oriented rather than product oriented and there 
was no scope for reduction in number and strengthen of the armed forces. It 
accommodated the changed concepts of warfare, it was felt necessary to take 
into consideration the external threats and self reliance in defence 
production. 
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PPREFACE 
The central theme of the present thesis entitled, "Sino-Pak Strategic 
Collaboration and its Impact on India's Security" is to highlight the ever 
growing security concerns of India vis-a-vis China and Pakistan. In this 
study an effort has been made to survey and analyse the main factors that 
have contributed in establishing the strategic relationship between the two 
countries and their impact on India's security. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. 
The first chapter of the thesis deals with the determinants of the 
Sino-Pak strategic collaboration, Pakistan's security concern for its national 
security and its hostility towards India had largely motivated it to befriend 
China despite the ideological differences between the two countries. As 
regards to China, its strategic concerns in Pakistan are visible. For China, 
Pakistan was strategically important for the proximity of Chinese two 
autonomous regions Sinkiang and Tibet to Indian subcontinent. Chinese 
strategic interest in Pakistan increased because of the latters possession of 
certain areas of Kashmir the location of which is in a region where the 
former Soviet Union, China, India and Afghanistan met together. China 
calculated how far Pakistan can be useful to it against India and Soviet 
Union. 
Chapter second makes an indepth analysis of major events which 
contributed to the emergence of Sino-Pak relations. Even though in the 
beginning Chinese were disturbed by Pakistan's stand on its major political 
and strategic issues like its entry into U.N., consideration of Tibet question 
at the U.N., the status of Formosa. Still China could not afford to let 
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Pakistan go out of its hand. On the other hand Pakistan's major political 
concern was, is question of Kashmir and in early sixties, China began to 
change its stand on the issue by switching over from non-involvement to 
that of involvement and the change was in favour of Pakistan. 
However, the conflictual nature of Sino Indian relations before and 
after 1962 war and also the 1963 Border agreement between China and 
Pakistan had a significant bearing on the growth of their relations. India was 
being viewed as a "common enemy". The axis was formed only to blacken 
India and to make territorial gains at its expense. 
Chapter Ilird takes into account the role that China had played during 
and after Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971. Moreover the significance 
of the construction of Northern routes which includes the famous 
Karakoram Highway is being examined in the context of India's security 
challenges vis-a-vis this Highway. 
The chapter IVth explores the military and strategic dimension of 
Sino-Pak collaboration. It makes an extensive study of the defence 
cooperation between the two in the aftermath of 1971 Bangladesh crisis. 
During the seventies and eighties Beijing supplied sophisticated weapons to 
Pakistan certainly for political and geostrategic reasons as it visualized 
Pakistan as its major ally in dealing with India. 
Chapter Vth takes an account of Nuclear and Missile Cooperation 
between China and Pakistan. For all practical purposes China has intervened 
in South Asian affairs by supplying nuclear and missile technology to 
Pakistan. It has tried its best to alter the strategic balance in its favour and its 
long term ally Pakistan to undermine India's natural predominance in the 
region. 
The Vlth chapter makes an analysis of security compulsions of India 
vis-a-vis China and Pakistan. Almost from last fifty years China and 
Pakistan had been the greatest threats to its security. India has infact 
reoriented its Defence and Foreign policy from time to time to make itself 
able to counter the possible dangers emanating from this strategic collusion 
between China and Pakistan. 
In the study an attempt is made to use all the available official 
documents on the topic. I have also utilized the Chinese, Pakistani and 
Indian newspapers, books, western publications in the collection of material 
for the thesis. 
The methodology adopted is primarily analytical, it has become 
historical wherever historical perspective was necessitated for a right 
perception. 
Chapter -1 
Determinants of Sino-CPak delations 
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Chapter- 1 
DETERMINANTS OF SINO-PAK RELATIONS : An Overview 
China and Pakistan belonged to two opposite camps since the early 
fifties, but their antithetical cold war positions did not result in mutually 
antagonistic ties. Thus Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognize 
the People's Republic of China, closely following in the footsteps of India. 
Pakistan-China friendship is usually described by Pakistanese and Chinese 
as loftier than the Himalayas and deeper than the Indian ocean. This 
relationship has not changed basically and continues to be marked by great 
understanding and multifaceted cooperation. 
It is said that China-Pakistan relationship defies explanation given the 
divergencies between the two countries. One was a militantly Marxist state 
and an acknowledged foe of the United States. The other was a staunch US 
ally and a member of the anti-China military alliance. Despite their inherent 
differences the two countries came together and formed a strong bond of 
friendship with ach other. A convergence of perceptions and congruity of 
interests without doubt brought China and Pakistan close to each other. 
Contradictions characterize the China Pakistan relationship with the 
identification of some similarities between them which also created 
compatibility in their relationship as much as mutual benefits which accrued 
to them. For Pakistan, her exclusive concern was India but for China it was 
primarily the US and secondarily India. In process Pakistan perceived China 
as a dominant power in Asia that would serve to undermine Indian 
prominence in the subcontinent. 
From Pakistan's standpoint, a friendly China not only enhances its 
security vis-a-vis India but also ensures a reliable partner. Ever conscious of 
its inferior status with India in the south Asian power hierarchy, the 
Pakistani drive for power parity became a primary objective of its foreign 
policy. Unable to challenge India on its own Pakistan began to try and 
secure political, military, diplomatic and economic support by aligning itself 
with an extra-regional power, viz. the United States. 
However as the 1960's revealed, Pakistan realized that its friendship 
with United States could not be depended upon beyond a certain limit, it saw 
in China a willing partner to counter India. For China and Pakistan, their 
hostility towards India served as a common ground to come together. Thus, 
China's friendship acted not only as a psychological boost for Pakistan but 
also provided diplomatic support at the UN and other world forms, 
especially on the contentious issue of Kashmir. More importantly, a 
generous Chinese military and economic aid was to prove vital for Pakistan 
in the wake of the 1965 US embargo. 
As for China, both regional and global considerations lent her the 
necessary drive to cultivate cordial relations with Pakistan. At the Chinese 
end, a fear of encirclement from 'principle enemies' had prompted Beijing 
to devise creative South Asian policies from the early 1950's while relying 
on India as its main ally in the area, it avoided alienating Pakistan despite 
the latters participation in the US alliance system. 
SECURITY CONCERNS OF PAKISTAN 
Pakistan was born in crisis. Perhaps no other description of the initial 
\ears of Pakistan would have been more apt than these few words of 
Zulfikar AH Bhutto. Pakistan at its initial breath as a separate entity soon 
after the partition was grappling with communal rights, heavy influx of 
refugees from India and severe economic and administrative dislocation. At 
that time nothing occupied the minds of the leaders of Pakistan more than 
the thought of consolidating and stabilizing an infant state and making it a 
viable entity in the family of Nations. 
Against this somewhat sombre and uninspiring political atmosphere, 
the eyes of the Pakistan's leaders naturally turned towards the outside 
powers which could really help them in overcoming the manifold difficulties 
the country had been encountering. Leadership was very much conscious of 
the inherent weakness of their country. Therefore, from the very beginning 
they remained in a constant search for getting external source to overcome 
its weaknesses and security concerns. 
Geographical concerns : 
Pakistan is strategically located in the Indian sub-continent and the 
Indian ocean. Till 1971 it was having two wings - west Pakistan and East 
Pakistan. This fragmented shape of Pakistan has always remained a security 
problem for Pakistan and thus contributed its relations to extra-regional 
powers. It is separated from the Soviet Union by a small strip of Afghan 
territory. Gilgit-Hunza-Baltistan areas of Kashmir under Pakistani 
occupation are contiguous to Chinese Sinkiang. East Pakistan was 
surrounded by India on three sides. Its southern boundary touches the Bay of 
Bengal. On account of location and nature of topography East Pakistan was 
vulnerable to an external threat to its security. West Pakistan was also 
divided into three distinct regions topographically. The mountain region, the 
plateau of Baluchistan and the plain of the Indus river. There are two main 
ranges the Hind Kush, which runs into Afghanistan in the west and the 
Karakoram, which runs through Kashmir, into Tibet in the East. The North 
West frontier province consists of the Sulaiman Range. Across this range 
there are a number of passes like Khyber, the Tochi, and the Gomal through 
which invaders have repeatedly fought to gain entrance into the lush green 
plains of India.' 
In the Gilgit Hunza-Baltistan region mountains extend from Kilik 
pass to the Karakoram pass enroute from Leh to Yarkand. Across this range 
there a number of passes. Most of this region is inaccessible, except the 
Shimshal pass, the Khunjerab pass and the Mintaka pass, which lead into the 
valley of the Hunza river, where Laden ponies could be used in the past for 
transportation.^ With the construction of highways connecting this region 
with Chinese Sinkiang, facilities for vehicular transport and communication 
between China and Pakistan have been created. Almost all the rivers which 
follow in Pakistan originate from Indian territory. 
From the point of view of its location and the nature of its topography 
west Pakistan is exposed to a threat to its security. The main defect of the 
west Pakistani territory is that it is not sufficiently broad. A powerful enemy 
can cut it into two slices by making rapid thrusts from the western to eastern 
frontiers." 
Geographical constraints on account of Pakistan's location, 
topography and the nature of its frontiers, give rise to security problem. 
When v/e look at Pakistan's location, the tlrst thing which strikes us is 
accuracy of the statement that "foreign policy begins at the frontiers".'' A 
cursory look at the map of Pakistan indicates that roughly half of the 
Pakistan's land frontiers meet with India, about 1/3 with Afghanistan, 1/6 
with Iran and a very small strip (through the Pakistani occupied Kashmir) 
with China. Former USSR was also close to it. This geographical relief has a 
direct bearing on Pakistan's foreign policy. 
President Ayub Khan wrote in his political autobiography : 
"Here is East Pakistan surrounded on three sides by 
India and the only approach is from the sea, which is not 
difficult for an enemy to control. West Pakistan is 
wedged in between three enormous powers with Soviet 
Union at the top, China in the north-east, and India in 
the south and East. I know of no other small country 
which has been the somewhat dubious distinction of 
having three such mighty neighbours". 
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In a speech at the Pakistan Institute of International Affair, on 25 August 
1961, President Ayub Khan recorded his apprehensions about Pakistan's 
insecurity resulting from its geography both in the regional and global 
contexts. He said Pakistan is divided into two halves. West Pakistan is 
pressed between three mighty powers in Asia. One (India) is virtually hostile 
and the others have an ideology which conflicts with our ideology.^ In the 
global context he observed that: 
... as far as the threat to Pakistan's security in global sphere is concerned, no 
body can deny that there is tremendous struggle between Soviet Russia and 
the United States of America. A major war today means decimation. 
Pakistan, especially West Pakistan occupies a crucial position. If war flares 
up in these parts of the v/orld, we can not remain away from it.^  
Pakistani leaders presume more serious threat to the security of 
Pakistan from its immediate South Asian neighbour India. It is clear from 
Ayub Khan's following statement that in the regional context Pakistanis fear 
a threat to their security mainly from India. 
... just look at the map of Kashmir. Just look at the 
location of the rivers on which the life of whole of West 
Pakistan, of some 45 million people depends. As our 
population increases every drop of water has got to be 
husbanded, stored and utilized. Then there is the added 
problem of our security, of physical military security. 
The present cease-fire line is just like a grip around our 
neck.^ 
Pakistan's seems to have developed obsession with their country's 
Geography. Z.A. Suleri, a noted Pakistani publicist remarked that : 
"So long as Pakistan stays within the range of 
subcontinental gravitation its position will be 
precarious, no settlement can overcome this 
geographical hazard".^ 
Although the Indo-Pakistan relationship was the central issue for both 
countries of the subcontinent, but for Pakistan it assumed transcendental 
importance. It is the base point for policy on all other issues, indeed, the 
position other countries took on Indo-Pakistani disputes determined 
Pakistan's attitudes towards those countries. The problems created by 
differing attitudes towards India were intensified by haggling over the 
division of power and allocation of resources between East and West 
Pakistan. Western wing was having power out of proportion to its 
population because most of the soldiers and civil servants were from West 
Pakistan. The disparities were a sense of disputes and disunity. Many West 
Pakistan's entertained doubts about the loyality of East Pakistan's and 
feared that some day the province would attempt to secede and rejoin India 
or would gradually be absorbed by "'Bharat".'" 
There were many gloomy forecast about the economic viability of the 
newly born state. To many its early collapse was a foregone conclusion, at 
least on economic grounds. In undivided India Muslims lagged behind in 
many aspects of life - in administration, trade and commerce, banking 
education and in political leadership. As Pakistan born out of a divided 
India, got itself a divided geography which was not only a great source of 
weakness for her defence but also of many politico-economic irritations and 
problems between the two wings. The fact that more than 2/3 of United 
Pakistan and about half of the present Pakistan's land borders meet with 
India, most of which with no natural frontiers and which remained 
undemarcated and conflicting for quite sometime, explain part of Pakistan's 
trouble with India." The fact that West Pakistan was separated by East 
Pakistan by 1,100 miles of Indian territory, Afghanistan still continues to 
decry the validity of the Durand Line, lays claim to a big chunk of Pakistani 
territory and has fanned and supported the Pakhtunistan idea in more than 
one ways. In all this, it was having a friend in the Soviet Union. 
Pakistan's lack of defence in depth vis-a-vis India - Pakistan's major 
port Karachi (as also the part of Chittagong when East Pakistan was part of 
Pakistan) fall within easy reach of Indian air basis and every Pakistani town 
of importance, except Quetta, lies within 150 miles of Indian soil and apart 
from the rivers of the Punjab there are no natural obstacles to an advance of 
the Indian army towards Lahore and Peshawar.'^ Pakistan has to depend 
heavily on friendly relations with other countries. 
From her very inception Pakistan seemed to have suffered''* from a 
self presumed threat of big India as "potentially a great nation and a big 
power" might have contributed to some extent, to small Pakistan's fear 
complex of India".'' Pakistan believed that India v/anted to see Pakistan 
"strangled" at birth"' and to achieve that end she began to adopt one after 
another all possible sorts of pressure tactics. 
The river system which is a natural barrier between India and 
Pai<istan had also become a source of tension because of their origin and 
course. The distribution of water of the rivers in both the wings of Pakistan 
created a serious problem leading to dispute between India and Pakistan. It 
can be said that Pakistan have, had considered a need for turning the 
weakness of their country's geography into a source of strength. Ayub Khan 
observed that ; now this location is a source of weakness in a physical term, 
but it could be converted into a source of strength, if we could establish 
normal and mutually acceptable relations with countries hemming us in.'' In 
its editorial Pakistan times also suggested to Pakistan Government that "Let 
us seek strength Avithin the campus of our own geography, the middle East 
on the one hand, and China on the other.'^  
Realizing the fact that China has a 2,400 miles long boundary with 
India, Pakistan's principal adversary in the international arena, with whom 
China has certain inherent conflicts, Pakistan has done every thing possible 
to draw closer to China. The Pakistani decision makers appear to be fully 
conscious of Kautilya's dictum that "enemy of your enemy is your friend" 
Pakistan's strategic location at the junction of India, Afghanistan, China, the 
Soviet Union and Iran, its location at the head of the Persian Gulf, Gulf of 
Aden and the Arabian Sea, attracts the USA as also China to it. Even the 
former Soviet Union appears aware of Pakistan's geopolitical importance. 
It becomes clear from this geographical analysis, that geographical 
location of Pakistan has acted as a constraint on Pakistan's foreign policy 
with reference to India. Other countries like China had also been in 
Pakistani calculations, but is not considered to be a serious threat as India. 
Economic Insecurity : 
At the time of Pakistan's birth there were many gloomy forecasts 
about its economic viability. To many its early collapse was a foregone 
conclusion, at least on economic grounds. Born in chaos, arson, looting, 
mass killing and migration, Pakistan emerged after partition with a much 
weaker economy and military power than India. The problem of feeding and 
rehabilitating seven million refugees'^  from India and the formidable task of 
protecting the lives and properties of six million non-Muslims leaving for 
India put a heavy strain on Pakistan's shattered economy and nascent 
administration. At that time Pakistan was badly in need of economic 
assistance. Both the superpowers (first America and then former Soviet 
Union) made overtures to Pakistan to rescue it from its economic rut. But 
the ruling class of Pakistan, which was loyal to the Britain and the USA, had 
unceremoniously rejected the Soviet offers. They laid down certain 
preconditions^' for accepting Russian assistance. Pakistan's economy was so 
much bound with that of western countries, particularly the United States, 
that this dependence puts a serious limitation on its independent economic 
development.^ ^ Although the Soviet offers for technical and economic 
assistance were in the national interest of Pakistan, the latter could not avail 
. of it due to the US and British manoeuvres. It indicates that Pak rejection of 
Soviet help was politically motivated. Infact China at that time did not have 
then the capacity to render any assistance to Pakistan's economy."'' So 
Pakistan had sought to use China as pressure on the West and the Soviet 
Union to secure more aid. Secondly China can be, and is, a good source of 
economic and technical assistance to Pakistan in certain important sectors of 
its economy - Industry, transport, power and Agriculture. Qualitatively, 
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China's help may not be much, but it has prompted the west and other 
communist countries to extend more aid to Pakistan. Pakistan was hopeful to 
have increase in the border trade with Chinese development of 
communication and transportation between Sinkiang and Pak-occupied 
Kashmir. 
Other nations, most notably the United States, have assisted 
Pakistan's economic development and military capability on a much larger 
scale then has china, yet the Pakistani sense of indebtedness to the Chinese 
is incomparably greater. The Chinese also have some "demonstration" 
impact on Pakistani opinion. It is argued that they too, like the Pakistanis, 
were once backward, corrupt, and disorganized with a low social cohesion. 
Indo-Pak mutual Antagonism and Censorious Perceptions : 
History and geography play an important part in designating a nations 
friends and enemies. In Pakistan's case India has filled the enemy's role 
during the last half century. Since the birth of Pakistan, its leaders have been 
perceiving a presumed threat to the national identity and security of their 
country from India. '^' It has been seen that Pakistan's foreign policy towards 
other countries is governed, to a, large extent, by this factor, and for that 
matter its bilateral relations are also guided by it. India and Pakistan have 
numerous specific disputes, some of which, notably the one regarding the 
Kashmir, have led to a high level of tension, even military conflicts between 
them. The disputes between the two countries have been symbolic of a more 
serious malaise, which is a result of deeper conflict, a conflict of images and 
finally the two new states as two nations. 
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There can be no doubt that a basic reason underlying their hostility is 
to be found in their censorious perceptions of each other rooted in their 
historic experience. These perceptions provide each side with a frame of 
reference for interpreting the others behaviour. This cycle has generated a 
deep mutual distrust in the two countries and in Pakistan's case an acute 
sense by "Indian threat" to National survival. Pakistan observers see India as 
an expansionist power entertaining notions of imperial grandeur. They recall 
the statements of Nehru and other Indian leaders that a 'leadership' role in 
Asia awaited India and that, in time India would be fourth great power in 
the world. They are disturbed by the projections and prescriptions of Indian 
theorists of "manifest destiny', such as K.M. Panikkar, who thought the 
political future of Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, Indo-China, 
Malaya and Indonesia was "indissolubly bound up" with India and urged 
that the ancient Indian Empire be recreated even if on a somewhat different 
basis.^ *^  
Pakistani commentators and opinion makers have seen India as a 
bully and an aggressor who has only contempt for the UN Charter a colonial 
power seeking to incorporate the nations of the South and South East Asia 
into an Indian Empire, a threat to the Security of all her smaller 
neighbours." Ayub Khan thought of India as an expansionist Hindu polity, 
whose leaders entertained a "deep, implacable, pathological hatred of the 
Muslims and wanted to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite.^^ Bhutto 
saw India as a deceptive aggressor state, whose leaders talked of peace 
while secretly preparing for aggressive war. He recalled that soon after 
assuring American audiences that "peace is a passion with us". Nehru had 
ordered the invasion of Goa. "Pakistan should be prepared for a similar 
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manifestation of the Indian passion for peace, he told the National 
Assembly. Both Ayub Khan and Bhutto asserted that India wanted to build 
an empire extending from the Hind Kush mountains to the Mekong River. 
Pakistanis continue to feel that India was not reconciled to the 
existence of Pakistan. Even though Indian leadership like Nehru stated on 
several occasions since 1947 that India never wanted to undo the partition^^ 
and that we accepted it, we continue to accept it but Pakistan has continued 
to disbelieve the same. Prime Minister Liyaqat Ali often complained that 
Indian's had accepted the partition with strong mental reservation.'^ ' The 
same thing was repeated by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir on 11 
March 1960"^  and by Z.A. Bhutto and President Ayub Khan on several 
occasions. Bhutto even said "in the destruction of Pakistan lays India's most 
sublime and finest dreams and Ayub Khan in his political autobiography 
also mentions it that "the leaders of India had not yet reconciled themselves 
to the very existence of Pakistan''^ Z.A. Suleri the chief editor of the 
"Pakistan Times" v/hile referring to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wrote that 
she has not been" overly respectful of Pakistan's territorial integrity" and 
adds that "this streak of irreconcilability to Pakistan, she has no doubt 
inherited from her father."' There are numerous examples where one can 
smell Pakistan's small status syndrome vis-a-vis India. President Zia-ul-Haq 
of Pakistan while replying to the questions by an Indian journalist Inderjit of 
"Times of India" as to v/hether there was a feeling in Pakistan, that India 
wanted to undo partition, said "there is a doubt in the minds of the people of 
Pakistan, I must admit. They feel thai perhaps Indian leadership or a 
segment of Indian public has not reconciled to the idea of Pakistan. 
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Indian suggestion for greater Indo-Pakistani cooperation, including 
some sort of an Indo-Pakistani federation, is strongly resented in Pakistan. 
As Nehru told C.L. Sulzberger of the "New York Times" in 1957, if we talk 
about it this upsets our neighbour. Infact Nehru's suggestion for greater 
cooperation between the two countries made in his interview to Selig 
Harrison of the "Washington Post" in Dec. 1962^ ^ created a furore in 
Pakistan Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir told Peter Schmid, that "even if 
India were to meet us with yielding love ... we should only regard it as a 
trap^ .^ Bhutto expressed similar views "we are fully aware of the treacherous 
nature of India and we do not want to endanger the existence of Pakistan in 
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the name of cooperation. So from the above facts one can confirm the 
perception of Pakistani leaders and policy makers towards India. 
So far as Indian perceptions of Pakistanis are concerned they are 
somewhat more varied and complex. Indian projections of post 
independence Pakistan and her leaders have been just as derogatory. Pandit 
Nehru alleged that Pakistani leaders were driven by the old communal 
hatred of India. He described the Ayub regime a "naked military 
dictatorship" without parallel in the "wide world today. Reacting to a firing 
incident at the Fazilka border in 1958, he characterized Pakistani 
"behaviour" as barbarous gangsterism."*^ 
Knowing perfectly well that India hates war and violence, Pakistani 
leaders continue to talk of an Indian threat to their national security and 
integrity. According to an Indian spokesman, this so called Indian threat is 
an invention of Pakistan's rulers calculated to divert attention from their 
oppression and exploitation of the Pakistani people which to a great extent is 
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proving right if we go through the present political crisis in Pakistan. Even a 
Pakistani writer has observed that: 
"the basic underlying motivation of our foreign policy orientation has 
been rivalry with India. There is pre-independence history behind it. The 
outlook has been carried into the Pakistani foreign policy.""^  So it can not be 
ruled out that many Indian's see Pakistani nationhood fragile, buih as it was 
on the "false" two nation doctrine. The argument goes to say that Pakistan 
suffer from a deep inferiority complex, a split personality, an acute identity 
crisis, and numerous other internal "contradictions" including severe 
problem of regionalism. The ruling elite in Pakistan have determined that 
their projections of India as an enemy is a tactic of survival both for 
themselves and for the country. If Pakistan did'nt hate India she would fall 
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apart. 
Many Indian commentators also assert that Pakistan is an aggressive 
state dedicated to India's ruin, Sardar K.M. Pannikar has alleged that 
Pakistan helped to disrupt and dismember India with the assistance of Indian 
muslims and then become a dominant power in the subcontinent. These 
hopes have not materialized, and the consequent frustration has aggravated 
Pakistani hostility towards India.'^ ^ 
In common Indian eyes Pakistan is illegitimate, ideologically, she 
represents a great heresy, functionally, a great tragedy. She has continued to 
be in league with foreigners, hostile to the neighbours in which she lives. 
She is an enfant terrible.'*'' 
It is amazing how nearly identical perceptions both countries have 
towards each other. Each side regards other as reactionary, medieval, 
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revivalist in spirit, irrational, even pathological in its hatred of the other, 
first in choice, of its methods; deceitful, aggressive, expansionist, war 
loving, subversive of the others, good order and determined to bring about 
its ruin. 
Since the Indo-Pakistan confrontation has been a going concern ever 
since the two nations became independent. There has been no reason or 
opportunity for their perceptions of each other to change for the better. With 
Indo-Pakistan hostility rooted deep into historical experience, and given the 
slow pace of social change and modernization in both countries, it is not 
surprising that relations have remained tense ever since independence. 
Pakistan's threat perception concerning India has been vivid, her security 
problems severe, and sense of need for reassurance form other quarters 
great. 
Pakistan's search for security : Military Pacts and Bandung Diplomacy 
By the early 1950's Pakistan was adopted by United States as an ally 
in the process of building anti-communist coalitions in Asia and Middle 
East. Pakistan welcomed this relationship, for it offered away of 
strengthening her military capability, and thus her bargaining position vis-a-
vis India, whom Pakistan feared the most. 
The eyes of Pakistani leaders naturally turned towards the United 
States - the power which could really help them in overcoming the manifold 
difficulties the country had been encountering. At this time also, two 
episodes of greater significance brought the United States and Pakistan 
closer and eased the task about which Pakistan leaders had been seriously 
thinking. Coming to power of Republican's in 1953 with John Foster Dulles 
as the secretary of states, who was the chief architect of the policy of 
containment in Asia.'*'* At that time Washington was in an urgent need of 
defence measures of Pakistan to be tied to those of United States - a strategy 
for which Pakistan Army was very willing. 
Infact from early 1951, the then commander-in-chief of the Pakistan 
Army, Ayub Khan had been thinking on the line of forging a closer military 
link with pentagon.'*^ So the idea of Ayub Khan got a chance when Dulles 
took charge of US State department, who himself was very eager to 
conclude a military pact in Asia in which Pakistan would be a member. 
Imposition of Mohammad Ali Bugra as 3"^ Prime Minister in April 1953 by 
the Governor General helped US efforts to bring Pakistan closer to its 
military orbit. Mohd. Ali Bugra a reliable friend and admirer of United 
States made no secret of his hatred for communist ideology."*^  
The new Prime Minister totally reversed the earlier policy of Liqayat 
Ali that Pakistan would remain neutral between the two power blocks.''^  The 
person who whole heartedly supported Mohammad Ali were the Governor 
General Gulam Mohammad, defence Secretary Iskander Mirza and the 
commander-in-chief Md. Ayub Khan. 
In October 1954, Mohammad Ali proclaimed in a television interview 
at Washington that "we can't remain neutral". .In todays conflict of 
ideologies, Pakistan wishes to be aligned with like minded nations that share 
the same ideas as are cherished by the people of Pakistan.'*^ The first 
concrete step towards this new policy was taken on May 19, 1954 when 
Pakistan and United States signed a mutual security Agreement in Karachi 
and America made a commitment to provide defence supplies to Pakistan. 
Although there was a some kind of verbal crusade against the aims and 
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objectives of International Communism. But, Mohammad Ali showed more 
circumspection and caution. From the stage of his attack on those countries 
that professed communism, China was purposely kept out. It indicates that 
Pakistan despite shaking hands wiih USA was keeping its corner soft for 
peoples Republic of China. Mohammad Ali avoided mentioning openly 
anything favourable about China so as to avert any possible doubt in 
Washington if it was to prove a dependable ally of the United States against 
communism. Significantly enough Mohmmad Ali showed more 
circumspection and caution towards China. 
In Columbo Conference, Mohammad Ali, contrary to Nehru's view 
that there is unrest and instability in Asia because of colonialism practiced 
by some western countries, went to the extent of asserting that the insidious 
Soviet attempt to bring all other nations under its heel was more dangerous 
than the western type of colonialism.^' He held Soviet Union responsible for 
all malaise in Asia. It was due to his persistence that a paragraph was 
included in the final communique of the conference which was unmistakably 
aimed at Soviet Union.^^ What was significant in contrast with his militant 
posture against the Soviet Union in the Colombo conference remained silent 
on the aims and activities of the Chinese communists in the south East Asian 
region. He had not bracketed the Chinese activities with those of the Soviet 
Union, nor had he recorded his dissent in the conference which declared that 
Chinese presence in the UN "would help to promote stability in Asia, ease 
Vk'Orld tension assist in bringing about a more realistic approach to the 
problem" of v/orld peace and security.^" 
It was an unusual opportunity for Pakistan when in April 1954 it 
become apparent that United States in order to contain the Chinese 
communists in Asia would proceed with plan to organize some kind of a 
collective military system on the model of NATO in Asia. '^' Pakistan 
welcomed this plan because it gave it point to play up the cheap game of 
communist bogey which it thought suitable to appeal Washington. The 
Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrulla, undertook a journey to Washington to apprise 
the US leaders of the vulnerability of the country, especially of East 
Pakistan, to the communist threat.^ ^ There is nothing to believe that Pakistan 
was at that time genuinely worried about the communist activities at home 
or was having concern over the Chinese activities in South East Asia. 
Pakistan was supposed to utilize in the time of need against India. Through 
this treaty Pakistan sought to balance her military strength with powerful 
India.^ ^ Pakistani leaders were trying very hard that the treaty should cover 
all cases of aggression not only communist ones; whereas Washington was 
hesitant to commit itself in case of non-communist aggression. The 
Impression with which Sir Zafrullah, the Prime Minister of Pakistan left the 
conference after signing the treaty was that the SEATO would cover 
aggression by India also. But US remained clear that in any India-Pakistan 
Armed conflict, it would not intervene. 
The main thing which was realized from the SEATO deliberations 
was the impression that Pakistan was more concerned about building a wall 
against India than containing the Chinese communists in Asia. 
Pakistan realized the importance of keeping China in good humor, she 
kept the Chinese fully informed of the motivating factors, and assured the 
Chinese of Pakistan friendship. Pakistani leaders were hopeful that if 
properly talked China might turn into a friend despite Pakistan's 
membership of the military pacts. The Pakistani Ambassador in China 
assured Peking that the decisions of his Government to join the conference 
had nothing to do with China and that the latter should not get unnecessarily 
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panik over it. 
Shortly, after Pakistan announced her willingness to attend the Manila 
Conference of 1954, Pakistan ambassador, major General Raza, in an 
official reception at Peking on Pakistan's seventh birth anniversary stressed 
Pakistan's wish to develop to further the existing happy and harmonious 
relations with China. Following the military alliance with United States 
Pakistan was, however, not able to maintain the same cordiality of relations 
with China. Accepting the assurances of his host, Mr. Chou-En-Lai 
reciprocated his feelings by saying that in future China and Pakistan could 
peacefully co-exist. As China was not happy when Pakistan began to vote 
with her western allies for postponing consideration of the question of 
Chinese representation in the United Nations. China regarded it as 
Pakistan's "double dealing tactics" of extending recognition to China but 
ignoring her at the United Nations.^ ^ 
During this time Pakistan was found engaged in diplomatic double 
dealing. On the one hand she continued to pose to the United States as its 
ally against the Chinese communists in Asia, and, on the other she went on 
assuring China, the main target of SEATO, that Pakistan had no animus 
against the communist regime of that country. Pakistani leaders missed no 
possible occasion to convey to China their peaceful and friendly intentions 
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towards Peking. A few days after the birth of SEATO, on China's National 
day on, 1^ ' October 1954, the Governor General Ghulam Mohammad sent a 
hearty message to Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung conveying the good wishes for 
the Chinese regime.'^ A delegation of Pakistani women was allowed to visit 
China on the above occasion. On their return, the delegation members were 
eloquent on the new Chinese regime and, what was more interesting was 
their open declaration that the Muslims in China had full religious freedom, 
a testimonial which would easily create a favourable impression of China in 
the more orthodox minds in Pakistan. 
Peking and Pakistan's And China Posture : 
In 1954 when Pakistan abandoned its policy of non-Alignment, allied 
itself with the west in the SEATO & CENTO and took military aid from the 
USA, Peking's reaction was naturally critical but it was in sharp contrast 
with the violent outburst from Moscow. Although SEATO was more of a 
provocation to China than the Soviet Union, it was not Peking but Moscow 
which lodged a strong and hastened protest with Pakistan government. Infact 
Chinese Government did not send any protest note to the Pakistan 
Government. Although Pakistan was only Asian member of the SEATO 
which had diplomatic relations with Peking and this fact was enough to irk 
the Chinese. Pakistan was not singled out for derogatory comments by 
Chinese leaders and the news papers. The Chinese government and press did 
lash out against the SEATO as "aggressive" and "hostile" to China but there 
is nothing on the record to show that they made Pakistan the target of 
recriminative attack or abuse. The vv'ar of words waged against Pakistan by 
New Delhi and Moscow was then so similar in phraseology and invective 
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that it appeared they operated from the same length.^' Realising the US 
postures people of Pakistan at that time urged the Government of Pakistan to 
pursue an independent course of action in foreign policy. Bhasani's section 
of the Awami League formed the National Awami party also opposed 
Pakistan's joining CENTO and SEATO and said in a statement that it 
believed in strengthening the U.N. to solve international problems including 
Pakistan's differences with India, by peaceful means. The Chinese 
correctly assessed that Pakistan did not share the declared purpose of the 
sponsors that the SEATO was to counter and contain communist countries, 
but primarily to increase her military strength vis-a-vis India.^^ Opportunism 
blinded China, and it regarded Pakistan as a better company than India, even 
when Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai relationship was at its height. During 1954-
1959 Chinese worked on the assumption that the support of a non-aligned 
India with a definitely anti-imperialist record, as against an aligned Pakistan 
was of greater advantage to their national objective and at the same time, 
they understood that only India could be their possible rival for influence in 
Asia. Therefore, they saw a ray of hope in the Pakistani stance. As Chou en 
lai later told to the Associated press of Pakistan on 10 April 1963 as a result 
of certain assurances received from Pakistan right from 1954, China 
appreciates Pakistan's objectives of gaining political and military 
ascendancy over India in joining the SEATO and CENTO, otherwise 
Pakistan had no other motivation in joining the pacts^''. Chinese in their 
cynical power political bias for Pakistan, ignored Pakistan's alliance with 
the west and also as an expression of their acquiescence, adopted an attitude 
of non-involvement in the Kashmir issue. 
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Bandung Diplomacy : 
The first personal contact between the Chinese and Pakistan leaders 
was realized on April 1955 at the Bandung conference, observers have 
repeatedly described this meeting as an important landmark heralding "a 
new phase of closer cooperation". It was really beginning of the Sino-
Pakistan entente coardiale which India later on termed as "collusion". The 
basic element of their understanding was the patent or latent hostility 
towards India. The assurance of close cooperation came through no less a 
person than Mao Tse-Tung himself. Replying to a speech of Pakistan 
ambassador Sultan-uddin Ahmed, stationed in Peking, Mao stated with 
confidence that from now on, the friendly relations between our two 
countries will grow closer with each passing day on the existing basis".^^ 
This statement v^ 'as an indicator of the fact that Sino-Pakistan friendship was 
already in an advanced stage. During the conference Pakistan's Prime 
Minister became overfriendly towards Mr. Chou-Enlai and showed as if 
Pakistan was more interested than India in forging good and close relations 
with China. Mohammad All's severe reprimand of Soviet diplomacy in Asia 
and Africa was quite contrast to his ideas about China. While discussing the 
alleged threat posed by the Chinese activities in Asia, Mohammad AH told 
assembled delegates that he was convinced of the peaceful motive of China, 
"we have friendliest relations with China, China is not certainly 
imperialistic, she has not brought any other country under her heel.^^ The 
statement of Mohd. Ali was a certificate to the effect that China is peace 
loving and interested in maintaining peace in South East Asia. 
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China had reasons to feel happy at the Pakistani performance. On the 
question of Pakistan's membership of SEATO Mohammad Ali was reported 
to have told Chou-en lai in a meeting of political committee of Bandung 
conference. He said on 23 April 1955, that Pakistani Prime Minister had 
assured him : 
Although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, 
Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear 
that China would commit aggression against her. As a 
result of that we achieved a mutual understanding 
although we are still against military treaties. 
The Prime Minister of Pakistan further Assured that if the United States 
launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it. This created 
agreement and harmony amongst us in understanding each other on 
collective peace and cooperation.^^ According to China Pak-US military 
pact could be used against anybody, except Peking. From Chinese point of 
view, therefore, there was nothing wrong with Pakistan's aggressive designs 
against India. On his return from Bandung, the Pakistani Prime Minister told 
to the Press correspondents of his peaceful intentions of China vis-a-vis 
Pakistan. At the end of the Conference, Mohammad Ali was beared, saying 
that he was tremendously impressed by the reasonableness and conciliatory 
attitude of Chou.''^ It indicates that Chou's projection of peaceful image of 
China, and his moderation and flexibility casted a spell on Mohd. Ali. So he 
went so far as to announce his preparedness to mediate between China and 
the United States over their various disputes. He took personal interest to 
bring the parties to negotiating table. Welcoming Chou's willingness to talk 
about farmosa, Mohammad Ali immediately relayed the information to 
Washington'' some believed that he had even worked out a plan to offer his 
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"good offices" in solving the dispute. This endeavour of Mohammad Ali did 
not go unnoticed in Peking, Chou invited him to visit China and the 
invitation was gladly accepted. 
What was more important was that both China and Pakistan gained 
equally from the Bandung conference. China by its efforts and active 
cooperation was able to insert an important clause into the "ten principles" 
adopted at the conference upholding Pakistan's right to join the military 
pacts for self defence against foreign aggression. The "Ten principles" 
proclaimed by the conference with the full support of China not only 
exonerated Pakistan from the charge of conspiring aggression against Asian 
countries, particularly India, but dealt a heavy blow to the peace loving 
Afro-Asian nation's policy of non-Alignment. This was a direct affront to 
India which was fighting courageously to defend its peaceful foreign policy. 
This action of China exposed duplicity and opportunism in its foreign 
policy. For, it was less than a year before that China had signed the 1954 
Panchshella agreement with India. Despite the fact China was held in high 
esteem by the people of India and Nehru's projection of good image and 
reputation of China before the Afro Asian nations, China did not hesitate to 
enclose the Pakistani statement branding India as an aggressive country. 
Bandung is highly significant for Sino-Pakistan relations because in 
this conference one Asian country with its definite commitment to west and 
being arrayed against China, came to an understanding with the apparent 
enemy itself that the former would not support any US aggressive actions 
against China even if the actions were taken under the military treaties in 
which the former was a party. This was nothing but an ideal example of real 
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politik in which two countries were indulged at the conference. It was, 
however, of importance for both China and Pakistan that their respective 
adversaries, at the time, the US and India should not become aware of this 
entente which is evident from this statement of Chou en lai : 
"I would like to give an explanation or clarification on 
behalf of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He believes 
that the Manila treaty is defensive in character, just as 
General Romulo said, although I do not believe in the 
explanation he gave". 
China's anachronistic and highly ambivalent attitude is also seen here when 
Chou en-lai later put it that Pakistan's position was "defensive" in an 
otherwise aggressive system of military alliances like the SEATO and 
CENTO.^' It was defensive against India. Both China and Pakistan were 
trying to twist the military pacts as instruments of pressure against India. 
As Pakistan seems to be aware of Sino-Indian differences so it always 
tried to play up the point that there is absence of "conflicting interests" 
between China and Pakistan. The obvious purpose of Pakistan would have 
been to make China aware that India has some territorial ambitions over 
former. This is also evident from here that before Bandung conference, the 
new Pakistani ambassador while presenting his credentials to Chairman Mao 
contended that the "cordial relations" between the two countries would 
continue to develop since "Pakistan has no territorial ambition over any 
country. In reply Mao remarked that "from now on the friendly relations 
between our two countries will grow closer with each passing day on the 
existino basis.''" 
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The Entente at Bandung was followed by a Chinese gesture of real 
significance which a western observer of Pakistani affairs claimed as cynical 
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expression of realpolitic. He revealed : 
"Following the Bandung conference, Karachi revealed -
as I have been assured on an unimpeachable authority -
a private message from Peking. The Chinese people's 
Government assured the Government of Pakistan that 
there was no conceivable clash of interests between the 
two countries which could imperil their friendly 
relations, but that this position did not apply to Indo-
Chinese relations in which a definite conflict of interests 
could be expected in the near future".^'' 
Pakistan took extra care in filling the gaps and worked for the success 
of Chinese line engaged itself in precipitating a Sino-Indian conflict. 
Chinese Note left o room for any doubt that Peking valued Pakistani 
friendship more than it did for the Indian. China dispelled whatever 
lingering suspicions were there in Pakistani mind. Peking made it clear that 
what Pindi was actually trying to achieve with huge material and military 
assistance from the USA and other allies would be facilitated by the Chinese 
activities against India.. 
On 15 June 1956, Chou-en lai talked of the historic links between the 
peoples of the two countries and reaffirmed his desire for friendly relations 
with the Pakistan. In June 1956, China Pakistan Friendship society was 
formed in Peking to foster closer relations between the two countries.'''' 
During the twelve day visit of Prime Minister Suharwardy to China in Oct. 
1956, Chou-en lai affirmed that Pakistan's membership of the SEATO 
should not be a bar to friendly relations between China and Pakistan." Two 
months latter Chou-en lai paid a return visit to Pakistan and the joint 
statement issued on 24 December 1956 clearly affirmed that "there is no real 
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conflict between the two countries. As a result of these confabulations, 
H.S. Suharwardy in February 1957 told the National Assembly in Karachi 
that Pakistan sought the friendship of China, and that he was "perfectly 
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certain when the crucial time comes, China will come to our assistance". 
The significance of these statement's went unnoticed in India whose 
leaders were still engrossed in the slogan Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. 
Pakistan's Attitude and Objectives towards China : 
Many factors prompted Pakistan to strengthen its multifaceted 
relation with China. Like Pakistan, China too was a developing country and 
the two countries were having some common problems in the field of 
Agriculture and industrialization. Pakistan was facing the problem of water 
logging, salinity and floods. Pakistan was well aware that China had 
overcome these problems and we could benefit from their experiences. 
Moreover when the western aid to Pakistan started declining, China came 
forward to offer such aid. Chinese aid to Pakistan was attractive as it carries 
low interest rates or no interest at all. China also showed its interest in 
setting up heavy industries in Pakistan, e.g., Taxila Industrial Complex, 
Above all in trade balance of trade was in favour of Pakistan and rarely in 
case of China. Although Chinese aid to Pakistan forms a small fraction of 
the total foreign aid that Pakistan was receiving. 
Since the birth of Pakistan, the major focus of its interaction with the 
international community has been based on tvv'o considerations, first, 
security against external challenges to its national identity, territorial 
integrity and independence, second, to secure economic assistance for its 
socio-economic progress in the early years of its independence.^° Pakistan's 
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leadership for some practical reasons choose to become an ally of the 
western bloc. Nonetheless Pakistan was first Muslim country to extend 
recognition to the peoples Republic of China on January 04, 1950. One of 
the reasons to have good relations with China was the fact that the peoples 
Republic of China would occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations and 
as a permanent member of UN security council, with the right to veto, would 
be able to have a direct influence on the discussions on Kashmir, an 
outstanding territorial dispute between India and Pakistan since the division 
of sub-continent. This cordial relations with China could help Pakistan in 
strengthening its position on Kashmir issue. In view of China's importance 
for the national interest of Pakistan during the Korean war, Pakistan not only 
abstained from voting on the UN resolution against China but also continued 
its trade relations with China. Pakistan at that time was looking around for 
buyers of its raw jute and cotton and for the supplies of much needed coal. 
Pakistan's exports to China in 1952 reached upto $ 83.8 million and the 
balance of trade heavily favoured Pakistan because imports from China that 
year totalled only $ 2.2 million. The heavy purchases of Pakistani raw 
materials and coal by China at a critical juncture left behind the impression 
that China had acted like a good friend. 
Strategic objective : 
Pakistanis see China as non-exploitative power. They feel she is not 
imperialistic, has no satellites in her camp; does not attempt to dominate 
Pakistan or extract concessions from her in return for her support; does not 
propagandize her ideology and scrupulously refrains from interfering in 
Pakistan's domestic affairs. Pakistan's diplomats share these perceptions as 
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a rule, the Chinese do not even volunteer advice. Security considerations 
and the compulsions of power politics have always been a vital factor in the 
development of Sino-Pakistan relations. Both China and Pakistan are 
sensitive to the dictates of political realism. They acted from the 
considerations of vital national interests. Both pursue power (military and 
related capabilities) as the most reliable means of countering hostile powers. 
From the geographical Analysis of Pakistan it is also clear that 
security has been the most important problem of Pakistan. Pakistani's 
strategic objective vis-a-vis China can be viewed from two different angles. 
Firstly whether China poses a threat to Pakistan's security directly or 
indirectly or both ways. Secondly whether China can help Pakistan in 
strengthening its security vis-a-vis its other neighbours. Pakistan had not in 
the beginning ruled out the threat to its security even from China. Infact in 
1953 and 1959 China had violated the airspace of Pak occupied Kashmir. In 
the 1959, the Ayub regime came across a Chinese map showing fairly large 
o t 
areas in the extreme northern regions of Pakistan as Chinese territory. 
Moreover the Chinese troops appeared occasionally in Pakistani territory^ "* 
across the border in Hunza and they rounded away some graziers from the 
areas. In September 1959 there occurred border skirmishes with Pakistanis 
on the Hunza border . Ayub became aware of the hopeless situation in 
which Pakistan was caught so instead of protesting to Peking for border 
violations and inaccurate maps, President Ayub said at a press conference 
that Pakistan would approach China for a peaceful settlement of border 
question by demarcating the northern frontiers. This was the beginning of 
Pakistan's overtures towards China but that time China did not responded to 
Pakistan proposals for boundary delimitation. The obvious fact was that 
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China was not ready to "antagonize India. To ensure against a possibility 
of Chinese attack Pakistan concluded a boundary agreement with China later 
on. 
Obviously, the Pakistani objective was to turn a potential area of 
tension into a tranquil border. Ideological and political subversion would 
have been a yet another form of Chinese threat to Pakistan. Because China 
was a communist state feeling proud to call it vanguard of liberation 
struggles all over the world. At that time in 1954 communist party was 
banned in Pakistan. Being an Islamic state and its reservation for 
communism Pakistani government was vigilantly watching over communist 
activities there. Another concern for Pakistan's security was China can use 
Afghanistan against it. 
China can bolster Pakistan's security vis-a-vis its other neighbours. 
As observed earlier, a threat to the security of Pakistan may emanate from 
its neighbours but Pakistan perceives such a threat mainly from India. The 
location of Tibet and Sinkiang on the north of Indian sub-continent places 
China in a position to intervene militarily in a confrontation between India 
and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Political Objectives : 
The emergence of Peoples Republic of China and the question of its 
recognition prompted the Pakistan rulers to seek the British view. Because 
of the Pakistan's handicap of inadequate information about the new 
government in China. Pakistan, like the British, viewed the Chinese 
revolution in 1949, even though engineered by the communists, as a 
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successful nationalist struggle to overthrow foreign yoke than merely a 
QO 
manifestation of the world wide communist design. 
Pakistani policy makers started selling the Idea that in the interest of 
Pakistan's national security it should have good relations with the nationalist 
China despite the opposite ideologies subscribed to by the two states. 
Pakistan's headache was somehow to win dependable friends in its fight 
against India. From political point of view Pakistan found China important 
in diverse ways, firstly, in the light of the discussion of Pakistani 
nationalism, Pakistani elite and the Indian factor, it is clear that Pakistani 
policy makers see political challenge mainly from India. They fear a threat 
to their national identity from India. In order to overcome its identity crisis 
Pakistan seeks to undermine India's political influence by organizing anti-
India campaigns. Finding that China is interested in undermining India's 
polifical influence in the Afro Asian world, Pakistani leaders think that 
China can serve as a counterweight against India. They also find China 
useful and important vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Since Pakistan's relation with 
Afghanistan have not always been friendly, so there objective became to 
eliminate a possibility of Sino Afgan complicity on one side, and to seek 
China's neutrality in Pak-Afghan affairs on the other. Moreover Pakistan's 
friendship with China will improve image of Pakistan as a country with 
independent foreign policy. Pakistan was well aware about that being a 
developing country China will give Pakistan a considerable political 
weightage. Keeping this in mind Pakistani policy makers have set before 
themselves an objective vis-a-vis China. That objective was to secure a 
better deal from both the superpowers, against India by using China. 
Pakistanis thought China was credited with the potentiality of emerging as a 
powerful leader of the Asia but also on the international stage. It was also 
taken into consideration by Pakistan that in the event of Britains eclipse as a 
world power, Pakistan's relation with China would give it a tremendous 
bargaining power with the USA. Enlightened self interest was obviously the 
principle motivation for Pakistan's decision to establish diplomatic relations 
with the government of Peking.^ ^ In case of Soviet offer of help and more 
for friendship, Pakistan adopted a totally indifferent attitude on the plea that 
the former Soviet Union was not also so advanced as to be able to provide it 
with capital machinery and technical skill, urgently needed for the 
development of country's industries. This branding would have been more 
appropriate in the case of China which was far more backward than the 
former USSR. The expectation of Pakistani leaders, therefore, of any 
substantial economic help form China was influenced by certain other 
considerations and compulsions. Pakistani considered China less dangerous 
than communist Russia. Pakistani strategists were afraid that "non-
communist" countries which had parts or alliances with the Soviet union had 
to ultimately change their political and economic systems and adopt 
communism and that had to make themselves wholly and completely 
subservient to the Russian's in matters of foreign policy. A Pakistani scholar 
also expressed the opinion that the significance of the Chinese revolution lay 
its indigenous character and its substantial difference form the Russian 
variety of communism.^ ° To the Pakistani policy makers, the threat of the 
Chinese communism compared to immediate and continuing danger form 
India, were remote threats. Accustomed, as many developing countries are, 
to "patron client" roles, Pakistan has, since the early 1950's, looked for a 
natrnn who wniilrl nrntect her interests from socalled Indian encroanhments 
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CHINESE POSTURE : 
Why did Peking befriend the military bureaucratic regime of 
Paicistan? China's ideological offensive and subversion in the third-world 
with the quixotic claim of bringing about world revolution led it to offer 
unflagging support to the Islamabad regime.^' 
According to a scholar on Chinese foreign policy China's relations 
with other countries can be explained on the basis of two conceptual 
frameworks. One is based on "Alliance Model". He has analysed China's 
relations with Pakistan on the "Alliance Model" this model sees China's 
foreign policy" as concerned with short problems, extremely determined and 
reactive. This is the view which, emphasizing China's weakness and 
vulnerability, points to the threat to China from several powerful adversaries 
and sees a concern for security as the dominant theme of China's foreign 
policy. This conception tends to see Chinese objectives as limited and short-
term and China's international behaviour as consisting primarily of reactions 
to the moves of others. 
With regard to Pakistan China kept ideology in a low key. Of three 
types of its relations with other countries viz. (i) party to party, (ii) people to 
people, (iii) state to state. China has choosen to establish relations with 
Pakistan in terms of the last type. It appears that China would not have seen 
bright prospect of any radical movement in Pakistan because the internal 
conditions prevalent in Pakistan were never favourable for communism. 
Islamic orientation is so deep rooted that it was impossible for communism 
to mystify the people in Pakistan. The chances of exporting revolution from 
China were also bleak. The geographical barrier between the two countries, 
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absence of Chinese community in Pakistan and the orthodox nature of the 
Pakistani society, lack of class consciousness, go against the spread of 
communism in Pakistan. There had, however, been many people with leftist 
leaning in Pakistan from its very inception e.g., Mian Iftikhar uddin, Faiz 
Ahmad Faiz, Maulani Bhashani and some others - but the ban of communist 
party in Pakistan left for them no option but to join other political parties. 
Chinese behaviour in the past years show that it has supported the 
reactionary regimes in Pakistan against the people. "' Not only that Chinese 
leaders lent political support to President Ayub Khan during his election 
campaign, but also persuaded Pakistani leftist like Maulana Bhashani to 
cooperate with him. Bhashani during an interview with Tariq AH told : 
"Mao said to me that at the present time China's 
relationship with Pakistan v/as extremely fragile and 
that US and Russia and India would do their utmost to 
break this relationship" 
He said : 
"You are our friends and if at the present you continue 
your struggle against the Ayub Govt., it will only 
strengthen the hands of Russia, America and India. It is 
against our principles to interfere with your work, but 
we would advise you to proceed slowly and carefully. 
Give us a chance to deepen our friendship with your 
government". "' 
For Chinese India was principle contradiction in South Asia so they held the 
need to counter Indian influence more important than achieving their 
ideological objectives in Pakistan. Geographically China is continental 
country surrounded by mountains and waters. There are a number of regions 
around the Chinese heartland, such as Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet. 
Beyond these Chinese borders touch mighty (former) Soviet Union, almost 
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shares 4500 miles border with it. Besides its borders with South East Asian 
countries, China has border with India and some other countries of the 
Indian sub-continent. Among its autonomous regions, Sinkiang and Tibet 
had remained source of anxiety. The proximity of these two regions to the 
Soviet Union and Indian subcontinent looms large in the geopolitics of 
China. Sinkiang is strategically located in Central Asian region. Besides its 
strategic importance for China, the region is rich in mineral resources hence 
has a vast potential for Industrial development.^^ The majority of the 
population in Sinkiang belongs to non-Hans race such as hazakhs, kirghizis, 
Uzbeks and Tartars. These races have always shown their desire for 
independence and identity. In past they have revolted against the Chinese 
central government. ^ Despite Sinkiang's integration into the peoples 
Republic of China as an autonomous region, the people have not given up 
their independent struggle.^'' 
Moreover, Indian sub-continent has a greater importance due to its 
strategic location among world's great powers. It has greater value for China 
than other powers of the world. The strategic location of Pakistan has 
always catched the interest of great powers. China's policy makers have also 
calculated the strategic value of Pakistan. Chinese leaders were always 
apprehensive about Muslim population of Sinkiang that they may raise a 
demand for annexation to their socalled homeland of Muslims which was 
Pakistan in the subcontinent. There have been instances when the Muslims 
of Sinkiang demonstrated the affinity existing between themselves and 
Pakistanis. On the Death of Mohammad AH Jinnah, Chinese Muslims had 
sent a telegram of condolence to the Pakistan government describing him as 
the "beloved leader of Muslims all over the world.^^ The lat'e Mohammad 
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Emin Bugra, a noted leader of the Turkestan Movement made references to 
the affinity existing between the Muslims of Sinkiang and Pakistan in his 
book, in terms of religion, the manner of living, marriage and burial 
ceremonies and general moral outlook.^^ The Turki language spoken in 
many parts of north west China has much in common with languages spoken 
in West Pakistan. So there are some cultural affinities which seems China 
have also taken into consideration while framing its Pakistan policy. 
Superpower factor : Because of strategic location of the sub-continent both 
the super powers desired the friendship of South Asian countries mostly of 
India and Pakistan, confronted with the necessity of choice, former USSR 
preferred India. Her choice making became simpler when Pakistan made 
herself unavailable by joining an American anti-Soviet alliance and India 
gave her "non alignment'' a pro-Moscow bias.'°° The ideological schism 
w^hich developed after the Stalin's death assured alarming proportions, and 
differences got further widened over their approach to non-aligned India. 
India's non-partisan stand on world issues like Korean crisis and on other 
occasions was a welcome matter for former Soviet union. Former Soviet 
Unions foreign aid to India and other non-aligned countries was condemned 
by China. Finding that Pakistan too was not happy on Soviet aid to India 
China wooed, Islamabad. 
The United States was considered by China an enemy till late 1960's 
and in ideological terms it continued to be so. Recognition of China and 
Korean crisis deteriorated the relation between the two. When USA tried to 
isolate China politically and economically during the 1950"s and in 1960's 
through SEATO and other measures like moral and material support to India 
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in its struggle against China, China perceived that United States and the 
Soviet Union had developed a convergence of interests on India. China tried 
to make Pakistan a negotiator between two enemies - China and USA, so as 
to loose the grip on its throat of two superpowers. China abandoned its 
earlier negative approach towards Pakistan's relationship with the United 
States. And China became no more concerned with its policy of minimizing 
US influence in South Asia. At this time among all the great powers, China 
alone was having lively sense of stake in Pakistan's continued existence as 
an independent state in southern Asia. So super power factor has also been 
relevant to China's Pakistan policy. 
Chinas relations with Pakistan during 1950's and upto 1963 shows a 
trend of power politics. Ideology played a minimum role in that time. Both 
kept ideology in a low key. The demands of realpolitic played the maximum 
role. Some scholars have even said that China was having some 
revolutionary objectives in Pakistan but the first ideological objective of 
China now seems would have been to get a foot hold in Pakistan and wait 
for favourable conditions to export Chinese model in Pakistan. Because the 
Chinese leadership under Mao Tse-Tung started building China as a model 
of political and socio-economic development. As China was not in favour of 
the established Indian model which was combination of the qualities of 
western liberalism, democracy and the soviet type of socialism. So it was an 
example at that time for developing countries to emulate Indian model 
which was quite successful. India's considerable progress during 1950's in 
economic, social and political fields above all the recognition of its non-
aligned policy from both the then superpowers caused a serious concern to 
China. So China tried to fish in the troubled waters - Indo-Pak hostility. 
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To keep things hot China began to exploit Indo-Pakistan disputes 
with the intention to weaken the position of two South Asian countries. This 
can be understood from Chinese refraining from making any public 
commitment over Kashmir what it had earlier assured to the Indian 
authorities privately that it accepts the Indian position in Kashmir. Chou En-
Lai told the Indian ambassador in Peking, R.K. Nehru on 16"^  March that 
China believed that the people of Kashmir had already expressed their 
wishes in regard to their future status and Peking subsequently asked New-
Delhi to point out any Chinese statement which questioned the Indian 
position in Kashmir." '^ But Chou-en lai and the late S.D. Bandaranaike, 
prime Minister of Ceylon, in a joint statement on 5^ ^ Feb. 1957 expressed 
their distress at "the unfortunate situation arised in the dispute between 
Pakistan and India in regard to Kashmir and appealed both India and 
Pakistan to settle this problem peacefully. 
It could very well be understood that they studiedly avoided a public 
commitment so as to take advantage of the dispute at later stage if it became 
necessary which infact served their interest with Pakistan very well. 
STRATEGIC INTEREST : 
Chinese interests in Pakistan in terms of power were not economic 
but political and strategic. Pakistan was in no sense an attractive market for 
China nor it could serve a source of qualitative and quantitative raw 
material. On the other side Chinese strategic concern's in Pakistan were 
visible. This is a fact that Sinkiang and Tibet are contiguous to the Indian 
subcontinent and China's hold over them is precarious'°"' Chinese strategic 
interest in Pakistan increased because of the possession of certain areas of 
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Kashmir by it. The location of this part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir is in a 
region where the former Soviet Union, China, India, and Afghanistan meet 
together."''' It seems China would have calculated it how far Pakistan can be 
useful to it against India and Soviet Union. 
No doubt Pakistan was not any potential threat to Chinese security in 
terms of an armed clash. However possibility of a Pakistan carrying out 
subversive activities seemed to have entered Chinese calculations. As 
mentioned earlier that Muslims are in majority in Sinkiang and they also 
involve Soviet Union which had long borders with a number of Asian 
countries. China always tried to have smooth diplomatic relations with 
Pakistan so as to avert the situation where Pakistan can be utilized against it 
by Soviet Union. Thus Pakistan figures in the defence of China's southern 
flank. 
Political Interest 
Politically China was always obsessed with its policy of becoming 
superpower. For achieving this status China thought its first step to be the 
leader of Asia. In the Chinese eyes India appeared as their main rival for the 
leadership in Asia. As New Delhi's policy of non-Alignment and struggle 
for relaxation of international tension stood as an obstacle in China's way to 
achieve its hegemonistic aims. India's growing prestige and increasing 
popularity of its policies in third v/orld were not to the liking of Chinese. 
Chinese being well aware of Indo-Pak hostility made no delay to fish in 
troubled waters. Chinese noted that since Pakistan's inception it is suffering 
from a parity syndrome vis-a-vis India, for that it has always invited external 
involvement in this region. Hence, China set before itself an objective of 
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making use of Pakistan to undermine India's influence and power. Although 
it was friendly with New Delhi earlier but cooperation turned into conflict. 
With the deterioration of relations between China and India the rivalry 
became manifest and open. China in order to befriend to countries of Asia 
and Africa raised a slogan of Afro-Asian solidarity. This move by China was 
motivated to undermine Indian prestige by the help of Pakistan and 
Indonesia. It was also projected by China that Afro Asian solidarity is a 
campaign against the super powers under its leadership. 
As we know since beginning China was opposed to the extension of 
US influence in Asia particularly South Asia. China decided to gradually 
wean Pakistan away from the United states by patient and persistent 
persuasion so as to undermine the US influence in Asia. 
India factor : India is next to China from the population point of view in 
the world. Every power of the world had to take India into consideration 
before formulating a meaningful policy towards this region. As India has 
potential to become a world power, and its active role in world politics had 
always been disliked by China. It is fact that both the superpowers of that 
time were trying on India to become their friend. But India very tactfully 
avoided them without breaking relations with them. It projected its non-
aligned policy to keep the superpowers at bay. Still China viewed India as a 
stooge of the v/estern imperialists and capitalists. It was against India's 
policy of non-alignment. It held it irrational. 
However, India's friendly overtures, like immediate recognition to 
Peking government, subsequent acquiescence of Chinese occupation of 
Tibet after earlier dissent and persistent backup of China's entry into United 
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nations at a time when it was shunned by the world body made China to 
adopt a pragmatic attitude towards New Delhi. 
Inspite, the show of friendliness by China towards India, the Chinese 
were alive to clash of interests with India. The conflict of interests flowed 
from the pledge of communists government before coming to power of 
territorial consolidation. In the list of such territories were included certain 
areas of India also. Inspite of the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement of 
friendship in 1954. both China and India remained unhappy over their 
unresolved borders.'°^ Several times Nehru tried to raise the question but 
China never showed its genuine desire to discuss it. 
Towards the close of I950's the Chinese began to perceive that India 
was becoming an area of convergence of interests between the two 
superpowers'°^ to isolate China. This perception of China was further 
strengthened by holding the conference of non-aligned Nations at Belgrade 
in 1961 and its implied recognition by both the superpowers. Nehru's stress 
for world peace was also viewed by China a counter to their policies. 
Moreover China never liked the Indian model of development and its 
growing importance in the world affairs. 
Hence China gradually perceived India as a rival and decided to 
undermine its power, prestige and growing influence. Chinese limited and 
calibrated military action against India is a manifestation of it. China also 
started a campaign of vilification against India. Pakistan who is a born 
enemy of India was taken by China as a natural ally against India. China 
converged its interests with Pakistan for strangulating India. China found 
opportunity to take advantage of the Indo-Pakistan quarrel, for making a 
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friend of the enemy of your enemy. Moreover friendly relations with India's 
neighbours was one way of isolating India as much as possible as well as 
useful demarcation that China was reasonable and friendly nation.'"'' 
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Chapter - 2 
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O^datlons (1949-65) 
Chapter- 2 
REVIEW OF THE EMERGENCE OF SINO-PAKISTAN 
RELATIONS (1949-65) 
In the 1950's, China was correct but cool towards Pakistan, from 
1955 onwards sometimes Sino-Pakistan relation showed warmth despite 
Pakistan's membership of SEATO. Although China was expressing regret of 
Pakistan's membership of this aggressive military alliance. It is also 
pertinent to note that China's disapproval was not so violent or threatening 
as of India. Even in the hey days of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai China was not 
ready to sacrifice relation's with Pakistan for the sake of Indian friendship. 
China in the days of friendship with India never endorsed India's claim on 
Kashmir. It even refused to discuss the frontier between it and Pakistani held 
Kashmir, when boundary talks with India began in 1960. This refusal simply 
stated that China was recognizing Kashmir as a disputed area. 
The diplomatic dialogue between the two Prime Ministers was a 
constructive step towards the normalization of ties. Chou-en lai got an 
enthusiastic welcome on his return visit to Pakistan after the Prime Minister 
H.S. Suharwardy's visit to China in 1956. The joint communique issued at 
the end of his visit stated : 
The difference between the political systems of 
Pakistan and China and the divergence of views on 
many problems should not prevent a strengthening of 
friendship between the two countries. Both the 
leaders reaffirmed their earlier conviction that with a 
view to promoting, further the cordial and friendly 
relations between Pakistan and China, due 
importance should be given to the commercial and 
cultural relations.' 
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They were happy that there was no real conflict of interests between 
the two countries. However, during 1955-1960 Pakistan bowed to the US 
pressure. It supported American stand to postphone action on the question of 
China's entry into the U.N. which it had earlier supported in 1949. It was 
only after two weeks of the return of the H.S. Suharwardy from China on 14 
November 1956, Pakistan voted in the steering committee of the General 
Assembly in favour of U.S. resolution that sought to exclude the question of 
Chinese representation from the agenda of the United Nations. While 
explaining its voting in the U.N., a feeble explanation was given by Karachi 
that "the present was not the opportune moment to press for the Chinese seat 
in the U.N. and that in its opinion, the admission of China should be brought 
about at a time when such action would lessen rather than enhance 
international tension.^ As a token of her genuine desire to be more friendly 
with China, Pakistan could have backed the move in 1956 to seat Peking in 
the UN. This gesture preceded by H.S. Suhrawardy's visit to China would 
have convinced the Chinese leaders of the sincerity of Pakistan regarding 
the question of forging a friendly tie v/ith her communist neighbour. 
However Chinese keenness to secure the goodwill of Pakistan at that time 
was fully understandable if one looked at it against the background of India-
China borders, the Sino-Soviet ideological rift which started in 1956 and the 
grov/ing Indo-Soviet friendship.'* Astute Chou en lai had earlier visualized 
the emerging power politics in the Indian subcontinent, involving India, 
Pakistan and China and in advance planned the strategy of keeping Pakistan 
on the list of those countries with whom China might have to maintain 
apparently good relations out of sheer diplomatic necessity. In his 
conversation with Suharwardy, Chou not only restated that China did not 
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consider the membership of the SEATO as a bar to more friendly relations 
between the two countries but reassured the Pakistani Prime Minister not to 
be scared of China because "the two countries do not have any conflict of 
interests". "Pakistan and China have many things in common", he added.^  
When the parliamentary democracy came to an end in Pakistan and 
the military regime of Ayub Khan emerged, the relations between the two 
were at the lowest ebb. But in 1960's, the earlier critic of Chinese policies -
Ayub Khan became the architect of friendship with China. He forsightedly, 
assured his western allies that Pakistan would follow a clear and 
unambiguous path^ Ayub Khan dwelled again and again on "dangers of the 
North" at the time of Himalayan crisis that began in 1959. His scheme of 
joint defence with India against communist countries was outrightly rejected 
by Nehru. Because he was not v^ -illing to sacrifice non-alignment through a 
military arrangement with a member of SEATO and CENTO. ^ Nehru 
ridiculed the idea of joint defence "I do not understand, when people say 
"let us have a joint defence - against whom?^ Actually before the armed 
conflicts of 1959 between Chinese and the Indian forces on border Nehru 
sought to retain the goodvk'ill of China. Though Nehru's rejection could not 
prevent the subsequent Pakistan-China unity. 
The year 1959, v^ 'as not only a crucial year for Sino-Indian 
disenchantment, it also marked the lowest ebb in Sino-Pakistani relations. 
Chinese were cynical about Ayub's proposal for joint defence with India and 
his harsh anti-communist speeches in this time. But the Chinese perceived 
that Ayub's scheme of joint defence with India was intended not merely to 
send off China but also to please America. They knew that Ayub was 
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satisfied, that Nehru would reject it. Thus if they protested the defence 
proposals, they did not attempt to settle the relations with Rawalpindi that 
had been showing some signs of improvement since the Bandung 
Conference. In .Tuly 1963 Ayub told his western allies that their new policy 
in South Asian would lead the smaller powers of the region to look to China 
for protection.'° 
If it is assumed that Pakistan's foreign policy is determined largely by 
her feelings or military insecurity vis-a-vis India ... it is not difficuh to 
understand how policies followed by the Soviet Union and United States 
may literally have driven. Pakistan into the arms of the Peking regime. The 
relative caution with which the Pakistan government pursued there cause 
indicates that there was by no means uniformity of enthusiasm for the policy 
change and that the intent was not the achievement of a full scale alliance 
with China but rather the obtaining of leverage which might dissuade the 
other powers from their Indian policies." 
EMERGING ENTENTE : 
China had always been polite if not ardent in its contacts with 
Pakistan. In time Pakistan-China Bhai-Bhai superseded Hindi-Chini Bhai 
Bhai, and Pakistan claimed the unique distinction for a non-communist 
country of enjoying a positive intimate relationship with communist China. 
If Pakistan had no complaints about the Chinese - attitude on Kashmir and 
military assistance to India being the two main criteria by which it evaluated 
the friendliness of a country - the Chinese were disturbed by Pakistan's 
stand on their entry into the U.N., consideration of the Tibet question at the 
UN, the status of Formosa, and few other issues. 
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After the Bogra-Chou talks at Bandung cultural contacts between 
China and Pakistan expanded rapidly. During 1955-56 hardly a month 
passed without a delegation of Pakistani and Chinese dignitaries visiting the 
other side. They included politicians, parliamentarians, lawyers, 
industrialists, writers, artists, public officials, and even Mullah's. The 
Chinese visitors left a favourable impression with Pakistani audiences and 
built a popular goodwill which latter became a determining factor in 
Pakistan's China policy. On their return from China, Pakistani dignitaries 
spoke of the Chinese Muslims, religions freedom, referred to China's rapid 
strides in the fields of technological and economic development, and praised 
the sense of mission, devotion and selflessness of her leaders. Returning 
from a similar visit Mohammad Ali told an audience in Dacca '"if democracy 
means rule by discussion, real democracy exists in China. He added that 
Islam was freer in China than elsewhere because Muslims have no worries 
to disturb their minds. They enjoyed religions freedom, and their social 
customs were respected.'" 
Chou En-Lai and other senior communist officials emphasized that 
there were no conflicts of interests between Pakistan and China; both were 
developing countries, facing similar problems, with much to learn from each 
others experiences; both were devoted to the principles of peace adopted at 
Bandung; cooperation between them could be strengthened despite their 
different social systems and their different views on "certain international 
questions"'.''' 
Pakistan increased the favour by gradually switching sides on the 
U.N. entry issue. In 1961 Pakistan finally broke with the Americans on the 
• * \ \ 
membership question, where Pakistan abstained from voting andtwa^years 
later Pakistan voted for the entry of PRC and from^"^^65>thp0u^^jii971, when 
the place of the peoples Republic was secured, Pakistan cosponsored the 
resolutions for the permanent seat of the Security Council in the United 
Nations. 
The biggest road block to better Sino-Pak relations also ended in 
1965 with the declaration of Pakistan's diplomat in U.N. General Assembly 
that "Tiwan is an integral part of China". Subsequently Pakistan decided to 
shun international conferences and meetings held in Formosa and to host no 
conference that Taiwanese representatives might attend. 
Major Political Concerns: 
Regarding Kashmir, Pakistan received some limited satisfaction from 
China. Unlike Soviet Union, China did not concede that Kashmir belonged 
to India. It appeared to Pakistani leaders to be very significant that one of 
the communist giants, despite its close alliance with the Soviet union, had 
studiously refrained from following its big brothers line so far as the 
question of Kashmir was concerned. And this moment Pakistan was greatly 
disturbed by the Soviet and United States "indifferent" attitude to this vital 
question. This was undoubtedly irritating to Pakistan. After all, Kashmir was 
the barometer of her foreign policy "let it not be forgotten" proclaimed a 
responsible Pakistani leader, "that Kashmir is the touchstone of the success 
and failure of Pakistan as a nation before its people and before the people of 
the world.''' Prime Minister Suhrawardy told the something, of course, in a 
different context : "I may tell you that most of our foreign policy depends 
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upon Kashmir question and if they (some Muslim countries) are with us on 
Kashmir, they are with us in foreign policy.' 
Chinese neutral approach obviously made Pakistan to think as to why 
a communist country against whom she has aligned herself with the western 
military bloc should not resort to retaliation by taking side in the Kashmir 
dispute. But beyond this neutral approach of China it would also appear that 
they wished to see that the dispute is settled between the two countries as 
was evident from the fact that Chinese welcomed the Bogra-Nehru 
Agreement in 1953 to have talks on holding a Kashmir plebiscite. However, 
China ruled out any UN intervention in solving the Kashmir dispute because 
it held UN at that time a mere instrumentality of the United States, who 
wanted to convert Kashmir into a colony and a military base. The peoples 
daily had something agreeable... for both sides. It endorsed the right of the 
people of Jammu and Kashmir alone to determine their own fate and future. 
It is clear that at this time the Chinese were not concerned with the specifics 
of any settlement that India and Pakistan might make, the}' wanted, first and 
foremost, to exclude western influence from the affairs of the subcontinent. 
It can be said that Chinese were looking at Indo-Pakistani disputes from 
their own and not Pakistani, perspective. It is also held that China kept its 
card secret perhaps to open it at the opportune movement and it should not 
be forgotten China too had some direct interest in the determination of the 
fate of Kashmir. It was the strategic importance of this particular part of 
India, which China could not afford to overlook.''' 
For sheer proximity of Kashmir to region of Soviet Central Asia, the 
place has a special appeal to China apart from its nearness to Delhi. The 
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control of Kashmir by a power friendly to China would have been a great 
strategic advantage to Peking not only for a India-China-Pakistan triangle in 
South but also in case of a likely Sino-Soviet conflict in Central Asia. 
Perhaps for all these strategic considerations China preferred to adopt a wait 
and watch policy and reserved its stand on the future developments of the 
Kashmir dispute. Chinese also wanted first and foremost, to exclude western 
influence from the affairs of the sub-continent. It seems they would have 
welcomed a settlement regardless of which side come out winning as long as 
it was accomplished without western participation. 
It can be said that there were no reasons for Pakistanis to expect a 
more favourable Chinese stand towards their problems with India. It is 
worth mentioning that Chinese were always blaming the West, rather than 
India, for the impasse in Kashmir. In view of China's neutralism and 
Russia's openly anti-Pakistan stand. Dawn observed that it was the 
communist world, not the west, that hoped to gain from the continuance of 
Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.'^ Speaking in the national Assembly in 
September, 1958, Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noor lamented that the two 
"great powers" - China and Russia - had done nothing to promote a 
peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem.'^ In March 1958, during the 
debate on Kashmir, it was suggested by some members of the Pakistan 
National Assembly that China should be cultivated to impress upon the 
western allies that without all out support on Kashmir they would not be 
able to obtain Pakistan's friendship.^° 
It was, however, only when the seeds of the Indo-China conflict 
began to sprout and border tension between the two reached at crisis 
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proportions that China began to move towards the Pakistani side of the 
issue. In the same debate Pakistan's then Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noor 
had told the National Assembly that China refused to intervene in the 
dispute and advised for bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan 
and as, such, no help could be expected from Peking. 
Infact, China was keeping its options open with regard to Kashmir, 
and was not prepared to take any stand, rather it was busy in occupying 
some areas of Kashmir without the knowledge of the Indian government to 
strengthen its hold over Tibet and Sinkiang. At this juncture, Chinese 
leaders did not think it wise to take any stand on Kashmir. Thus, Pakistan 
and China failed to attain political understanding on this issue. 
Pakistan's position on the issue of Chinese importance - their 
induction in U.N. was ambivalent. Outside the UN, Pakistan newsmen, 
politicians, and even government officials declared in favour of admitting 
communist China. For example Pakistani ambassador in Peking at an 
Independence Day reception in 1955 told his guests, including Chou, that 
Pakistan is both in and outside the government wished to see China; restored 
to her 'legitimate position" in the UN.~^ It led to the speculation that despite 
its pro-US attitude Pakistan would eventually support Peking's claim to 
China's seat in the United Nations. This is what the Pakistan's Foreign 
Minister Hamidul Huq Chaudhri, said "we have always been of the viev/ 
that to create a stabilizing influence in South and South East Asia, the 
admission of the China into UN is necessary". Suhrawardy's China visit 
also generated some optimism for the facilitation of each others matters. 
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But despite these declarations of sympathy when the time came, the 
Pakistani delegate, at the UN, dutifully supported, year after year, the 
American move to postpone consideration of the question of China's 
admission. It is interesting to note that in January 1954 Pakistan called an 
explanation of its High Commissioner in UK because he made a statement in 
favour of China's admission in the United Nation. 
The shift in Pakistani attitude was in line with the US policy towards 
the PRC. Obviously Peking did not like it. China considered it as "double 
dealing" tactics of extending recognition to the China v/hile at the same time 
ignoring China at the United Nations and, as such it was regarded as an 
unfriendly act".^^ A Pakistani writer claimed that "Chinese diplomats 
privately complained that Prime Minister Suhrawardy's actions vis-a-vis 
Sino Pakistani relations were not in harmony with the professions of 
friendship which he had made to the Chinese during his visit to China in 
October 1956.^ ^ It was on account of these unfriendly acts of Pakistan, 
China sent a protest note on July 21, 1959 in which it listed several causes 
of Chinese grievances against Pakistan. Among the important issues on 
which Pakistan was alleged to have adopted extremely unfriendly attitude 
were Pakistan's voting pattern in U.N., reception to the Taiwanese Haj 
mission, and Pakistan's attitude towards the Tibetan question. China 
mounted pressure on Pakistan by violating air space of Pak occupied 
Kashmir. 
Ayub's Initial Phase : 
By temperament Ayub Khan was less respectful to ideologies like 
communism or liberal Democracy. The policies and activities of the 
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communist countries always aroused his suspicion. Although the downward 
trend in Sino-Pak relations continued through the first two years of his 
presidency. After observing the situation quickly he sought a shift in the 
countries foreign policy. He criticized the earlier governments for having 
needlessly restrained Pakistan's relations with the countries such as the 
USSR and China. 
He sought to pursue a policy that Pakistan' interests and geography 
dictated. He also referred that there is no external friend or eternal enemy 
but eternal interest only. To UK and the USA Ayub Khan was the most 
competent and dependable man, capable of providing stability to the 
chronically unstable Muslim country in South Asia.^' As Commander in 
Chief during the 1953-54' Ayub had taken a leading part in the negotiations 
that eventuated in Pakistan's alliance with the United States. The level of 
Pakistan China relations fell when anti-communist posture of Ayub in the 
field of foreign policy began to take a definite shape. At home he arrested all 
the communists and their sympathisers and sent them behind bars alongwith 
the pro-Chinese leader's, Maulana Bhasani of East Pakistan and Faiz Ahmad 
Faiz. The conclusion of a bilateral Pak-US defence Aareement on 5"^  March 
1959 dispelled doubts regarding the exact nature of the Pakistani policy. 
In this period three issues strained the relations between China and 
Pakistan. The Chinese suppression of the revolt in Tibet, her interpretation 
of certain Pakistani actions and Statements as implying support of a two 
China policy, and Ayub Khan's proposal for joint defence arrangement 
between India and Pakistan. And as stated earlier, that when Pakistani 
foreign Minister received the Taiwan Haj delegation to Karachi in July 
1959, China lodged a protest with Pakistan for interfering in China's 
internal affairs. China grew more critical of Ayub regime after the Pak-US 
bilateral agreement of 5 March, 1959, to resist aggression direct or 
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indirect,", without specifying whether communist or not. Chma 
vociferously condemned it as an act of blackmail and double edged weapon 
directed against China, as also "such nationally independent countries as 
29 
India, Iraq and Afganistan. 
However in sharp contrast to this period of stresses and strains, the 
Chinese latter, gave a clear chit to the Ayub regime and averred that ever 
since president Ayub's coming to power, the relations between the two 
countries improved steadily. Pertinently Sino-Pak relations showed a thaw 
in late 1959, and improved in the following year; the Chinese ambassador in 
Delhi held a veiled threat of two fronts to the Indian Foreign office, whereas 
the president Ayub in the autumn threatened to go and "sleep with the 
devil.^ ^ 
China and Pakistan as we know had nothing in common, their 
ideology, form of Government and in foreign policy except both see, India 
as an impediment to their designs. It is a kind of negative unity which China 
and Pakistan are having against India. This aspect was highlighted by India 
as "Collusion". The initiative for this collusion came from Pakistan who had 
been on the look out for any stick to beat India. When there were possibility 
of clash between Sino-Indian forces after the movement of Chinese troops in 
August 1959 to Longju in NEFA and in Ladakh, Ayub Khan made an 
abortive attempt to make Nehru agree to cede Pakistani claims on Kashmir. 
At that time he also thought to have some deal with China. 
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President Ayub looked into the maps and previous papers and decided 
to be guided not by tradition and established boundary but by "actual line of 
control"."' which gave him sufficient flexibility to make adjustments with 
the Chinese. As Pakistan had no compunction in parting with the Pakistan 
occupied Kashmir territory, which juridically did not belong to her. On 23, 
October 1959 he told news men of his resolve to approach China for a 
settlement of the border Question. He said Pakistan did not want to get 
involved in a border dispute with China. While making this move it seems, 
that Ayub Khan might have assumed that China might be willing to get 
involved in the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir and will accept 
Pakistan's suggestion and even if China got involved in Indo-Pakistani 
affairs, it would cause serious concerns to the US and they would be 
compelled to put pressure on India to settle the Kashmir question. But to 
Ayub Khan's dismay neither China was in hurry to respond to the Pakistani 
suggestion''' nor were the western countries prepared to make any serious 
effort to resolve the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan's satisfaction. Pakistan 
decided to make serious efforts to have border negotiations with China when 
it saw that there is no immediate possibility of a solution of Kashmir. 
The Indus water Treaty of September 1960 between India and 
Pakistan prompted the Chinese to have second thoughts about Pakistani 
offer of border negotiation''"' but at the same time Chinese were not ready to 
change their stand on Kashmir and acquiesce in Pakistan's occupation of a 
part or whole of Kashmir. In January, 1961, Pakistans Foreign Minister 
Manzur Qadir disclosed the agreement with the Chinese to conduct 
negotiations for the demarcation of their borders with Pakistan occupied 
Kashmir."''' 
There were certain reasons why Ayub Khan showed relative coolness 
tow'ards China in his first two years of power. Actually he was very hopeful 
that stronger American might finally lead to a solution of the problem of 
Kashmir, hence he did not respond Chinese diplomacy and astuteness to 
establish a normal and viable relationship with Peking. It was really 
disappointing to Peking, but Pakistan's mood of exasperation with the Ayub 
regime was never so acute as to make it completely alienated from Pakistan 
(without looking at its own greater interest). 
The decision makers in China had known fully well that in view of its 
worsening relations with India, Pekings stake in the friendship of Pakistan, 
the only power in the sub-continent which had access to Indian ocean, was 
naturally high and under no circumstances, it could allow Pakistan by its 
hostile posture to go closer to India and to form a joint axis against China. 
Peking though that neither logic nor diplomacy would suggest alienation 
from a neighbour who was India's enemy.^ ^ 
Peking was aware that its main adversary- is United States the 
protagonist of military pacts against it, so it would be totally undiplomatic to 
adopt a hostile posture towards Pakistan, that might lead to further 
enhancement of US influence over the policy of Pakistan. When in 1961 
Chinese ambassador saw president Ayub and told him about the support for 
the Chinese entry into the U.N. on simple majority basis than on 2/3 
majority, President Ayub took up the matter. 
"I asked him about our suggestions of demarcating 
the undefined border between China and Pakistan. He 
said that was a very complicated matter. I told him 
that if border demarcation was a very complicated 
matter, China's admission to the U.N. was even more 
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complicated. I expressed surprise that proposal to 
demarcate the border between China and Pakistan has 
evoked no response. I think the Chinese ambassador 
was impressed by what I told him". 
By early 1961, however, China was already beginning to explore 
ways to improve relations with Pakistan. On January 15, 1961, it was 
announced by Pakistani foreign Minister that China was willing to discuss 
demarcation of borders with Pakistan. This was strange because China and 
Pakistan did not have any border in common. What they had in common was 
border between Pakistan occupied Kashmir and China. Earlier the Chinese 
position was that since its (Kashmir's) accession to India, Kashmir was a 
part of India. But the Chinese willingness to negotiate with Pakistan on 
Kashmir China border implied that Peking's stand has changed. Yet Chou en 
lai said to the secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 
R.K. Nehru, in Peking : can you cite any document to show that we have 
ever said that Kashmir is not a part of India."'^  
Foreign Policy Shift: 
By the closing of 1961 the international situation was beginning to 
change. A crack in the monolithic structure of communist bloc was 
worsening and China in pursuance of her interests was trying to come out in 
the world in search of friends. Under this changed political context the 
leaders of Pakistan also feh the need of re-adjustment and reappraisal. They 
could no longer treat China with causality after China's growing hostility 
with Soviet Union. India, China hostility, however, greatly enhanced the 
prospects of China-Pakistan relations. It was shrewedly calculated, it seems 
in Pakistan that if in India-China rivalry, Peking were given adequate 
support, Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India would be definitely strengthened 
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on the diplomatic front. The Sino Indian relations had already been moving 
away from panchasheela and brotherly cooperation towards confrontation. 
The assumption of office by John F. Kennedy in the USA and his 
decision to help democratic India by way of giving large economic and 
military assistance in order to build up her defence potential against the 
Chinese ambition in Asia.^ ^ Kennedy tried to ensure India's leadership role 
in Asia and a strong counterpoise against China. This decision of Kennedy 
administration ran counter to the basic assumption of Pakistan's foreign 
policy that the military parity in her strength vis-a-vis India was being 
maintained by her receipt of military aid from the west, particularly from the 
U.S. So U.S. decision to aid India made that assumption seriously fallible. 
Thus the momentous decision of US administration hastened Karachi to turn 
its eyes towards China. 
Pakistan's leaders watched with dismay that neutral India would 
receive so much consideration from the United States because of Chinese 
threat while as Pakistan which had cost her lot with the free world would be 
taken for granted by Washington as if the latter had no obligation towards 
the permanent ally. Interestingly President Ayub started leaning towards 
China in the beginning of sixties contrary to the expectations of the Chinese 
leadership who were believing after the assumption of power by Ayub that 
Sino-Pakistan cordial relation is impossible.^ ^ The Sino-Soviet rift which 
surfaced in I960 added a new dimension to the Sino-Pakistan relations. 
The Chinese started thinking on the new lines and showed more 
interest in cementing their country's ties with Pakistan. The foreign policy 
by the Ayub government was severely criticized and it was argued by the 
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critics that for the development of Pakistan, the cooperation of other 
countries was essential and in their opinion China was the most suitable one. 
The Pakistan China lobby was led by Altaf Hussain, editor of the influential 
English daily, "The Dawn" and M.A.H. Isphani/*^ 
Pakistan, who was in search of an opportunity to achieve its main 
foreign policy objectives in the early sixties i.e. to hold out a hand of 
friendship to China and to humiliate and isolate India from two sides. 
Sino-India war and Sino-Pak Coexistence : 
The opportunity for which Pakistan was wary came in 1962 when the 
Sino Indian war broke out. The US and the other western countries 
condemned Chinese attack. The Washington post wrote that India is in a 
great peril than it had been at any time since its independence, ... if India 
requests military assistance from the U.S., 'help to the limit of prudence 
should be given. It is a fact that at that time United States supported India at 
the risk of alienating Pakistan.'* President Makarios of Cyprus condemned 
the Chinese"attack on India as "unprovoked and unjustified" and Dr. N.M. 
Pesera, of the Lanka Sama Samaj party said that the Chinese attack on India 
was a major disaster, for the cause of Asian solidarity and posed the simple 
question : "What is it China has gained by this except losing the goodwill of 
the whole of Asia? " 
Ignoring the distress of Asian countries over the Sino-Indian border 
conflict, Peking leaders systematically began to fan anti India sentiment in 
Pakistan and thus created new tensions in the Indian subcontinent. They 
began to hint to the Pakistani ruling circles, particularly those with an 
adventurous temperament, that in the event of any conflict between Pakistan 
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and India, there will be full support from Peking. That was the reason then 
Pakistani foreign Minister boasted in a speech to the National Assembly on 
July 17, 1963, that an attack from India on Pakistan was no longer confined 
to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on 
Pakistan involved the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in 
Asia."*^  But the irony was that Peking fiirted with Ayub Khan's autocratic 
regime in Pakistan and denounced the Indian government as "reactionary 
nationalist". The dominating factor in the Chinese aggression against India 
was its dogmatic line; cooperation with pro imperialist and anti-democratic 
Pakistan was a matter of expediency. Pakistan's no response and non-
seriousness on the Chinese aggression on India shows and makes it clear 
that Pakistan had prior knowledge of Chinese designs on India and its 
directions. Even Pakistani national Assembly could not hesitate to regard 
this aggression no more than a border warfare and would "be restricted to 
the area under dispute". President Ayub too while giving his expert opinion 
to the National Assembly on November 21, 1962, said, "China's aim would 
be limited because of the difficult terrain, the unkind weather and the 
difficuh lines of communications. China had no designs on the Indo-
gangetic plains".'*'* It seems that there was no clash of opinion between 
China and Pakistan, their main purpose was to force India to face military 
debacle under the joint Sino-Pakistan pressure on the border. 
Pakistan with its clear idea of the Sino-US interests in the conflict, 
indulged in caustic comments against India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared in 
the National Assembly that Pakistan had no enemity whatsoever with China, 
which was infact a great friend. It would be a folly on the part of anyone to 
think that Pakistan would go to India's help in its fight with China".'*^ 
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Against the liberation of Goa, Bhutto said in the National Assembly that the 
peoples Republic of China is no pimple on the face of India as was little 
Goa.''^  It was a colossus. 
Pakistan in its own way saw in the Chinese aggression an opportunity 
of seeing India's disintegration and had hoped that China would not end the 
war in a huff before ensuring complete success of its purpose. Chinese 
ceasefire declaration disappointed Pakistan beyond recovery. Bhutto 
lamented in the National Assembly "we could not for instance, anticipate the 
unilateral declaration of ceasefire by the people's Republic of China.''^  
After the outbreak of the war Pakistan Press and public opinion held 
India responsible for the confrontation. Pakistan's Foreign Minister 
Mohammad Ali Bugra while speaking to Pakistan National Assembly held 
India responsible for the conflict.'*^ Ayub Khan too underplayed the gravity 
of Chinese attack on India, to him the v/hole thing was a military absurdity. 
M.A.H. Isphani described Pakistani reaction to the Sino-India war as "'it 
would be hypocrisy to deny the joy which almost all Pakistanis felt at the 
Indian defeat. Some even thanked Allah for teaching their bullying 
neighbour a lesson of her life and at the same time bringing her down 
several pegs from her claim of leadership of Asia.^ ° 
There was another reason of Pakistani under estimation of Chinese 
aggression as mere border conflict that was the western arms aid to India for 
her defence against China, which was highly resented by Pakistan giving 
plea that there was no threat to India's security from China. It was largely a 
camouflage for getting more western weapons to be used against Pakistan.^' 
Pakistan's Foreign Minister while expressing his dissent to western arms aid 
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to India said that this would aggravate the situation rather than alleviate it. 
People of Pakistan became much worried after the western military aid to 
India, Z.A. Bhutto Pakistan's Foreign Minister made a lengthy statement in 
the National Assembly on the country's foreign policy. He described the pro 
Sino-Indian crisis period "perhaps the gravest one that the people of 
Pakistan are faced with" and as a result of the US aid to India Pakistan's 
foreign policy is in the process of being re-shaped". It was believed in 
Pakistan that the western countries particularly the U.S. had over-reacted to 
the crisis and they were not keen to settle Sino-Indian dispute in a peaceful 
manner. The main reason was the United States, had been provided an 
excellent opportunity "of making a powerful non-committal nation like India 
an ally in its avowed fight against world communism. 
Commenting on the unilateral ceasefire by China Pakistani foreign 
Minister observed that : 
We can not but applaud this action on the part of Chinese Prime 
Minister Cho-en lai and his associates and an evidence of their sincere 
desire to limit this conflict to the settlement of the boundary dispute.^^ 
Chinese could guess clearly how loud would be Pakistani shouting in 
its favour and to what level of dishonesty pindi rulers would stoop to defend 
Peking's ostentatious peace loving image. How Pakistani leaders were firm 
in their efforts against India. This can be seen here what Z.A. Bhutto said 
that Pakistan would not collaborate with India even if Kashmir dispute was 
resohed amicably, that friendship with China was a fundamental principle 
of Pakistan's foreign policy, and that we will not barter or bargain it away 
from anything.'-' By this enimity on the part of Pakistan towards India. 
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Chinese leaders feel assured that Pakistan's hostility towards India was 
patient and it would not submit to any western pressure to eventuality of 
India and Pakistan forming a joint front against China. 
Prime Minister Nehru in a brilliant exposition of the Sino-Pak 
duplicity once said: The fact that in the history of the world you will find 
very few examples of such deceit and duplicity as Pakistan has shown in 
siding with China in the dispute between India and China. It is an action 
singularly lacking in principles and can only be described as blackmail. 
Thus from the above analysis it can be said that Sino-India war had 
been a water-shed and starting point in Pakistan-China close relations. It 
brought a meaningful understanding between the two countries. Pakistan's 
reaction to Sino-India war and its sidedness with China had an impact on the 
future strategic axis between the two countries. 
ALLIANCE IN ACTION 
Community of fundamental interests brought Pakistan and China into 
a stable relationship which has exerted a profound influence on the 
contemporary politics of the sub-continent. It is obvious fact that 
Government of Pakistan supported Chinese during the 1962 war with India. 
What was more important than this moral support by Pakistan to China was 
the former's skilful attempt to embrass India during her crisis. At this time 
Pakistan announced her intention to negotiate her border problem with 
China. That part of Kashmir which has been under the occupation of 
Pakistan had nearly three hundred miles of common border with China. This 
border was not absolutely dead, it was sensitive and there had been reports 
of occasional disturbances in this region. In April 1953, Pakistan had 
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reinforced troops along the frontier as a consequence of China's violations 
of her Gilgit border. The very next year, Pakistan got hold of certain maps 
published in Beijing, showing the strategically important passes of Kilik, 
Mintaka, Khunjerab, and Shimsal which control access routes between 
Xinjiang and Hunza-Baltistan, as parts of Chinese territory.^'* Though the 
Pakistani leaders were aware that the borders that region had not been 
clearly demarcated^^ the Chinese cartographical claims puzzled them 
because these very areas shown in the Chinese maps as Chinese territory 
were known to them as definitely under the jurisdiction of Pakistan.^^ 
As mentioned earlier that the year 1959 was not marked by any Sino-
Pakistan cordiality and in this very year the Chinese cartographical claims 
against Pakistan and Chou's demand of 40,000 sq.miles of Indian territory, 
made on 08 September 1959 piqued Ayub so much that, in a press 
conference on 23 October he openly warned China that "dire consequences" 
would follow if the ''hovering giant cast a baleful shadow over Pakistan".^^ 
A few days earlier, the Foreign Minister Manzoor Quadir, informed that the 
Pakistan Government would not take any cognizance of Chinese maps that 
had shown the areas of Pakistan as Chinese territory. 
China's refusal to discuss boundary lines between Pakistan held 
Kashmir and the Chinese province of Sinkiang during the 1960's talks with 
the Indian's goaded Pakistan to suggest in a diplomatic note on March 28, 
1961, that China concluded with it a formal treaty on boundaries. However 
Pakistan's design to determine the boundary line with Sinkiang was first 
publicly voiced at on Oct. 28, 1959, news conference at which President 
Ayub said that Pakistan would approach China for a peaceful settlement. 
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The prolonged exchange of notes between Peking and Delhi after the 
emergence of border conflict between them led Pakistan further to think that 
she could easily exploit the situation arising from the Sino-Indian conflict to 
her own advantage, if her own border problem with China was settled. The 
Government of Pakistan sent its March 28, 1961, note through the Embassy 
in Peking, while on February 27, 1962 the Chinese government indicated 
willingness in a note delivered to Pakistani Embassy its readiness to reach 
"an agreed apprehension of the location and alignment of this boundary so 
as to prevent the tranquility on the border from being adversely affected on 
account of misunderstanding. 
After the Sino Indian war Ayub Khan felt that by drawing close to 
China, Pakistan could realize its objective of securing Kashmir with or 
without the western support. In order to exert pressure on Pakistan's western 
allies Pakistani leaders like Z.A. Bhutto declared that even if Indo-Pak talks 
resulted in a settlement of Kashmir dispute they would strengthen Pakistan's 
relations with China.^ '^  Within this framework Pakistan's China policy was 
formulated. Before arriving at this formulation Ayub Khan had made some 
gestures towards China as mentioned earlier. These Pakistani gestures were 
rewarded by China's agreeing to conduct negotiations for a provisional 
boundary agreement on 03 May, 1962. 
Reverting to the Kashmir problem, it may be pointed out that the 
Chinese leaders were apprehending lest the Indo-Pak talks on Kashmir 
mioht lead to setting up of Indo-Pak joint liont against China for which 
United States had been working since 1953 and Ayub Khan's proposal of 
joint defence was a link in the China. To forestall such a possibility Beijing 
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hastened the pace of its talks with Islamabad. On the eve of Indo-Pak talks it 
was announced that Pakistan and China had reached a complete agreement 
on the location and alignment of the boundary between Sinkiang and the 
areas of Kashmir under Pakistan's control. Obviously, it vitiated the 
atmosphere of Indo-Pak Talks, which ultimately resulted in failure. 
Consequently Pakistan and China signed the Sino-Pak-boundary Agreement 
on 2 March 1963. 
Under the Agreement, according to the Indian sources about 2050 
sq.miles territory was surrendered to China. But Pakistan denied this 
charge on the ground that the areas so ceded were not under its control and 
fell within the territory of Kashmir only on the map, an argument hardly 
tenable. According to Ayub Khan the "sole purpose of the agreement was to 
eliminate a possibility of conflict (Vk'ith China) in future.^ '* It means Sino-Pak 
friendship was founded on Pakistani fears vis-a-vis China. However the 
more weighty considerations were to seek China as a counter weight against 
India and to convey a message to the United States that Pakistan should not 
be taken for granted. 
It is probable that after the subsidence of initial anger aroused by the 
Chinese cartographical claim, the Pakistan leaders studied in detail the 
question of border with China and it seemed, they arrived at the conclusion 
that although the factual frontier existed between Pakistan and China the 
exact boundary had never been officially defined nor demarcated. Later this 
was publicly admitted by the Ayub Khan^ ^ as mentioned earlier. 
Subsequently on May 03. 1962, a joint statement confirmed that "the 
two sides have agreed to conduct negotiations so as to attain an agreed 
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understanding of the location and alignment of this boundary.'^ ^ It was made 
clear by China and Pakistan in the statement that this understanding is 
provisional : after settlement of the Indo-Pakistani Kashmir dispute the 
sovereign authorities concerned would negotiate a formal treaty. This stress 
on the provisional nature of the understanding was designed to deflect 
Indian insistence that no Sino-Pakistani agreements be reached on an area 
that was, according to New Delhi illegally possessed. More important, the 
agreement was provisional because both China and Pakistan considered 
Kashmir issue as unsettled. 
However, both China and Pakistan brushed aside the Indian protest 
notes as to the legality of the proposed transactions. China, however, 
reiterated her non-involvement in Kashmir question.^ ^ 
India strongly protested against the joint communique on the plea that 
as Pakistan had no common border with China because of Kashmir's 
accession to India, the Pakistan China talks would constitute an 
infringement of her sovereign right over Kashmir. 
The developments under reference werQ, first of all attributed to the 
peace-loving character of both governments: both wanted quite borders and 
good relations with all their neighbours. Pakistan had reached border 
agreements with Burma, and with Iran and had settled most of her border 
disputes with India. China had concluded similar agreements with Burma 
and Nepal. It was held in Pakistani news papers that Pekings troubles with 
India arose from the latters choice of a militant path and abandonment of the 
spirit of Panchsheel. Nehru may have made sure of couple of billion dollars 
in aid, but he has created danaerous tensions.''^  
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Congratulating leaders of both the nations for their high 
statesmanship, Dawn singled out foreign secretary Dehlavi for special 
commendation, since he had "perhaps done the hardest work in this 
connections*^ It was held that a Pakistan closely allied to the United States 
and having an equally close balance with neighbouring China will be an 
outstanding example of the triumph of reason over fear and shortsighted self 
interest. Morning news of Pakistan noted that Ayub Khan's government 
having defined the national interest in broad terms, did not view alliance 
with the west as barrier to friendly relations with China and the Soviet 
Union. Economic cooperation with China need not hurt Pakistan's relation 
with the United states. Indeed "if the experience of India is any guide, the 
American will be the more responsive to our needs than they have been 
hitherto.^' 
It is worthwhile to mention here that actual negotiations, between the 
Pakistan and China for border question began on October 13, 1962 a week 
before the Chinese attacked Indian positions along the Sino-Indian border. It 
was a few hours before the talks between India and Pakistan were to begin 
that "a complete agreement in principle on the location and alignment of 
boundary was announced. According to the Times of India, December 1962, 
"this shady agreement" was announced two hours after the Indian delegation 
under Swaran Singh had called on President Ayub. The Government of 
Pakistan however asserted that the timing had been determined in Peking 
and that the announcement, coming, when it did, was purely co-incidental. 
One would simply struck by the rapidity v/ith which the negotiations of such 
a vitally important matter was successfully conducted within a very short 
period of slightly over two months. It is very doubtful whether the broad-
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agreement could have been promptly arrived at if the Sino-Indian clash had 
not cast a dark spell over the negotiations. 
As Bhutto told the National Assembly, later after the conclusion of 
the boundary agreement that "though our negotiations were progressing, 
they were progressing in an unsatisfactory manner. Then at the time of the 
Sino-Indian conflict an impetus given to these negotiations and we can 
understand why an impetus should have been given to these negotiations 
because no state would like to face any unresolved situation on two fronts.^^ 
From the nature of the Chinese attack and the deployment of her 
troops all along the Sino Indian borders, the Chinese action seems to be pre-
planned and the border negotiations that China undertook with Pakistan a 
few days before this armed resort might have been partly motivated by the 
Chinese aim to neutralize Pakistan against the impeding plan of its action in 
India. It seems China was in great hurry to come to terms with Pakistan, but 
Pakistan also had her own reasons to prompt. China was trying to project its 
image as a peace loving country and let India responsible for the Himalayan 
crisis because of its rigidness and less intransigent in the matter. 
For Pakistan, Kashmir was the touchstone of the success and criterion 
of friendship with any country. For her Chinese willingness to talk with it 
the boundary of Kashmir was in itself a greater achievement for her, because 
it signified the Chinese rejection of the Indian case about Kashmir. Another 
factor which led Pakistan to prompt was the thought that it will bring down 
its neighbour "several pegs down" from her claim of being the leader of 
Asia. However it is not possible to ascertain exactly how far Pakistan gained 
or lost as a result of this deal. It is very strange that an agreement of such 
m^ ' S';; 
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importance was never placed before Pakistan Assi^ cfibly>ibr finalratifi'ujrtion, 
which was a quite denial of the right to information tffi=tfe.pgT^Te where a 
territorial sovereignty of the country was involved. This gave rise to doubts 
and suspicions among the intellectuals that something is foul in the 
agreement. Criticism was reflected by the opposition parties during the 
Presidential Election campaign. One of the Presidential candidate namely 
Ms. Fatimah Jinah said that through this agreement Ayub government has 
conceded a big chunk of the Pakistani territory to China. Commenting on 
the settlement the correspondent of the London Times observed that the deal 
"now reached between Pakistan and China would seem to be an equitable 
compromises.'"^ The jubilation in the west justified the apprehension that the 
imperialists had sinister motives in encouraging Sino-Pak border Agreement 
to deliberately undermine India's policy of peace and friendship. The fact 
that the real intention behind border agreement Vv'as to throw the mud at 
India. As was evident from the Bhutto's speech in UN General Assembly, 
the main objective of the Sino-Pak border agreement was to neutralize 
India's friends. In the same speech Bhutto inadvertently admitted that during 
the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, Pakistan resisted the natural temptation of 
taking advantage of helplessness of India". As a price for this Bhutto staked 
his claim on Kashmir. Bhutto blurted out that only way in which India can 
demonstrate to the world that "Pakistan does really have some secret 
understanding with the peoples Republic of China is by agreeing to an 
honourable and equitable settlement on Kashmir.'^ Bhutto had indirectly 
admitted that there was really some concrete understanding with China 
which would be effectively used to bully India. Peking too had sufficient 
reasons to have this sort of arrangement with Pakistan for the services 
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rendered by the latter in defending China's shattered image at the imperialist 
gathering of CENTO and SEATO. 
Analysis of the Border agreement shows that it covered a 200 miles 
frontier beginning at the trijunction of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sinkiang 
and running in a general south easterly direction upto Karakoram pass. 
China ceded to Pakistan 750 sq.miles of territory beyond the main watershed 
of the Karakoram range, comprising the Oprang valley and the Darband-
Darwaza pocket including its sah mines which had been under the Chinese 
control. Pakistan surrendered no part of the territory under her control. In 
drawing up the agreement the two sides relied on the customary boundary 
line, follov/ing the principle of main watershed. It was claimed by 
Rawalpindi that Pakistan gained 1,350 sq.miles including 750 sq.miles of 
Shimshall valley which had been under the administrative control of the 
Chinese. The net gain of China amounted to 2,050 sq.miles of territory. 
The compromise arrived at left about 2050 square miles on China's side, 
including the Shakrgam Mustagh drainage area of about 1050 sq.miles 
which at one point Pakistan had claimed.^^ However, the new territory 
brought Pakistan some modest economic advantages -grazing grounds and 
the Darband-Darwaza salt mines areas of Shimshall, were rich in natural 
resources. For Hunzan's this area became necessary for their livelihood and 
economic well being. By the agreement the people of Hunza were, therefore, 
immensely benefited. Secure possession of the waters draining into the 
Indus system must also be reckoned as an advantage in view of Pakistani 
apprehensions about the future of the streams flowing into west Pakistan 
from the Indian occupied part of Kashmir.^^ Pakistan claimed to have gained 
access to six out of the seven passes along the Karakoram Range and control 
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of three quarter of worlds second highest peak K-2 (Mount Godwin 
Austen).^ *^  
RILACTING T O A G R E E M E N T : 
Prime Minister Nehru charged in the Indian Lok Sabha on 5 March 
1963, that Pakistan out of anti-Indian hysteric mood, had conceded to China 
not merely 2,050 square miles of territory as contended by her but 13,000 
sq.miles according to survey of Pakistan map. Pakistan categorically 
denied the Indian charges and claimed that agreement did not result in any 
loss of territory as mentioned earlier. Bhutto said we have evidence in our 
possession to deny the Indian allegation to prove the equitable nature of the 
accord between Pakistan and China reached on the basis of mutual respect, 
accommodation on each others historical right and mutual interest.^ ^ 
Some critics said the Chinese had an axe to grind, it suited them to 
cultivate Pakistan before what they called (teaching India lesson). The brief 
Sino-Indian conflict was virtually a walk-over for the Chinese who added 
insult to India's injury by unilaterally with drawing their forces from the 
teiTitory they had seized and releasing the Indian prisoners of war. The 
humiliating defeat clearly brought home the message that the Indians were 
no match to China's military power and the Chinese had no military 
compulsion to rush through a border agreement with Pakistan. 
It was held in India that the announcement of "agreement in 
principle" on Dec. 26, 1962 was badly timed, since it jeopardized the 
outcome of Pakistan India talks on Kashmir scheduled to begin the same 
day. 
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The Anglo US inspired Pakistan India talks on Kashmir were 
underway when the Sino-Pakistan border agreement was signed, and neither 
the Indians nor the Americans approved of the Pakistani move. The Times 
of India called it a "shady agreement" which it said was announced by the 
government of Pakistan two hours after the Indian delegation had called 
upon President Ayub.^ '* The New York Times termed the announcement a 
"deliberate provocation" intended to pressure India into making concessions 
on Kashmir". 
Ironically some Pakistani critics have held the view that Ayub Khan 
missed a historic opportunity in 1962 to seek scores with India and had to 
pay for the lapse three years latter when Indians had recovered from the 
border war debacle. Swaran Singh foreign Minister and Chief negotiator 
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post it, Pakistan signing an agreement with "India's enemy". Both the USA 
and U.K. regarded the time as unfortunate. The agreement was regarded, if 
not an act of collusion between Pakistan and China, as a big step in that 
direction.^ ^ 
Foreign authors agree that Pakistan was gainer in the 1963 border 
agreement, challenging the Indian allegation Pakistan claimed that it had 
under its possession such documents to show that the British government 
had acknowledged the Chinese title and sovereignty over those regions 
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which Pakistan is accused of having surrendered to China. For another 
reason the agreement was beneficial to Pakistan. In return for its surrender 
of some cartographical claim over the regions where it had no effective 
jurisdiction, Pakistan gained by this agreement China's permanent 
denunciation of any right over Hunza. The agreement also enabled Pakistan 
to retain control over some important passes in the Himalayas and most of 
the K-2 peak in Karakoram range to which China had laid claim would 
remain with Pakistan by this settlement. 
With guns still hot from its war with India, China signed agreement 
not for land, but for proof of its willingness to settle boundary question 
peacefully. If New Delhi was annoyed, Peking scored with the agreement 
diplomatic triumph, particularly among the Afro Asian countries. 
As already mentioned, it is not possible to say exactly how far 
Pakistan has surrendered the Kashmir territory to China, through the March, 
2, 1963, agreement, because negotiations were secretly conducted and no 
detailed and authentic information about the order in question is available. It 
is claimed both by Pakistan and China that the traditional customary line 
following the main watershed principle is basis of demarcation of the 
boundary. But according to the Indian sources the traditional boundary west 
of the Karakoram pass ran along the watershed dividing the tributaries of the 
Yarkand river and those of the Hunza river. It lay along the kilkik, mintaka, 
Karchanai, Parpik and Khunjareb passes. It then crossed the Shaksgam river 
and lay along the Aghil mountains, passing along the Aghil Marpo and 
Shaksgam passes to Karakoram passes.^ " In 1962 the survey of Pakistan - A 
government agency - published a map which included Tanghdumbash area 
and the entire shaksgam valley upto the Raskam river in Pakistan and thus, 
showing the boundary at Shahidullah which v/as at about 70 miles North of 
Karakoram pass. On the other hand, China published in 1960 a map which 
claims parts of Hunza. If the 1963 Sino-Pak boundary agreement is 
compared with the 1962 Pakistan survey map, Pakistan appears to have 
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surrendered about 13,000 sq.miles of territory. In this connection, it may be 
pointed out, that when India made a reference to the 1962 map of Pakistan 
survey, Pakistan government denied that it was proper authority to draw a 
line of an undefined frontier. 
Alastair Lamb in support of his argument had made two points (He 
defends the agreement) viz. I. that Mir of Hunza was a tributary of China 
since 18"" century, 2. that in order to terminate the Hunza's tributary 
relationship the Government of Britain made a proposal to China in 1899. 
The proposal was based on Donaland boundary line. The British government 
had suggested to China that it should relinquish its suzerainty over Hunza in 
exchange for latter's termination of rights over Raskam and Taghdambash.^' 
While G.N. Rao, an adviser to Indian delegation which discussed the 
boundary question with Chinese delegation in 1960 says that Hunza was 
never a tributary of China and it entered into such a relationship with 
Kashmir since 1896. According to Rao the Mir of Hunza invaded and 
defeated the Kirghiz nomads of Taghdambash Pamir and informed the 
Chinese that in future Hunza territories would extend upto Dafdar in 
Tanghdambash. " 
Rao has argued that; there is no evidence of the Chinese ever having 
exercised any jurisdiction in the Raskam valley before the 1890's. On the 
other hand there is positive evidence to show that the Chinese at that time 
considered the Kuen Lun as their southern boundary. It appears that 
agreement has been arrived at, more or less, on the basis of the Pakistani 
line of Actual control. But Pakistani line of Actual control was not the same 
as it existed in 1948 when Pakistan occupied these areas. Pakistan has been 
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pulling behind its administration and control in the face of Chinese pressure 
form time to time. Khalid Bin Syed tried to explain Pakistani withdrawals 
from the Kashmir territory under its occupation to avoid clash with china. 
He observed that border in this area had not been clearly demarcated on the 
Pakistani side the territory extended upto the Karakoram range was totally 
inaccessible except through mule tracks. There was a distance of 30 to 40 
miles between the last outpost and the actual border on the Pakistan side. 
The Chinese on their side of border had good roads over which jeeps could 
travel. So it is obvious that Pakistan succumbed to the Chinese pressures 
and could not preserve the traditional boundary of Kashmir with china and 
even the most important reason for surrendering the Kashmir territory was 
political, i.e. to buy off Chinese friendship. 
Pakistan wanted to impress upon the western countries as well as 
India's friends that it was India's bellicosity that was mainly responsible for 
the continuation of the Sino-Indian differences. It needed to justify also the 
Sino-Pak border agreement as a peaceful settlement between the 
neighbouring states v^ /hich India was allegedly opposing. Very few however, 
were taken in by Bhutto's verbal jugglery. But failure did not demoralize 
either Pakistan or China. Pakistan found in this agreement opportunity to 
claim international recognition, at least defacto, of its otherwise illegal 
occupation of Kashmir, whereas China, having secured its pound of flesh at 
India's cost, bound Pakistan more tightly to its apron strings. 
Thus the signing of this border Agreement turned a new leaf in 
understanding, cooperation, and friendship between the two countries. There 
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was no looking back thereafter as Sino-Pakistan ties went from strength to 
strength and India was being viewed as a common enemy. 
India a common Enemy : 
The agreement gave a boost to Sino-Pak ties. By the end of 1963 
India became the common enemy of both China and Pakistan. The Sino-Pak 
axis was formed only to blacken India and make territorial gains at the 
India's expense. Much more important thing was the general efflorescence 
in the relations between China and Pakistan. They got one common 
objective, to have a weak India as their neighbour. Pakistan felt secure in her 
knowledge that India's uncompromising stance and threat of western 
intervention would prevent China form over extending herself to Indian 
territory, while Pakistan's friendship for China and latters menacing attitude 
towards India would go a long way to weaken India both internally and 
externally, since she will be more dependent of foreign economic and 
military aid. 
The Border agreement became an effective weapon in the hands of 
China and Pakistan to cry hoarse against stubborn refusal by India to give up 
her legitimate claims over her own territory. Pakistan continued to pursue its 
policy of blackmail against India. India's attempts to strengthen its defence 
was presented by Pakistan as a preclude to an attack on Pakistan. Bhutto 
said that the augmentation of India's military strength "has a menacing 
significance, not for Pakistan only but for the whole region stretching from 
Plindkush mountains to Mekong River.^ ^ 
At the CENTO and SEATO meetings in early 1963, Bhutto declared 
unequivocally, "China had no designs to invade India. Bhutto's sincere 
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service found warm appreciation in Peking. Two pro Government Paicistani 
dailies also reported Chou-en lai's deep appreciation of Pakistan's defence 
of China in CENTO and SEATO, particularly to "disabuse the minds of the 
western military allies of any suggestions about China having committed 
aggression against India.''^  Chou-en lai justified Pakistan's CENTO and 
SEATO alliances saying that "it was a matter of necessity and security 
Q7 
against India's aggressive designs. As mentioned earlier Bhutto indirectly 
threatened India of severe consequences if they did the mischief of attacking 
Pakistan, as Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the 
largest state in Asia. It is admitted by Pakistan press reports that Bhutto 
stated in Hyderabad in 1963, "although there was no Sino-Pak military 
agreement, there is a strong assumption that the two countries would join 
OS 
hands to outdo any possible Indian mischief. 
At this time Pakistan had realized the "unreliability" of the American 
strategic cover, (who were disturbed because of China-Pak border 
agreement) in the event of a sub continental crisis. Moreover, a blatantly 
pro-American, foreign policy was proving unnecessarily counter productive 
to Pakistan's vital interests as it was increasingly becoming an undesirable 
constraint upon Pakistan's diplomatic flexibility. After the Sino Indian 
border conflicts India became an "enemy state" China too was desperate in 
finding an "ally" which could keep India busy at an additional front. The 
"Sino-Pak nexus" then onwards became an enormously useful strategic-
cum-diplomatic resource for both the states, to be employed consistently 
against their common enemy - India... Both China and Pakistan believed to 
keep India destablished. to get India's neighbours to gangup against it, all 
with a view to preventing India from emerging as a preeminent power in the 
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subcontinent in Asia and in the world, why else would China, so militarily 
opposed to U.S. imperialism in the early 1960's, start, a relationship of 
friendship with Pakistan, which was then a member of two anti communist 
military pacts, CENTO and SEATO's led by the US. An axis against India, 
the common enemy would be the obvious answer, as chankya says in the 
Arthashastra, the enemy's enemy becomes a friend. 
Pakistan devised its ways right into the Chinese camp on the pretext 
of India's attempt to isolate Pindi. China played up the differences between 
India and Pakistan by encouraging Pindi's, "India baiting". In December 
1963, the Chinese vice Minister for foreign trade during his visit to Pakistan 
declared that "if ever there is a war between India and Pakistan, China will 
surely support. Pakistan and not India". Both the countries particularly 
Pakistan began to outcry against India's non-alignment policy and 
friendship with the Soviet Union. Pakistani President in Colombo on 
December 12, 1963 said that "non-alignment is a shadow of major powers 
conflict". He also stated that Pakistan would not join the non-aligned world 
to be called "a sycophant of major powers".'^'' 
Pakistan's renewed love for China earned for it valuable Peking 
support on the Kashmir issue which had been the corner stone of Pakistan's 
policy of the Alignment with the west as well as v/ith China. China 
disregarded its stand on Kashmir and whole heartedly supported the 
Pakistani case. Chinese support was also noteworthy due to the fact that it 
barred the Chinese hypocrisy. It is interesting that Chinese Primier way back 
in 1956 during his visit to Pakistan evaded a firm commitment or answer on 
the issue by his laconic response that wc are still in the age of studying the 
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question. There is a principle followed in China that one has no say on a 
question until he has studied it.'°° This was also in flagrant violation of the 
unequivocal Chinese assurance to the Indian ambassador, R.K. Nehru, in 
Peking on March 14, 1956 that China believed that the people of Kashmir 
had already expressed their wishes in regard to their future status and on the 
issue of Kashmir's accession to India.'°' 
The common enemity with India is important in Sino-Pak relationship 
but it was not the only factor which bound them together. For Pakistan, it 
was and still is the most important one but for China the most important 
objective during the 1960's and 1970's was the break the encirclement of its 
south western tier. 
Intensifying friendship : 
The friendship nourished by the Sino Indian conflict was boosted up 
by the Sino-Pak border agreement of March 1963. This gave way to a 
number of formal agreements, exchange of several official visits and 
cultural delegations. Even before the Border Agreement was signed a trade 
agreement was signed on Jan. 5, 1963, which provided that Pakistan would 
export jute, jute manufactures, cotton, cotton textiles, leather, sports goods, 
surgical instruments, news print etc. in exchange for Chinese metals, coal, 
cement, machinery, cereals, chemicals, steel products etc. As a result Peking 
became the biggest buyer of the Pakistani cotton, during 1963-64 - 302,000 
bales out of Pakistan's total export of 539,000 bales. 
With rapid developments in political relations, the commercial and 
trade contacts side by side began to grow steadily. Pakistan realized that 
under the changed political situation it should not rely solely on U.S., and 
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should avail the opportunity in China. Import of coal, cement, chemicals, 
light machinery etc. were the items of main stimulation from China in the 
trade agreement.'°^ The agreement granted each country the most favoured 
nation status in bilateral trade and commerce including shipping. It should 
be noted here that during the preceding three years, Chinese imports from 
and exports to, Pakistan had registered a drastic decline - imports, from 1.8 
million dollars 1960 to 01 million dollars in 1961 and 16 million in 1962, 
and exports from and .04 million in I960 to .36 in 1961 and .42 in 1962.'°" 
During the year of Korean war the volume of trade between China and 
Pakistan had been very high but as said above, thereafter there was a decline 
particularly between 1958-1962. Realizing overdependence on west Pakistan 
government decided to diversify its trade and economic relations with as 
many countries as could possibly be done."^^ The trade agreement between 
China and Pakistan was followed by the Bartar Agreement on 30 September 
1963.'°^ This agreement was for the exchange of Pakistani jute for the 
Chinese cement. 
Another Agreement which evoked much speculation outside the 
country and comments in international circles was the Civil Aviation 
agreement commonly known as "AIR TRAVEL" agreement signed on 29 
August 1963. It was the first of its kind that China had made with a non-
communist country. This was a commercial treaty that expanded Pakistan 
International Airlines business and foreign exchange earnings. 
Towards the end of 1962, however, PIA, was looking for new 
business with plans to extend International Survey to Tokyo, the airlines was 
refused landing rights in Hong Kong; by the British subsequently, PIA 
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approached Chinese aviation authorities and secured rights and facilities in 
canton and Shangai. 
According to Pakistan agreement was basically a commercial 
venture'"'' but in USA political importance was given to it. USA was furious 
on the agreement and threatened Pakistan with a stoppage of spares in 
maintenance parts for PIA's Boeings and as a further sign of displeasure. 
The United States cut off aid for the development and modernization of an 
airport at Dacca. U.S. state department termed it "an unfortunate breach of 
free world solidarity'°^ But in pursuit of Pakistan's new policy to strengthen 
its friendship with China, Pakistan ignored the American threats and tapped 
its own resources for the development of the Dacca airport. The Chinese 
press was exuberant : "when the choice had to be made between national 
prestige and the American dole with all its accompanying insolence and 
insult. Pakistan preferred to uphold the honour of its people. Pakistan by 
deciding to resist American pressure and build with its own resources; 
shows that self reliance is a weapon that can help the new emerging nations 
to safeguard their national independence.'°^ 
The beginning of the Sino-Pak airlink was solemnized on April 29, 
1964, when the first PI A plane landed at Shanghai airport, and the Chinese 
hailed the service as "milestone" in the history of friendly relations between 
the two countries"'. At a reception for PIA Managing Director Nur Khan, 
Chinese Foreign Minister Chen-yi said : we would like to point out that 
those who tried to isolate and blockade China have failed."^ The opening of 
the air service in April 1964 by PIA shortened the distance between the two 
countries and strengthened the Sino-Pak ties not only between each other 
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but with other Asian and African countries. Irritation with the agreement led 
US President to sent under secretary of state George Ball to Rawalpindi to 
inquire how far Pakistan intended to carry her flirtation with China. But 
Pakistani leaders showed firmness and told him that American policy of 
Arming India without securing a Kashmir settlement had left them no 
alternative but to seek friendly relations with China. PIA Chief Nur Khan 
remarked that the negotiations were carried out in a spirit of mutual 
understanding and cooperation and that the interests of the two countries 
airlines were advanced. As China was also granted reciprocal facilities in 
Pakistan.'" 
Bhutto, said that whole deal was purely for the purpose of 
economizing and not for any other mischievous considerations."^ This 
explanation of Bhutto who was foreign Minister at that time appeared to be 
reasonable if one considers that similar agreements existed between China 
and Nepal, China and Burma, and upto 1962 between China and India."" 
Pakistans Air Travel agreement with China and Soviet Union (in same year) 
were rated as something of a diplomatic triumph because western airlines 
had for years tried in vain to obtain landing rights in China. However, the 
Pakistani motive behind the agreement was to strengthened the cooperation 
with Peoples Republic of China to get its support against India. In the same 
year i.e. 1963 Pakistan entered into two other agreements, one concerning 
the Radio-photo service and the other dealing with friendship between the 
two leading news agencies of the two countries. Pakistan and China also 
signed a cultural agreement on 26 March 1965 to promote cooperation 
between the two countries in the field of culture, arts, science and 
literature."' Also Pakistan was going close to China not by signing these 
91 
agreements but also it was going through by backing the Chinese stand on 
important international issues. On the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty China was 
fully supported by Pakistan. Pakistan held that China has a good and definite 
reason of its own to disapprove the treaty."^ The growing Pak China 
friendship brought about a marked change in their attitude to each other and 
to SEATO and CENTO. The intensity of friendship was increasingly 
reflected in their mutual support for each other on various national and 
international issues - Peking lent support to Pakistan on Kashmir, Pakistan 
reverted to her old policy of supporting Pekings representation in the U.N. 
and opposing two China or one china - one Taiwan theory. President Ayub 
Khan hailed the first nuclear test by China as most impressive achievement 
of the Chinese government and the Chinese people. The important of the 
year 1963 was the visit of the popular peasant leader, Maulana Abdul Hamid 
Khan Bhasani, to China in November 1963. The trip was not only an 
important landmark in the history of Sino-Pak friendship, but it was 
crucially significant also for the democratic and antidictatorship movement 
in Pakistan. It will not be correct to say that people were against Bhasani's 
going to China but they were actually protesting the Bhasani's compliance 
with Ayub Khan's request to go to China on his behalf as a leader of an 
official delegation. And Bhasani too during his speeches and talks with 
Chinese leaders proved a loyal representative of President Ayub. When 
Bhasani was interviewed about the nature of talks between him and Mao Tse 
Tung - Bhasani revealed that "Mao said to me that at present time China's 
relation with Pakistan was extremely fragile and that the United states, 
Russia and India would do their utmost to break this relationship. He said 
you are our friend, and if at present movement you continue your struggle 
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against the Ayub government, it will strengthen only the hands of Russia, 
America and India. It is against our principles to interfere with your work, 
but we would advise you to proceed slowly and carefully. Give us a chance 
to deepen our friendship with your government. So it is clear here from 
the Mao's request what China wanted to achieve through friendship with 
Pakistan at the cost of democratic and progressive movements in Pakistan. 
It was nothing but the opposing tendencies in China to Russia and 
India which it thought hindrance in its hegemonistic goals. However, the 
USA was deliberately mentioned to save Bhasani from embarrassment and 
justify his alignment with the Ayub regime. The fact of Ayub's link with 
USA, was more clearly known to Mao than to any body else. Anger against 
USA was only a propaganda. The main aim was to play up India's alleged 
aggressive posture towards its neighbours especially China and Pakistan 
with whom New Delhi was not on good terms. This was also in quite 
conformity with the views expressed by Foreign Minister Bhutto that "the 
motive force in her alliance was to counter India's assiduous and planned 
tactics to isolate Pakistan in order to finally strangle her."'^ 
Pakistan thus devised its ways right into the Chinese camp on the 
pretext of India's attempt to isolate Pindi. China too played the Indo-Pak 
hostility to get close to Pakistan. China realized after that Pakistan, 
especially after the failure of her talks with India regarding Kashmir, had 
really become serious about normalizing the relation with Peking and it also 
thought despite US pressure it would not have entered into several 
asrecments with Pekina. 
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In order to further strengthen the relationship between the two 
countries, there were exchange of visits between 1963-65 on February 18, 
1964 Chou en lai paid a visit to Pakistan with his foreign Minister and an 
unusually large contingent of 48 members. His pleading of second Afro-
Asian Conference got a ready response from Ayub Khan who declared that 
people of Pakistan favour the convening of a second Afro-Asian 
Conference'^°. In Karachi Chou-en lai in his first speech said that: 
"I believe that our present visit will enhance mutual understanding 
and trust between us and make new contributions to the strengthening of the 
Sino-Pak friendship and Asian African solidarity".'^' Chou-en Lai also 
showed his agreement with Ayub Khan by expressing hope that Kashmir 
question would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of 
Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. The joint communique 
issued on 23 Feb. 1964 showed that there was greater area of understanding 
between the leaders of the two countries than before. The thing which 
satisfied the Pakistani leaders was Chou's avoidance of any reference to 
Pakistan's association with military pacts. Chou never questioned the 
sincerity of Pakistan to have peace and he is reported to have told some 
correspondents that Pakistan had no aggressive designs against any country. 
She wanted to live in peace and amity with every nation.'^^ President Ayub 
Khan, as friendly gesture to his guest, reiterated that the Chinese 
representafion in the U.N. was an urgent necessity for a lasting peace in the 
world. Without China's active help and cooperation, international tension 
could not be reduced. " At a well attended civic reception in Karachi on 
February 18; Chou declared that the development of friendly relations 
between China and Pakistan was "an important contribution to peace in Asia 
and the world. ^ Apart from this both leaders decided to continue their 
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friendly cooperation in accordance with the ten principles enunciated at the 
first Bandung conference of Afro-Asian countries and agreed to oppose 
colonialism in all its forms, the need for second Afro Asian nations 
conference was also recognized. Chou-en lai's glib talk of the fast rate of 
economic progress of Pakistan under Ayub's rule raised serious doubts in 
peoples minds about the sincerity and wisdom of the Chinese premier. Cho-
en lai also declared that the Pakistan government and public opinion have 
righteously refuted the slanders made by the forces hostile to China and 
pointed out that China is a peace loving country. This constitutes a valuable 
support to China for which the Chinese government and the people would 
like to express sincere gratitude. He also projected Ayub Khan before the 
people of Pakistan as a consistent fighter for defending national 
independence and sovereignty against foreign interference'^^ and people of 
Pakistan are progressing economically under the able leadership of Pakistan. 
It was held by Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi that both China and 
Pakistan have great stakes in Asia. He also said; 
People of China will stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistani 
people and the people of Asia on the vast fertile and newly emerging 
continent of ours and strive to create a bright future for ourselves'^^ An 
important aspect of Chou's visit was that he was trying to become the Chief 
spokesman and leader of the Afro Asian countries and also to degrade the 
image of Pandit Nehru whom he v/as considering as his personal rival in 
Asia. 
Another important aspect of Chou's visit was certainly related to seek 
help of Ayub to open dialogue with the USA, this was disclosed by the 
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Ayub Khan himself, "he said when Chou-en Lai visited Pakistan half of my 
talks with him were on relations with USA.'^^ 
In India Chou-en lai's visit to Pakistan signified another proof of a 
common desire to weaken India and browbeat India "Sisir Gupta said "the 
Sino-Pak alliance... spelled danger for India". 
On the other side Chou's visit roused popular enthusiasm in Pakistan 
and a romour that the two countries might enter into non-aggression pact. 
Plowever, China became the beneficiary of the tangible interests which were 
of vital importance, for it was longing for long its countries with Muslim 
countries particularly of Middle East. This was important for China because 
of the situation which became after the Sino-Soviet rift. 
In terms of personal gains Ayub was greatest beneficiary of Chou's 
visit to Pakistan. Because Ayub at home was facing the criticism from a 
large section of people mostly of socialist tinge. The introduction of "basic 
democracy" in Pakistan by Ayub in 1962 had created a discontent among the 
people over the issues of fundamental rights which were being denied to 
them. Thus in such a political situation the praises and eulogies of the Ayub 
regime by a communist statesman of Chou's stature would use those as a 
propaganda weapon against his enemies at home. This was indeed an 
inexplicable characteristic of the Chinese friendship for the Ayub regime. 
Chou en Lai's reiteration of the Chinese approval of Pakistan's membership 
in the CENTO and SEATO pacts as "defensive" and common cause of the 
Chinese and Pakistani people under the leadership of Ayub Khan for 
promoting Afro Asian solidarity and defending world peace, "constituted an 
indirect advice to the anti Ayub forces to give up their just struggle".'"" 
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Ayub to China : 
In March, 1965, Ayub Khan paid a return visit to China to put the 
relation of the two countries on firm footing. The visit was partly in 
response to an earlier invitation of Chou-en Lai and partly in fulfillment of 
his election pledge in 1964 that if, he would be elected he will pursue an 
independent line of action in the field of foreign relations. The election held 
in 1965 owned a great deal to the service extended by Chairman Mao's 
follower, Maulana Bhasani, the pledge was reported to be one of the 
conditions on the basis of which he received the support of Maulana Bhasani 
in East Pakistan during the presidential election.'^' 
Moulana Bhasani who made an excuse of illness and withdrew from 
electioneering which actually was a political illness to let Ayub Khan won 
the election.'""" Any way the visit was significant for two reasons. Firstly, the 
visit coincided with the second anniversary of the Sino-Pak Boundary 
Agreement. Secondly after the victory in election Ayub Khan wanted to 
demonstrate his countrymen that he had adopted an independent foreign 
policy. During his visit Ayub Khan was given hero's welcome in Peking. 
The Chinese leaders praised Ayub Khan for taking initiative to raise the 
level of interaction between the two countries. Peoples daily welcoming 
Ayub's visit to China, described Sino-Pak relations as a "model of a new 
type of relations between states". Chou-en lai expressed his gratitude that 
the Chinese people would ever remain thankful to Ayub Khan for his efforts 
in improving the Sino-Pak friendship. President, too assured that Pakistan 
vv'ould strive its utmost for closest relation with China.'""^ Chinese premier 
assessed that, on their part there would be no lack of effort to maintain that 
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level of friendship. Ayub Khan on the other side remained, however, very 
much guarded in his pronouncements. The China Pakistani joint 
communique issued at the end of Ayub's visit. Much emphasis was given on 
the convening of the second conference of Afro-Asian Nations. Pakistan 
also agreed with China in expressing opposition to the introduction of 
nuclear weapons into the Indian ocean and also agreed in the communique 
to the settlement of Kashmir dispute according to the wishes of the Kashmir 
people as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. The joint communique 
characterized the talks as "frank" sincere and friendly. 
However, there was some difference of opinion on certain issues 
between the two countries, for example on the question of Vietnam the 
Pakistani president disappointed the host. At a mass rally in Peking on 5'^  
March 1965 Ayub merely expressed his hope that the Vietnam issue would 
be settled on the basis of honour and justice. In joint communique too 
Pakistan showed very little commitment to the issue of Vietnam. The joint 
communique conveniently refrained from condemning the US aggression in 
Vietnam which was then the most agonizing issue concerning world 
attention. The reason for this ominous silence by these countries on Vietnam 
issue became clear soon. The two countries then straining nerves to bring 
about a viable "Sino-US Entente which could have been easily hindered by 
criticizing America on Vietnam issue. 
Meanwhile the visit of a high level team from the defence ministry 
headed by General Liuya-Lou, the Chief of the Chinese Air Force, and their 
secret talks with some high Pakistani officials combined with Ayub Khan's 
visit to China, aroused a wide speculation that the two countries might have 
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contemplating in terms of a military agreement between themselves. This 
further hardened the US attitude towards the Sino-Pak Entente. They held 
that relations between China and Pakistan are undermining American 
Strategy in South and South East Asia. 
In a statement Foreign Minister Bhutto in May 1965 made it clear that 
direction in which the Sino-Pak had a special role in cementing the relations 
between different Afro-Asian countries and that that such a unity and 
solidarity is "not directed against the western powers or their interests and 
its fulfillment lies in collaboration with the west and the rest of the world.'^^ 
As a retaliatory measure, Washington decision of stopping the 
economic aid to Pakistan was held by President Ayub as a dishonour and 
undermining of Pakistan's sovereignty. "We cannot endanger our honour, 
integrity and our sovereignty. A nation without honour is of no value, said 
President Ayub. ' This unexpected change in American attitude towards 
Pakistan made Pakistanis think about the over dependence of Pakistan over 
USA. It faced acute economic crisis but China found an opportunity to 
extend her helping hand in the honour of crisis. Chinese ambassador in 
Karachi promptly declared that his country would provide Pakistan with an 
interest free loan for building up her "independent and Self reliant 
economy", In an editorial Jen-min Jeh-pao vehemently criticized the 
"shameless blackmail" practised by the United States in using "aid" as a 
pressure on Pakistan to give up its independent policy "' The extent to which 
China and Pakistan came closer to each other became evident when, in the 
wake of 1965 Indo-Pakistan war China openly supported Pakistan and cease 
fire line in Kashmir. It was actually from the coming back of Ayub Khan 
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China visit, China showed shared concern with Pakistan that "the Kashmir 
dispute remained unresolved and considered its continued existence a threat 
to peace and security in region. 
China's vision and policies about Kashmir : 
Kashmir has been on the top of south Asian Agenda lies in the fact 
that it has been experiencing the highest level of sustained violence and 
destruction ever since the British departed from the subcontinent. Kashmir 
dispute has remained an important issue of Pakistan Foreign policy on which 
Pakistan expected Chinese support. Pakistan explored its external links for 
the Kashmir question with the powers that have been underwriting 
Pakistan's indulgence in Kashmir and to explore their own motivations. 
Through the 1950's Chinese stand on Kashmir dispute remained 
ambivalent. During the early 1960's China began to change its stand on this 
issue. It switched its stand from non-involvement to that of involvement 
and, the change was seen in favour of Pakistan.''" 
China in addition to being a most enduring supporter of Pakistan's 
policies on Kashmir since early 1960's as stated earlier. China happens to 
physically occupy about 40,000 sq.kms. of Indian province of Jammu and 
Kashmir. This includes territories of and around the Aksai Chin (about 
33,000 sq.km.) as also 5,180 sq. kms. that was ceded by Pakistan to China 
under their border Agreement of 2"'' March 1963. So much so that if 
Pakistan occupies 1/3 of this province then China occupies nearly 1/4"^  of 
it''*^ This shows that China has its own stakes in Kashmir, it does not sees 
only the interest of Pakistan but in Pakistan's interest it knows lies its own 
interest. The most important reason for china's interest in Kashmir has been 
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China's restive Islamic population in its Xingiang autonomous region, 
bordering Kashmir which creates both a geographical and Islamic 
connection linking China's internal security to that of India and Pakistan. So 
to contain any negative fallout of radical Islamic ideologies into Xingiang, 
China had cultivated Pakistan and Afghanistan and continued to support, 
Pakistan's struggle for Kashmir. 
China's preoccupation with fortifying territories as southwards as 
possible thereby gradually occupying Kashmir's AksaiChin as also taking 
about 5,180 Sq. Km. of Kashmir's territories under 1963 border settlement 
of 2 March. The Border Agreement was a significant step in this direction. 
Pakistan ceded territories it was only giving away parts of disputed 
territories in return for China's friendship thereby making China integral to 
the Kashmir question. As India was to make critical compromises by 
accepting China's sovereignty over Tibet yet when it announced its northern 
borders in Kashmir, it did so without consulting the Chinese. The joint 
communique issued at the end of Chou en lai's Pakistan's visit in February 
1964 characterised Chinese stand on Kashmir dispute in these words : 
They expressed the hope that Kashmir dispute would be resolved in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.'''\ the resolution 
implied that China was in favour of plebicite, China's skepticism about 
South Asia's cooperation at that time as bourgeoisie and stooges of western 
powers and opt for supporting South Asian revolutionary insurgencies. In 
the Kashmir China tried to radicalize its support to Kashmir liberation 
during the cultural revolution years.''*'' 
10] 
No one can deny also the fact that there was some British legacy who 
had left un-demarcated and rigid borders in their colonial states and allowed 
smaller states to continue as sphere of influence that could switch sides from 
time to time. There was only one official proposal which Britishers made 
with Beijing for defining borders in the region. It was made during 1899. 
This proposal had sought to define China's borders with Brifish India along 
the Mustagh-karakoram - Laktsang. Line including the Lingzhithang plains 
but it did not claim the north eastern Aksai Chin''* .^ It is that area where 
China latter built its strategic Karakoram highway to Pakistan which was to 
become the first major bone of contention linking China to Kashmir. 
Dalai Lam's political Asylum in one of the South Asian countries 
(India) also enhanced China's interest in the Kashmir question 1962 war 
between China and India is also a milestone in the evaluation of China's 
Kashmir policy. All the post 1962 trends made China so much integral to the 
evolution of Kashmir question. These trends included -
a) beginning of China's All weather special relafionship with Pakistan. 
b) China Pakistan axis making Islamabad adopt a far more aggressive and 
inflexible posture 
c) Humiliated India being forced to accept third party mediation, 
partitioning of Kashmir and China being more integral to Kashmir thus 
further complicated the settlement of Kashmir problem. Involvement of 
China as the 3'^ '^  critical player thus created a dangerous stalemate on 
Kashmir question. 
Pakistan's gradual drift towards China since 1959 followed by 
Chinese victory over India in 1962 had made the strategic equations of this 
region very fiuid. 
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The increasing indulgence of China in South Asia was to only further 
justify their initiative on Kashmir question. They were aware of the fact that 
Pakistan had been constantly urging the USA to intervene in Kashmir 
dispute between India and Pakistan for its resolution and that ensured China 
that their initiative on Kashmir will be accepted in Pakistani quarters. 
Aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war Nehru found himself caught in the 
crossfire and seemed hardly in a position to withstand the pressure from 
China as well as from USA on Kashmir question Nehru's indirect reference 
on 30"^  Nov. 1962 in Indian Parliament to not upsetting the status quo in 
Kashmir made Harimansandeys furious and got Nehru issue a clarification" 
that he attached no condition to talking to Pakistan on Kashmir.''^ ^ 
It is worthwhile to mention that India was awaken to reality three 
years back of Sino Indian war of 1962 when China refused to discuss 'the 
boundary west of Karakoram pass between China's Sinkiang and 
Kashmir.''*'' India came to know that China had declined to recognize the 
accession of Kashmir to India. This was also observed by the Indians 
when process of talks between Pakistan and India were going on one side 
and on the other side China and Pakistan signed a border Agreement. This 
was clearly an affront to Nehru's earlier requests to President Ayub not to 
cooperate with China in any China India confrontation, and India's 
sustained opposition to Pakistan having any locus standi in negotiating 
Kashmir's borders with China.'''^ It is also worth to mention here that even 
before these proposed negotiations between Pakistan and India, the Indian 
side led by Sardar Swaran Singh, had planned to propose conversion of 
ceasefire line as international boundary as also prepared various proposals 
for rectifying this line which would entail granting Pakistan additional 
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territories upto 3,500 sq. miles from Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir.'^° 
This was all the result of multifaceted pressures from both China and Anglo 
American teams. However, on 31, December 1963, Nehru reverted to his 
favorite theme, that the basic issue involved in the Kashmir dispute was that 
'Pakistan should vacate aggression'^' and he asserted that India Pakistan 
discussions on Kashmir had no direct bearing on the problems we face with 
regard to China.'^ ^ 
More than making China an active player in the Kashmir question 
was significant the India's turn on Kashmir question. As India agreed to 
formally propose ceasefire line to be made as the international border in 
Kashmir and India accepted the Anglo-American mediation in India-
Pakistan talks on Kashmir. Both China and Pakistan viewed this shift from 
Indian side as indications of its weakness which was to make Pakistan more 
and more ambitious on Kashmir and finally leading to the second Indo-
Pakistan war over Kashmir in 1965 hereby further complicating India-
Pakistan equations on Kashmir also cementing China Pakistan axis and 
China's role in Kashmir. 
It is said that it was China's increasing indulgence with Islamabad 
since 1959 followed by the China. India war of 1962, that was to make 
Nehru formally pursue partition as a solution to Kashmir question - Pakistan 
had since become enamoured with internationalizing Kashmir and has since 
been seeing out third party mediation or intervention. This had made Nehru 
so much agreeable to Anglo-American mediation in Kashmir. In August 13 
in parliament Nehru referred to pressures put upon India by USA and UK to 
find a settlement with Pakistan and that it is under these circumstances that 
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India had been prepared to have the good offices of a mutually accepted 
I ^^ 
personality even though previously we had declined a similar proposal. 
After the border Agreement, China had come to be one of the 
Pakistans major suppliers of military equipment and technologies.'^'* This 
prompted Pakistan to Snatch-Kashmir from India by force. In 1965 war 
between Pakistan and India, Beijing had issued a some sort of deadline for 
coming to ceasefire with the Pakistan armed forces.'^ ^ However China did 
not enter into war physically but its indirect threats compelled India to retain 
five of her seven mountain divisions on her northern borders. During 1971 
war between India and Pakistan China called India adventurist, expansionist 
and aggressor and both general Yahah Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had 
publicly declared that if need be, China could militarily intervene in support 
of the Pakistan side.'^ ^ Here also China helped Pakistan morally and gave 
weapons and equipment. It also allowed Pakistan Air Force flights eastward 
to overfly from its territory.'" The supportive role that China played to 
promote Pakistan's interests against India during the second Kashmir war of 
1965 caused a considerable concern to India. After the Indo-Pakistan 
divergence developed over Kashmir and resulted in war, China changed her 
policy towards India. This change was essentially over the Kashmir issue 
wherein China indulged in the dubious diplomacy of duplicity. The Chinese 
foreign policy found it necessary to support Pakistan for her own ends was 
evident from the contrast in her previous posture towards Kashmir. 
China had also been extremely critical of India's role in the creation 
of Bangladesh as this had completely upset China's strategic calculations of 
using Pakistan as a Chinese bulwark against India. China's military and 
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transfer of various nuclear and missile technologies and components to 
Pakistan were to obtain Pakistan a nuclear deterrent capability treaty 
undervisiting sustenance of Pakistans low intensity conflict by propagating 
and promoting extremists in Kashmir since late 1980's. 
During the mid 1970"s China finally awakened to the destructive and 
disruptive potential of Pakistan and this led to gradual Indo-China 
reapproachment, and U-turn in Chinese thinking and policy in Kashmir was 
viewed. 
The first noticeable example of China's return to its original policy of 
silence on Kashmir was to happen in the 1982 joint communique between 
Zia-ul-Haque and Zhao Ziyang in Islamabad'^^ China was further 
disillusioned with Pakistan because of latters involvement with Taliban and 
their repercussions for Xinjian and finally, by Pakistan's nuclear tests and 
missile programme. 
Kargil war between India and Pakistan on Kashmir was to emerge as 
the epitome of this new thinking in China's Kashmir policy. China's neutral 
posture terminated its earlier pro-Pakistan lable on Kashmir. 
However, the track record of China has kept India extremely cautious 
about the Chinese posture of ventrality, with many commentators even 
describing China's ventrality as ventrality in favour of Pakistani intrusions 
in Kashmir.'^^ Now the important question is how long could China 
maintain its ventrality on Kashmir. This posture of neutrality has to be 
examined in the light of weather or not it is seen in Chinas own national 
interest, Now that both contacting parties have developed nuclear weapons 
and many experts say that China has now few options on Kashmir because 
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India and Pakistan would have to display restraint, although soon after 
nuclearisation they had gone for a war on Kashmir in Kargil. 
In recent years, China's options have varied between the strong and 
not-so-strong exhortations to Pakistan to respect the line of control in 
Jammu and Kashmir which Pakistan has repeatedly violated. In Kargil 
conflict of 1999 China seemed more worried about the fact that such 
eventuality runs the risk of involving western intervention." 
107 
References 
1. The Dawn, Karachi, December 25, 1956. 
2. Year Book of the United Nations, 1956, pp. 137-38. 
3. Asian Recorder, 1956, p. 1162. 
4. B.N. Goswami, Pakistan and China; A study of their Relations, 
Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 51-52. 
5. New China News Agency, hereinafter written as NCNA, 19 October, 
1956. 
6. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan Perspective : A Collection of 
Important articles and Extracts from Major Speeches, Washington 
Embassy of Pakistan, pp. 3-16. 
7. Daily Telegraph, October 24, 1959. 
8. Statesman (Delhi), May 5, 1959. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Pakistan's Bitterness inclines her towards China, Observer (London), 
Foreign News Service, July 22, 1963 
11. Klaus H. Pringsheim, China's role in Indo-Pakistani Conflict, China 
Quarterly, October-December 1965, pp. 170-75. 
12. New China News Agency, Sept. 03, 1958. 
13. Anwar Hussain Syed, Diplomacy of an Etente Cordiale, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1974, p. 66. 
14. The speech of Mian M.M. Khan Daulatana, Pakistan National 
Assembly, Debates, 2 (8 March 1958) 1016. 
15. Pakistan National Assembly Debates, 1 (25 Feb. 1957) 1096. 
16. Anwar Hussain Syed, op.cit., p. 70. 
17. B.N. Goswami, op.cit., p. 47. 
108 
18. Anwar Hussain Syed, op.cit., p. 70. 
19. Dawn, Karachi, February 7, 1957. 
20. Pakistan National Assembly Debates, 2 (8 March 1958) pp. 1008-33. 
21. Ibid., pp. 1034-35. 
22. N.C.N.A., august 14, 1955. 
23. Ibid., July 7, 1956. 
24. M.A.H. Isphani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-64, Pakistan 
Horizon, vol. XVII, No. 3 (Third Quarter, 1964), pp. 238-39. 
25. Peking Review, 30 Sept. 1958, pp. 26-27. 
26. P.L. Bhola, Pakistan China Relations : Search for Politico-Strategic 
Relationship, R.B.S.A. Publishers, Jaipur, 1986, p. 71. 
27. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan : A Study of the Martial Law 
Administration, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp. 167, 178. 
28. Sangant Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal, Asian 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1970, p. 109. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid., p. 110. 
31. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters; a Political 
autobiography, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp. 61-62. 
32. Ibid., p. 162. 
33. Sangant Singh, op.cit., p. 111. 
34. Speech at Peshawar on 15 Jan. Morning News, Karachi, 16 Jan. 1961. 
35. B.N. Goswami, op.cit., p. 72. 
36. Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 162. 
37. Amitava Mukherjee, Sudhir Banerjee, Chinese Policy towards Asia, 
Sterling Publishers (P) Ltd. New Delhi, 1975, p. 31. 
109 
38. B.N. Goswami, op.cit., p. 73. 
39. S.S. Bindra, Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Deep & 
Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1988, pp. 255-56. 
40. Ibid., p. 257. 
41. Ibid., p. 157. 
42. Amitava Mukherjee, op.cit., p. 31. 
43. Ibid., p. 32. 
44. Pakistan National Assembly Debate, November 21, 1962. 
45. Pakistan Times, November 9, 1962. 
46. Tapan Das, Sino-Pakistan Collusion and US Policy, Asia Publication, 
New Delhi, 1972, p. 92. 
47. National Assembly Debate, 1962. 
48. Dawn, 27 Oct. 1962 (editorial). 
49. R.K.Jain (ed) China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Vol. II, Relation 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1977, p. 43. 
50. M.A.H. Isphani, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: 1947-64, op.cit., pp. 
247-68. 
51. Pakistan Times, 1 Nov. 1962. 
52. R.K. Jain, op.cit., p. 42. 
53. Dawn, 29 Nov. 1962. 
54. Mujtaba Rizvi, The Frontier of Pakistan, National Publishing House 
Ltd., Karachi, 1971, p. 163. 
55. At a press Conference on 23 Oct. 1959, Ayub admitted that the 
Pakistan China border was not defined, Dawn, 24 Oct. 1959. 
56. Khalida Qureshi, Pakistan and the Sino Indian Dispiite-1, Pakistan 
Horizon, 15 (Fourth Quarter, 1962), p. 321. 
110 
57. Dawn, 24 October, 1959. 
58. Pakistan Times, 14 Oct. 1959. 
50. Dawn, 29 October, 1959. 
60. Z.A. Bhutto said that Pakistan would not collaborate with India 
against China even if Kashmir issue was peacefully settled. He added 
that friendship with China was a "fundamental principle of Pakistan's 
Foreign Policy... we will not barter or bargain it away for anything". 
R.K. Jain, op.cit., p. 42. 
61. Guardian (Manchester), 5 May 1962. 
62. New China News Agency Report, 27 Dec. 1962. 
63. Sino-Pak Agreement, 2 March 1963, some facts, Ministry of External 
Affairs, Govt, of India, New Delhi, 1963, pp. 32-34. 
64. Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 162. 
65. Dawn, 23 March, 1962. 
66. Dawn, May 04, 1962. 
67. China's Note dated 31 May, 1962 to India, Govt, of India, white 
paperNo. VI, pp. 99-102. 
69. See the note given by Indian to the High Commissioner of Pakistan in 
New Delhi on lO"^  May 1962, Foreign Affairs Record No. 8, 1962, 
pp. 139-40. 
69. Pakistan Times, May 15, 1962 (editorial). 
70. Dawn, May 4, 1962. 
71. Morning News (editorial), 26 May, 1962. 
72. Pakistan National Assembly Debate, vol. 2, July 17, 1963, p. 1669. 
73. K.P. Mishra et al., Pakistan's search for constitutional consensus, 
New Delhi, 1967, pp. 144-7. 
11 
74. The Times (London), 4 March, 1%3. 
75. Tapan Das, op.cit., p. 95. 
76. Anwar Hussain Syed, op.cit., p. 87. 
77. The New York Times, March 4, 1963. 
78. Anwar Hussain Syed, op.cit., p. 87. 
79. Ibid. 
80. P.L.Bhola, op.cit., p. 103. 
81. Indian Lok Sabha Debate, 14-15 March, 1963, pp. 2162-65. 
82. Dawn28, March 1963. 
83. Prof. Khaiid Mahmud, Sino-Pakistan Relations : An all weather 
Friendship, Regional Studies, vol. 19(3), Summer 2000-01, 
Islamabad, Pakistan, p. 3. 
84. Times of India, New Delhi, Dec. 28, 1962. 
85. The New York Times, Dec. 29, 1962. 
86. Prof. Khaiid Mahmud, op.cit., p. 8. 
87. Ibid. 
88. The New York Times. It also wrote that the time was intended to 
pressurize India into making concessions on Kashmir. 
89. B.N. Goswami, op.cit., p. 91. 
90. Sino-Pak "Agreement" March 2, 1963, some facts (Ministry of 
External Affairs, Govt, of India, New Delhi, 1963), pp. 32-34. These 
charges were made by Prime Minister Nehru in Lok Sabha, see Lok 
Sabha debates, vol. 14, March 1963, pp. 2164-65. 
91. Alastair Lamb. Quoted by P.L. Bhola. Op.cit., p. 105. 
112 
92. G.N. Rao, The Indian China Border : A reappraisal, Asia Publishing 
House, New Delhi, 1986, p. 43. 
93. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan's foreign policy : An Analysis of 
Pakistan Fears and Interests, Asian Survey IV, No. 3, March, 1964, 
p. 749. 
94. Sangat Singh, op.cit., p. 112. 
95. Tapan Das, op.cit., p. 96. 
96. Pakistan Times, June 18, 1963. 
97. Pakistan Times (Dacca), June 2, 1963. 
98. Morning News, Oct. 9, 1963. 
99. Hindustan Times, December 16, 1963. 
100. Dawn, December 25, 1956. 
101. Government of India, White Paper No. VI, 1961, Ministry of External 
Affairs, New Delhi. 
102. Prof. Mohammad Moniruzzaman, Trends in Pakistan's External 
Policy 1947-71 with particular reference to peoples China, Asiatic 
Press, Dhaka, 1985, p. 58. 
103. B.N. Goswami, op.cit., p. 94. 
104. S.P. Verma, India, Pakistan and China, a study in regional 
imbalances, South Asian Studies Journal, vol. 6, July 1971, No. 2, p. 
12 (Jaipur). 
105. Times (London) 23 August, 1963. 
106. S.C.M.P. 3075 (8 Oct. 1963), p. 34. 
107. Dawn, 08 June, 1963. 
108. New York Times, Sept. 01,1963. 
109. Peking Review, July 03, 1964. 
113 
110. Ibid., 8 May, 1964. 
111. Dawn, August 30, 1963. 
112. Bhutto Speech in National Assembly Debate, 17 July 1963, p. 1673. 
113. B.N. Goswami, op.cit., p. 102. 
114., N.C.N. A, 16 Sept. 1963. 
115. Dawn (Karachi) 27 March, 1965. 
116. Asian Recorder, 1963, p. 5575. 
117. Dawn, December, 16, 1964. 
118. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's power, Jonathan Cape 
Ltd. London, 1970. 
119. The Times (London), November 28, 1962. 
120. Dawn, 21 Feb. 1964. 
121. Dawn, 27 March, 1965. 
122. P.L.Bhola, op.cit., p. 115. 
123. Dawn, 26 Feb. 1964. 
124. Ibid. 21 Feb. 1964. 
125. Ibid., Feb. 19, 1964. 
126. Ibid.,Feb. 25, 1964. 
127. Ibid., Feb. 24, 1964. 
128. Morning News (Dacca) 14 July, 1964. 
129. Shiwaji Ganguli, Chou En Lai in Pakistan, Foreign Affairs Reports, 
April 1964. 
130. Dawn, 19 Feb. 1964. 
131. The Pakistan Observer (Dacca) 15 July 1964. 
14 
132. Tapan Das, op.cit., p. 112. 
133. Dawn, 3 March, 1965. 
134. Tapan Das, op.cit., pp. 113-14. 
135. S.C.M.P., 3583 (23 July, 1965), 17. 
136. Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for peace, The Pakistan Institute of 
International Affairs. 
137. Dawn, 15 July, 1965. 
138. Asian Recorder (1965) p. 6673. 
139. Survey of China mainland press (S.C.M.P.) No. 3503, 23 July 1960. 
140. P.L.Bhola, op.cit., p. 124. 
141. Ibid. 
142. Swaran Singh, China-South Asia : issues, Equations, Policies, Lancer 
Books, New Delhi, 2003, p. 72. 
143. China Today, 5 March, 1964, pp. 7-10. 
144. Swaransingh, op.cit., p. 76. 
145. Major General D.K. Patil, War in Himalayas : The Indian Army in 
Crisis, 1962, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1991. 
146. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 
1941-1991, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1993, p. 210. 
147. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis, 
London Oxford Univ. Press, 1973, p. 218. 
148. Ibid. 
149. Sarvapalli Gopal, JawaharlalNehru, A biography 1956-1964, vol. Ill, 
Jonathan Cape, London, 1984, p. 256. 
150. Major General D.K. Palit, op.cit., p. 371. 
115 
151. Asian Recorder, 1963, p. 5016. 
152. Jawahar Lai Nehru, Changing India, Foreign Affairs, April, 1963. 
153. Lars blinkerberg, India - Pakistan : The history of unsolved conflicts, 
vol. 1, The Historical part. Odense University Press, Odense, 
Denmark, 1998, p. 196. 
154. General Mohammad Musa (Rtd.), My version : India-Pakistan War 
1965 Wajadalis Press Ltd. Lahore, 1983, pp. 11, 92. 
155. Swaran Singh, op.cit., p. 90-91. 
156. Ibid. 
157. Sukhbir Choudhary, Indo-Pak war and Big powers, Trimurthy 
Publications, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 41-45. 
158. Swaran Singh, China's Kashmir policy. World Focus, New Delhi, 
vol. 23, Nos. 10-12, Oct.-Dec. 2002, p. 20. 
159. V.R. Raghua\an, China, India and Kashmir, The Hindu (New Delhi), 
15 June, 1999. p. 10. 
Chapter - 3 
Stno-^ak Stratctic Collusion since 1965-75 
Chapter- 3 
STRATEGIC COLLUSION BETWEEN CHINA AND PAKISTAN 
SINCE 1965-75 
Pakistan continued to pursue war as a prolongation of politics by 
different means, China chose the threat of war as an equally effective 
foreign policy posture against India.' Pakistani troops, already excited by 
Peking fed arms and ammunition, started pouncing upon the Indian soldiers 
in the Rann of Kutch in April May 1965. In early 1965 Pakistani ranger 
started intruding into the Indian territory of the Rann of Kutch area and 
forcibly occupied kanjar kot and established a standing post there. Later on 
9 April 1965 Pakistan launched a full scale military attack on the Rann of 
kutch with heavy artillery and tanks. Actually this was the area where the 
borders between the two countries remained unsettled. China, without 
probing into the question of how the armed confrontation started between 
the two countries over the Rann of kutch, outrightly condemned the Indian 
action and made fool of itself by denouncing India for allegedly carrying out 
the US schemes of "making Asian's fight Asian's" at a movement when the 
Chinese broker, Bhutto was passing his sleepless nights in agony to bring 
the USA and Chinese leaders together at a conference table. The important 
thing was that despite Chinese support to Pakistan both superpowers were 
against the confrontation and by the persuasive efforts of British Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson. India and Pakistan signed an agreement on 30 June 
1965 to resolve the dispute peacefully^ Encouraged by this agreement 
Pakistan very soon launched its "operation Gibratter" to capture the Kashmir 
valley.^  The large scale infiltration was witness from Pakistan side to 
17 
Kashmir on 5 August, 1965. The aim of these infihrators was to provoke the 
Kashmiri Muslims against the Indian government and to carry out sabotage 
in Kashmir. India in response to this awkward situation of undeclared war 
invaded west Pakistan, directing its attack at Lahore, the provincial capital, 
located about fifteen miles from the border and regarded by many, as the 
heart of Pakistan. As is customary on such occasions, many foreign 
governments deplored the fighting and expressed their hope for ceasefire. 
Some took sides with either India or Pakistan. Among Pakistani supporters 
China spoke the laudest. She gave Pakistan the unqualified support and, 
threatened India with a grave consequences" for allegedly violating Chinese 
territory along the Sikkim border.^ Chinese policy created widespread 
apprehension of a general war in Asia. By linking the Sino-Indian and the 
Indo-Pakistan conflicts, the Chinese fostered a sense of urgency among the 
powers about terminating the Indo-Pakistan war. Because of Chinese 
involvement some of the great powers, especially the Soviet Union, could 
not side openly with India and so as to put pressure on Pakistan.^ United 
States was not prepared to involve itself in this Indo-Pak conflict inspite of 
the fact that President Ayub Khan appealed for the US intervention.^ A 
white House spokesman. Bill Mayers immediately ruled out any direct US 
intervention as proposed by Ayub Khan and affirmed that the United States 
supported peace operations through the United Nations. The United States 
on the other hand cut off the military aid both to India and Pakistan. The US 
refusal to intervene opened up opportunities for Soviet diplomacy in South 
Asia. The Soviet Union was able to play the mediator's role. It appealed to 
both India and Pakistan to settle their disputes through peaceful means and 
direct negotiations. Soviet Premier Kosygin in a similar message to Ayub 
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Khan and Lai Bahadur Shastri pointed out : "In the present grim situation, 
the main emphasis should not be concentrated ... on halting the tanks and 
silencing the guns.^  Soviet Union also failed Bhutto's attempt in the security 
council to raise the Kashmir issue, and insisted on a ceasefire. 
China became uncomfortable and irked on the activities of Soviet 
Union. Chinese acrabity grew fierce since the fiasco of its own policy in 
1962 when it tried to achieve its objective by armed conflict. The Chinese 
foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi came to Pakistan at this hour of 
Pakistan's need. Marshal Chen Yi joined with Pakistan in branding India as 
the aggressor and declared that China would give all support and help to the 
just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provocation in 
Kashmir". The Chinese foreign Minister once again took Pakistan's stand in 
regard to Kashmir and stated categorically that China had all sympathy for 
the "freedom fighters" in Kashmir, who were struggling to "liberate 
Kashmir from the tyrannical Indian domination.^ 
It would be correct to say that Chinese sympathy and moral support, 
was not a mere expression or lip service towards Pakistan but there was a 
surfeit of arms supply and strong unequivocal political support for Pakistan. 
China put pressure on India by mobilizing its troops along the Assam and 
NEFA borders. 
China was, hov/ever, not deterred by the tragic consequences of the 
war on the people of Pakistan and India as well. The people of both the 
countries against whom China should have had no enemity were unfortunate 
victims of the war with crushing economic burden on them. China was also 
not satisfied with economizing Pakistan alone, it even went to the extent of 
enticing the US to intervene in favour of Pakistan. 
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Before fighting had spread beyond Kashmir, China's Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi, on his way to Mali, halted at Karachi, and at a news 
conference condemned India's "provocative violations" of the ceasefire line 
in Kashmir, supported Pakistan's "just action in throwing back the Indian 
attacks and reiterated the view that it was India's cruel and repressive" rule 
in Kashmir which had led to the existing situation.'° On September 05, 
Peoples Daily declared in an editorial that India had "barbarously" tried to 
crush the just demand of the Kashmiri people for self determination and that 
the Kashmiri's, no longer able to tolerate their "brutal" rule, had risen in 
revolt. It advised India "to stop its domineering and arbitrary practice of 
bullying its neighbour." 
Why China was carrying out this virulent propaganda against India? 
The answer seems to be that she was trjang to create an impression on the 
minds of the government and people of Pakistan that UN, USA and 
erstwhile USSR were all on the side of India in its aggression and we the 
Chinese are only friends to Pakistan on whom she must rely. For eighteen 
years, it was pointed out, that the United Nations had permitted India to act 
'lawlessly, in Kashmir without "lifting a finger" to restrain her.'^ The 
security council according to China had not uttered a single word of 
disapproval on India crossing the ceasefire line and occupying the Kargil 
area on August 14, the Tithwal area on August 25 and the Uri Poonch area 
on August 28, but had become active only when Pakistan hit back on 
September V\ and the Indian troops found themselves in difficulties. The 
United Nations, the peoples daily pointed out, consistently reversing right 
and wrong and calling black as white, had always served the interests of the 
aseressors. Today, (it) is again siding with the aggressor on Kashmir issue 
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and the Indo-Pakistan conflict... and has become a sanctuary for the Indian 
aggression"'^ U.S. action in suspending military aid to both India and 
Pakistan in Chinese view, was designed to make Pakistan still weaker in 
relation to India and Soviet Union also had been assisting India in 
"sabotaging'" international agreement on Kashmir and annexing it. In present 
struggle too Soviet Union had come forward with good offices only when 
Indian armies had started suffering reverses which was alleged to aim at 
forcing Pakistan to accept India's annexation of Kashmir as legitimate.''' 
China, beginning with September 08, sent several protests to New 
Delhi threatening grave consequences, if India did not dismantle aggressive 
military works, which she had allegedly constructed on the Chinese side of 
the Sino-Sikkim border and return the kidnapped men and animals. China 
was throughout linking her grievances with India with a condemnation of 
India's aggression against Pakistan and promising support to Pakistan in her 
"just and defensive war" against India so long as the Indian Government 
oppresses Kashmiri people... long as the Indian Government persists in its 
unbridled aggression against Pakistan China will not cease supporting 
Pakistan.'' 
However, it is clear from the above analysis that Pakistan leadership 
was looking more to the United States for its support than to China, but 
China was more willing than the USA to support Pakistan and China 
obviously could not have felt at ease when Pakistan president Ayub Khan 
repeatedly appealed to USA to come to its rescue. On Sept. 05, i.e. before 
the Indian armies proceeded towards Lahore. Ayub had told newsmen in 
Karachi that "the US can play a definite role, it can tell both India and 
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Pakistan that it will not stand for this trouble.'^ It was really a virtual slap on 
China as treated by various commentators, because it was against the 
Chinese policy of keeping the western influence away from Asia. But for, 
Pakistan it was impossible to break away completely from the USA and 
other western and south East Asian Muslim Friends. It was also held that 
Pakistan's growing friendship with China was indeed motivated by a desire 
to play a role of an interpreter of the American point of view. 
It was actually a dual policy of Pakistan to have great intimacy with 
China for keeping one of the Asian giants in good humour and partly 
dissuading western powers from their all out efforts to help India. As quite 
often mentioned Pakistan was concerned more to restore balance of power in 
South Asian region which it held was allegedly disturbed by the large scale 
military aid to India by western powers following the 1962 Sino-India war, 
actually Ayub Khan wanted to impress the western powers that it was not 
China but India from where it feared aggression. To clear its position 
Pakistan tried to do away with the embracing situation in which it was 
caught by the enthusiastic support from China, Pakistan's Ambassador in 
Washington found it necessary to declare that, there have been no 
agreement, no collusion of any kind between my government and China". 
The Dawn also insisted in its editorial on 21 September that "the Chinese 
move (of giving ultimatum to India) has nothing whatever to do with 
Pakistan's defensive war with India".''' 
Pakistan was in essence exploiting her friendship with Peking to 
'blackmail" both the west and India - she hoped to use her friendship with 
Pekine to "blackmair' the USA into putting further pressure on India on 
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Kashmir and at the same time to use its links with the west as a bait Peking 
to give its support to Pakistan on the issue in the hope of weaning it from the 
western camp. 
The supportive role that China played to promote Pakistan's interests 
against India during the second Kashmir war of 1965 caused considerable 
concern to India. Though China did not participate in the war but her 
diplomatic support was sufficient to highten security tension in India. The 
External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh, subsequently told this in the Indian 
Parliament: 
"China in conspiracy or collusion with Pakistan... gave us an 
ultimatum and was ready to strike us at a moment when our armies were 
locked in combat with Pakistan".'^ 
China changed her policy towards India with time and according to 
its own interest. After Indo-Pak divergence over Kashmir China got 
indulged into the dubious diplomacy of duplicity. China's foreign policy 
found it necessary to support Pakistan for her own ends which one can see 
from its previous posture towards Kashmir. It was in fact a subtle policy 
shift from its stated non-involvement in Kashmir conflict. China attempted 
to implement her strategy through the statement that India while carrying 
out war against Pakistan had simultaneously started tension along the Sino-
Indian border."" China attempted to link the Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian 
disputes together. 
The reason that China chose to link up Sino-India and Sino-Pak 
conflicts was to play an active role in the sub-continent. This was what the 
Chinese Foreign Minister Chou-en lai who said : 
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"India's act of aggression posses a threat to peace in this part of Asia 
and China cannot but closely follow the development of the situation".^ 
Chinese Ultimatum 
In accordance with such strategy China alleged that India has violated 
her territory along their common border. On 08 September 1965 China sent 
a note to India with the threat of serious consequences in case of non-
compliance. Her demand was that India should remove all the "aggressive 
military structures" on the Sikkim China border within three days time. 
Besides, China demanded that India withdraw her "aggressive armed forces" 
and cease acts of aggression and provocation along their common border. 
It was asserted that Indian troops had crossed the China-Sikkim boundary on 
four successive occasions in July 1965. Then in August it was said that 
Indian troops had repeatedly intruded into China's territory in the western 
sector. "' China considered that "India's aggression against any of its 
neighbours concerns all of its neighbours" it further warned that a chain of 
consequences could follow from such Indian bellicosity if Delhi did not 
mend its ways. '^' However the real depth of Pakistan and China entente was 
revealed on 08 September. 
With the serving of the Chinese note Peking's ulterior motive of 
fishing in the troubled waters become evident to then superpowers (USSR 
and USA) and it was reported that both the powers conveyed their strong 
7 ^ 
feeling to Peking against these machinations. 
But this proved in vain, China was undeterred by the great powers 
concern, sent an ultimatum to India on 16 September to dismantle all the 
alleged posts on the Sikkim border within seventy two hours, failing which a 
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grave consequence was to follow.'^ ^ Chinese communication to India during 
September and October of 1965 represented both Pakistan and China as 
victims of India's aggressive expansionism. In every note send to India by 
China, during this period Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan conflicts were 
linked. The Chinese also found occasions to assert in these notes that, come 
what might, they would not be stopped from supporting Pakistan's fight 
against Indian aggression. However the Govt, and press in Pakistan did not 
acknowledge that the Chinese allegations against India had anything to do 
with the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Infact they tried to disentangle the two 
situations. In an editorial on September 21, Dawn insisted that the Chinese 
move has nothing whatever to do with Pakistan's defensive v/ar with India". 
The Chinese protest to India on September 26 made the usual digression 
from its main subject to announce that "the whole world now sees that it was 
India which launched a war of aggression against Pakistan... and it was 
China and other justice upholding countries which by their firm anti 
aggressive stand punctured your aggressive arrogance".^^ 
Referring to the Chinese ultimatum, Indian Prime Minister Lai 
Bahadur Shastri told the parliament on September 17, 1965 that India had 
made strenuous attempts to settle the question peacefully and with honour. 
He accused China of interference calculated to prolong and to enlarge the 
conflict between India and Pakistan. Shastri in response to Chinese 
allegations of putting up structures in Chinese territory suggested for an 
independent observer be allowed to inspect things for himself But the 
Chinese had not accepted this. Shastri assured the Parliament that if we are 
attacked, we shall fight for our freedom with grim determination. On 
September 22 he told both houses of Parliament of India's acceptance of the 
125 
U.N. demand for ceasefire meanwhile, the Chinese troops had crossed the 
well known and delimited boundary at Dongchir La and Nathu La on the 
Sikkim China border on September 20 and 21 respectively. 
The centrality of China to the Indo-Pak war was clear from the 
statement of the Indian delegate M.E. Chagla to the security Council on l?"" 
September 1965 when he said Pakistan commenced the war in the hope that 
China would strongly support her offensive against India. "On the same day 
Prime Minister Shastri said .. .what China is looking for is not a redress of 
grievances, real or imaginary, but some excuse to start its aggressive 
activities again, this time acting in collusion with its ally Pakistan. 
He also criticized China for her attempt to confront India through the 
self appointed role of a regional policeman in Asia. He further revealed that 
Pakistan was not prepared to accept the ceasefire unconditionally as India 
had done. Chagla's shrewd suspicion was that the reason for the delay was 
that Pakistan kept waiting for China to press home her ultimatum and attack 
India. If China had attacked India Pakistan would have sung a different tune. 
This is what Chagla said in a statement which India would always remember 
that "there is one lesson which I learnt what ultimately matters is power, 
what ultimately matters is strength of your country, we have all the justice 
on our side, but if we are weak, nobody is going to listen. If we want our 
influence to be felt in the councils of the world, "we must be strong".^" 
India, after sometime realized that China would confine her role only 
to diplomatic support and not embark on a military role in conjunction with 
Pakistan. In this context the President Dr. Radhakrishnan said 
in a radio broadcast to the nation on 25 September 1965. 
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"The Sino Indian border troubles of 1962 have been used by Pakistan 
to secure the assistance of China". China combines common sense and 
bravado in her Foreign policy. China threatens trouble though she acts in 
accordance with her own interests. China knows that if she intervened on the 
side of Pakistan, she would invite the opposition of many countries, great 
and small. Her intervention would lead to a general war with all its 
disastrous consequences. China is aware of this danger of the extension of 
war resulting in great power involvement. She is therefore, content to create 
a diversion of small scale activity along the Sino Indian border to oblige 
Pakistan.^' 
Subsequently China herself acknowledged in an editorial on 18 
September 1965 in the Peoples Daily that she had sparked off an issue on 
the Sikkim-Tibet border to aid Pakistan."^ 
Chinese Sincerity in its ultimatum : 
The game of Chinese ultimatum offers an interesting story. Chinese 
ultimatums showed that Peking wanted to derive maximum benefit at the 
minimum cost. It was probably not Chinese intention to intervene in the 
Indo-Pakistani conflict in a big way. It was only a diversionary measure, at 
the most to ensure that Indian troops could not be moved form the NEFA to 
Punjab front. " During the war between India and Pakistan China demanded 
that India "stop all its acts of aggression and provocation against China in 
the western middle and eastern sectors of the Sino Indian border or 
otherwise bear all the responsibility for all consequences arising from its 
actions". The Chinese ultimatum came on September 16, 1965, ten days 
after war had started between India and Pakistan. The war formally came to 
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an end on September 23, seven days after China had issued the ultimatum. If 
China was serious about its ultimatum it would have surely intervened 
militarily.'^ '* However one can also say that it was basically American threat 
against China's involvement that had held China back. But the Americans 
had enough problems to keep them busy and it was unlikely that they would 
have taken immediate action had the Chinese intervened militarily. And it is 
also fact by then Indo-Soviet relations too had not germinated into a full 
blown strategic partnership. It is therefore difficult to argue that Moscow 
would have militarily engaged China in the interest of the South Asian 
politics. The most sensible perspective on the issue, therefore, seems to be a 
conscious move on the part of China to militarily stay clear of South Asian 
conflicts involving India and Pakistan. However the Chinese assurance, 
revealingly enough, avoided any mention of the term "territorial integrity" 
which ruled out any possibility of Chinese intervention in the war"."^ 
China was well conscious about the US and Soviet efforts for ending 
the war, and was very much satisfied that ultimately India and Pakistan 
would accept the ceasefire proposals and their ultimatum will automatically 
become inoperative. But there is no doubt in saying China was encouraging 
Pakistan against India, it even went to the extent of enticing the USA to 
intervene in favour of Pakistan. Bhutto informed the National Assembly 
that, "India dared not raise its little finger against East Pakistan, I cannot say 
any more one day all will be known."' Moreover Ayub Khan's invitation for 
the US intervention in the conflict on one side and on the other side his 
private appeals to China for "doing something" put Peking in a great 
predicament. Probably China thought that there is choice between two evils, 
if she intervenes India will become next veitnema and by US involvement 
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war will become global war. The possibility of nuclear war was taken into 
account by Chinese leaders. According to G.W. Choudhury Mao Tse-tung 
was reported to have told Ayub Khan that "if there is nuclear war, it is 
Peking not Rawalpindi that will be the target. 
If the Chinese ultimatum was not backed by military action, China 
would have lost face in the Afro-Asian world. The US silence even after the 
Ayub Khan's invitation proved useful to China when Peking was sure that 
India and Pakistan would accept cease-fire, it gave a new uhimatum for 
another three days. No follow up action was taken by China in respect of its 
ultimatum, because in the meantime India and Pakistan had accepted the 
ceasefire proposals. So the Chinese support to Pakistan at that time was 
largely political. 
China curtailed the role of the superpowers in their attempts to 
influence the outcome of politico-military developments in the subcontinent 
through her indirect involvement in the Indo-Pak war. Basically China 
considered that the superpowers had their sympathies for India rather than 
Pakistan. 
What precisely was China's role ? The Indian government and the 
press charged "collusion" between Pakistan and China. The Chinese 
dismissed the Indian charges as fantastic tale, and Pakistani spokesmen 
described them as sheer propaganda designed to agitate certain sections of 
opinion in the united States. In a Television interview with the American 
Broadcasting Corporation, Pakistan's ambassador in Washington declared 
that "there have been no promises, no agreements, no collusion between my 
Government and China.''^  
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In China Pakistan Diplomacy of an Entente cordiale Anwar Syed has 
written about the information he got during his interviews with then 
Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto and other diplomats proves China's active 
role in Indo Pak war of 1965. He writes, that during a meeting in 1965, 
Chou en-lai, after hearing Ayub Khan's discourse on Kashmir, is said to 
have observed that a "just settlement of the dispute would not materialize 
unless Pakistanis were willing to make "sacrifices". When Chen Yi stopped 
at Karachi on September 04, he was told that Pakistanis were now ready to 
make sacrifices. At the same time Pakistanis have always denied any 
Chinese role in encouraging Pakistan to go for war with India. Then prime 
Minister Bhutto and his colleagues had interpreted Chou-en-lai's reference 
to the necessity of making sacrifices as a philosophical statement and not as 
a philosophical policy of recommendation.'"^ 
The basis for such considerations arose from the cold relations 
between China and the superpowers. It is relevant to say that super powers 
were also more concerned about the growing Sino-Pak collaboration 
because they were apprehensive that it would enhance the strategic structure 
of East Asian colossus on the Indian sub-continent. So they tried to detest 
the growing relation between China and Pakistan. Under these 
circumstances superpowers would have normally supported India but they 
were feared that their help to India would only push Pakistan near to China. 
It therefore follows that India was at a disadvantage against Pakistan 
due to the role that China played in the 1965 Indo-Pak war. 
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Chinese Strategy to Placate Pakistani People : 
Although China had to eat its own pie and nothing followed in the 
wake of the ultimatum, but if it were used by her as a strategy to placate the 
Pakistani people, it undoubtedly proved successful. It immediately made 
China extremely endearing to the people of Pakistan who began to look 
upon her not as a fair-weather friend but a genuine ally who would not 
refuse to stand by their side with all her power at a critical hour in their 
country's life. 
Paradoxically Pakistani people openly expressed their gratitude to 
China and its political leadership also did so but with some reservations : 
Pakistani politicians and official spokesmen were somewhat more 
reserved in their reactions, although they too expressed gratitude. The press 
v/hich generally reflected government views, tried to separate the dispute 
between Pakistan and India from China's dispute with India and its 
ultimatum to India.'" 
It further interprets the rationale of the Pakistani political leadership's 
skeptical attitude towards the Chinese action. To quote : 
Pakistan believed that China's unfavourable image might harm the 
Pakistani cause and that Pakistan's grievances would be forgotten. A second 
reason was Pakistan's heavy military and economic dependence on the US. 
Ayub Khan's sensitivity on this issue made him want to avoid irritating the 
US unnecessarily. A third reason was that the enthusiasm of the Pakistani 
public over Chinese support tied Ayub Khan's hands and prevented him 
from accepting a settlement that he might otherwise have agreed to, because 
the public believed that Chinese support created the right condition for 
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presenting India with harsher demands. This Pakistani reaction set the stage 
for Peking's attitude towards the 1966 Tashkent conference/^ 
Thus one can summarise form the above analysis that it was actually 
the propaganda within Pakistan during the war which was responsible for 
building the China's image in Pakistani people as a friendly power which 
came to their rescue. As has been pointed out earlier that President Ayub 
Khan was not impressed by the Chinese role. After the Indo-Pakistani 
conflict he came to realize the futility of the use of force for the solution of 
indo-Pakistani disputes, as it became obvious by the fact that he agreed to 
attend the Tashkent Meeting and signed a declaration. Moreover, the 
conflict exposed China's limitation to support Pakistan against India in a 
war. 
Reaction of Chinese Ultimatum : 
There can be no doubt that vast majority of the people in Pakistan 
appreciated the Chinese support deeply. Students in Karachi carrying huge 
portraits of Chou en lai and Chenyi, called on the Chinese ambassador to 
thank him. Some Rawalpindi lawyers sent off a telegram to Chou en-lai 
thanking him and declaring : "Friendship of Pakistan and the great Chinese 
nation and their common struggle against Indian aggression, which has been 
encouraged and aided by the imperialists, is guarantee for the final triumph 
of the peace loving people of the world.'*'' Poets wrote laudatory verses 
about China and Indonesia. The war literature and war histories praised 
china in glowing terms. 
In reciprocity, Pakistan condemned the alleged Indian provocations to 
China. Both China and Pakistan, wrote dawn on September 1&, were victims 
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of India's "imperialist thuger". Even the president Ayub Kiian who was not 
really impressed by Chinese role in the conflict sent a message of thanks to. 
the Chinese. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then foreign minister of Pakistan, 
while addressing the UN General Assembly thanked a number of nations 
including China, who gave us full moral support, and rising above 
ideological differences, upheld the cause of righteousness to condemn the 
v/ar of aggression launched against us by India.'*'' Hence China reaped a 
goodwill among the urban masses of Pakistan is undoubtedly true. But the 
relations between the two governments did not necessarily improve further. 
It should be apparent that Ayub Khan wished to pursue a policy of 
"dual alignment". He was thinking to have beneficial relationship with both 
China and United States at the same time. There were also some reports 
from Rawalpindi, London, and Washington narrating that Chinese 
"overreaction'" had encouraged the collusion theory and tended to damage 
what remained of Pakistan's "good relations with the United states".'*^ Ayub 
Khan was moving to correct the "balance of friendships", and that is why 
quite frankly he had declared the US has a role to play in this part of the 
v^ 'orld and they ought to play it more positively. He observed also that by 
exercising her influence in the right measure united states could further its 
own interests of having strong India and Pakistan subcontinent.''^ 
It is obvious that China could not have found much comfort in these 
observations. It was really a virtual slap at China. But it is also fact that 
what Pakistan was expecting from China that was not fulfilled by china. 
Ayub Khan appealed to these to "do something", they issued threats to 
India, but apparently these were not sufficient. As, Pekings ultimatum to 
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India came just a little more than a day after the Presidents press conference. 
It would seem that the Chinese decided to seize the initiative after the U.S. 
President had disdainfully declined President Ayub Khan's invitation.''^  So 
despite Chinese virtual involvement in the war of 1965 between India and 
Pakistan Chinese diplomacy did not bring Peking and Rawalpindi any 
closer. But truth is that there was a heavy pro-Chinese sentiment of the 
Pakistani public which inhibited the process of "de-escalation". 
The Chinese ultimatum of September 16 commanded a somewhat 
higher degree of credibility than did the previous threats. But even so the 
reaction was mixed. Indian officials, on the one hand claimed that the 
Chinese were about to do something "sinister". C.S. Jha, then Indian foreign 
secretary, declared that a "fateful moment in history" had arrived, that 
Chinese meant to humble India. Back home in Delhi Chinese ultimatum 
was viewed as chiefly as a Chinese effort to encourage Pakistan. Some 
viewed the ultimatum as a "psychological gambit" to unnerve India. It was 
also observed that Chinese were only bluffing. It was actually a cunning 
move on the part of China to reap the "maximum dividends with the 
minimum effort". The ultimatum was followed by the reports of the Chinese 
troop mobilization on the India-china borders. In this context, Pekings 
choice of particular area be the Sikkim borders, was actually made 
deliberately to show India that it cannot protect Sikkim which had long 
wanted the status of sovereign state. However the consensus summed to be 
that Chinese can not contemplate a major attack on India because it will not 
like to invite great power intervention against it. Ultimately, however, China 
had to eat own pie and nothing followed in the wake of the ultimatum. 
Whatever the Chinese and Pakistani gained by threatening India, through 
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collusion policy, there was no less gain for India. Indian leadership and 
policy makers came to realize the fact that 'no country in the world can 
defend himself alone. The need was felt by then Indian Prime Minister 
Shastri and he promised that India's "defence preparedness will have to be 
improved continuously and the country would have "to remain vigilant all 
along its frontiers".''^  
Need for Tashkent and Chinese Attitude : 
China's intervention in the Indo-Pakistan war certainly accelerated 
the process which led to the ceasefire and signing of an agreement between 
India and Pakistan at Tashkent. The prospect of China's intervention did 
place both the superpowers in a dilemma. Anwar Syed has written in the 
orbis very aptly that "if China launched a major attack on India", "the result 
might be a world war. If she made only a small principle advances and the 
two great powers did not go to India's aid they would alienate Delhi. And if 
they did aid India, they would alienate Pakistan and push her closer towards 
China. The Indo-Pakistan war had been a nuisance; it now became an 
intolerable situation. It must be terminated.^ ^ 
International dailies held that if ceasefire was not immediately 
effected, the consequences would be catastrophic throughout the world. The 
growing pressure of public opinion all over the world mostly from western 
countries which led to India and Pakistan agreeing on September 22 to a 
ceasefire. 
It is pertinent to mention that Pakistani leadership had started the war 
in 1965 in the hope that, with or without Chinese support, it would be 
possible for Pakistan to grab Kashmir form India. During the course of the 
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Indo Pakistan conflict it could not secure a quick victory and found itself 
bogged down in the quagmire of the consequences emerging out of the 
conflict. There was no option for Pakistan also but to accept the UN call. 
Pakistan was getting worse in the battlefield and losing the important and 
valuable territory such as Haji Pir, Tithwal and Kargil. Moreover Pakistani 
stocks of ammunition were depleting too. So it moved from its earlier 
reticence on Soviet efforts and good office for the resolution of conflict. 
During the 1965 conflict Pakistan was at the horn, of dilemma whether to 
continue or stop fighting, Soviet mediation offer helped Pakistan extricating 
itself from it. '^ Pakistani leaders attended the Tashkent conference. The 
Tashkent Declaration unfolded a prospect of increasing Soviet influence. It 
was a pointer to the declining influence of China in Pakistan. The Soviet 
efforts got tacit approval by the US also and they did not showed any 
reaction towards Soviet convening the Tashkant conference. 
Indo-Pakistan war formally ended when Ayub Khan and Prime 
Minister Shastri met in Uzbek city of Tashkent in January 1966. Although 
Chinese were suspicious of Soviet mediation, they did not oppose Ayub 
Khan's journey to Tashkent. On the other hand Chinese maintained a degree 
of military pressure on the borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and the North Frontier 
Agency for several months following the Indo-Pakistan ceasefire with a 
view to strengthening Pakistan's negotiating position vis-a-vis India. Anwar 
Syed writes after an interview with Bhutto that when the terms of the 
Tashkent accord became known. Chinese were deeply disappointed. China 
even sent a note to India on Jan. 6 while the Tashkent talks were proceeding, 
threatening to '^ resolutely strike back" if India continued intrusions, 
provocations or armed attacks. China was at its usual game of wanting to 
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disrupt peaceful efforts and to keep India and Pakistan separated." China 
really was resenting the Russian mediation. 
On Januar>' 4, 1966 the conference opened, albeit in a mood of 
considerable skepticism. Both side had taken rigid positions: India was 
demanding a no war pact and refusing to budge from her stand on Kashmir, 
on the other side Pakistan insisted that a meaningful peace could not be 
made without a mutually satisfactory Kashmir settlement. Premier 
Kosygin's determined efforts, however, motivated the leaders of both the 
countries and on January lO"^  Tashkent declaration was signed. It contained 
the two government's, agreement to withdraw their forces to positions they 
had occupied before August 05, 1965. To repatriate prisoners of v/ar 
promptly, to reestablish normal diplomatic relations, not to permit hostile 
propaganda against each other, to settle their disputes peacefully, and to 
consider measures for restoring cultural and economic relations. 
In Pakistan deteriorated situation after the signing of Tashkent show 
how people were kept unaware about the realities. They were stunned by the 
proceeding at Tashkent, unable to understand why Ayub, the Victor, was 
coming home without substantial Indian concessions on Kashmir politically 
aware people in rural areas, the intelligentsia, and the opposition parties 
generally regarded the Tashkent agreement as a betrayal and a national 
disgrace '^' while certain sections of the society, especially the business 
community were relieved after the end of the war. The depth of the public 
resentment was immense Bhutto too become a national hero by dissociating 
himself from the decisions to stop fighting on September 23, he had wept in 
the security Council and used to fight India for thousand year if necessary. 
He was totally opposed to the settlement Ayub Khan made with the Shastri. 
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Pakistan's participation in the Tashkent conference was not in line 
with Chinese policy towards South Asia. An important Chinese objective 
was to keep the things hot in the region. There is no evidence to show that 
China directly tried to prevent Pakistan from going to Tashkent. However, 
the possibility of China advising Pakistan on this point cannot be ruled out.^ ^ 
It is also not inconceivable that Pakistanis might have assured Chinese 
leaders that they would not make any compromise on the Kashmir issue that 
is why China refrained from any public criticism of Pakistan attending the 
Tashkent Conference. They seemed to have adopted an attitude of "wait and 
watch". 
The Chinese did not criticize the terms of the agreement because they 
were aware that it might imply condemnation of Ayub Khan. It would also 
mean that Chinese are supporting anti-Tashkent Pakistanis against their 
government. Hov/ever, they were not totally mum, occasionally they tried 
their best to characterize the agreement as a product of "Soviet American 
plotting". They said that Soviet Union and America had backed India 
against Pakistan and made a common cause against China in pursuing their 
interventionist policy in Asia. Moreover Pakistan's growing closeness to the 
Soviet Union, was all the more distressing to China. Therefore Soviet 
mediatory role in the Indo-Pak dispute was a source of frustration for China. 
Moreover, the increasing attempt of China to play a significant role in the 
Pakistani politics was not to the liking of the Soviet Union. According to it 
the closer Pakistan - China accord had been possible because of the 
Pakistani disgust v/ith the big pow-ers who were thought to have neglected 
her security problem. What Moscow was believing was that Karachi would 
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deliberately move closer to China if no big power was there to restore its 
confidence in the matter of its security vis-a-vis India.^  
There were many indirect evidences from which it can be held that 
China was always trying to end the Soviet mediation in South Asian 
conflict. Two points clearly stood out from which Chinese attitude was 
reflected. Firstly, China had taken certain steps before and during the 
Tashkent. Chinese military pressure on the borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and 
North East Frontier Agency for several months after the Indo-Pakistan, 
ceasefire. Secondly, as mentioned earlier that Chinese strongly worded note 
to India in which China had threatened India to "strike back unless Indian 
intrusions in the Chinese territory" were stopped. This led to a speculation 
that China intended to harm the conference and aimed at strengthening the 
hands of the hardliness in Pakistan Government, particularly those of 
Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto. '^' As Ayub had signed the Tashkent 
Declaration overruling his foreign Minister Bhutto who was deadly opposed 
to the declaration. China could not hold its anger on the declaration and it 
branded the Agreement as a "product of US-Soviet Conspiracy" only when 
the criticism in Pakistan against declaration became more strindent. 
However, China did not call in question the terms of the Declaration. It 
seems they were conscious enough that their image in government quarters 
of Pakistan viz. their direct criticism would have part President Ayub Khan 
in difficulties who was already center of criticism in Pakistan at that time. 
Reacting to the suggestions that Ayub Government had been unnerved by 
the vigor of Chinese diplomacy during the war, they insisted that Sino-
Pakistan friendship was not merely matter of relations between the two 
governments but extended to the two peoples. They urged Pakistan to stand 
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firm in face of Indian pressure. Chinese attitude towards Tashkent also get 
reflected from the quick visits of Liu Shao-chi and Chen yi to Karachi. 
Liu Shao-Chi and Chen Yi in Pakistan ; 
The increasing efforts of Soviet Union to cultivate Pakistan naturally 
made China uneasy. China viewed Soviet efforts a game to isolate China in 
south Asia. Chinese apprehension was also based on the policy of Soviet 
neutrality in Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and its increasing military and 
economic assistance to Karachi. China became sure that Soviet union wants 
to outmanoeuvre us in Pakistan. To counteract the Soviet diplomatic moves, 
China adopted the simple tactics of exposing the hallowness and 
inconsistency behind the Soviet talk of friendship and cooperation with 
Pakistan. China reminded Pakistan soviet union's commitment to India on 
Kashmir, its neutrality during Indo-Pak war of 1965 when Pakistan was 
realy in need of help. Even after few. months of Tashkent on Pakistan's 
National Day in March 1966, Lio-Shao Chi and Chou en-lai pledged that 
"the Chinese people will for ever remain the dependable friends of the 
Pakistani people. China was really worried about that after Tashkent 
Pakistan might come under pressure to come to a settlement with India 
regarding Kashmir, which can bring position at stake. 
In this context Liu Shao chi and vice-premier Chen yi and a large 
contingent of high officials, paid a visit to Pakistan at the end of March 
1966, where they got an unprecedented welcome. Bhutto, shared the 
applause when he was accompanying Liu and Chen. He expressed the 
popular feeling when he told the Chinese that their assistance during the war 
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had made Sino-Pakistan friendship imperishable/^ This expression of 
Pakistani gratitude was in a way a belief in the permanence of the friendship 
between China and Pakistan. 
Liu had praised the government of Pakistan for "sternly" refuting the 
imperialist revisionist "nonsense" that China posed a threat to the security of 
the Indian sub-continent. All the Chinese officials had frequently referred to 
an American-Soviet Indian conspiracy to disrupt Sino-Pakistan friendship, 
which must, however, fail since the two peoples, whose fundamental 
interests were engaged in this relationship, would not countenance it. 
Therefore, "no force on Earth" could undermine their friendship so reasoned 
by Chau en lai and Chen Yi and other dignitaries of China.^ ° They also 
reminded facitly the thought of Mao Tse Tung which also confirmed the 
value of maintaining Sino-Pakistan friendship. Mao had said that one should 
support what the enemy opposed and oppose what he supported. The 
imperialists (US) the revisionists (Soviet Union) and the expansionist (India) 
had all united in opposing Sino-Pakistan friendship, which proved that it had 
been a good thing. 
Chinese leaders in their speeches also brought home the fact to 
Pakistanis that China supported Pakistan in the face of super power's 
opposition. By criticizing the superpower for their efforts to end the conflict 
Chinese were trying to create a goodwill among the Pakistan people. 
Infact there was a decline in the flow of high level visits from China 
to Paksitan after Liu Shao chi's visit to Pakistan, except a stop over by 
premier Chou-en-lai. However, it is interesting to note that when there was 
some slow movement from Chinese side in official visits, the number of 
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official visits from Pakistan to China increased. When Chinese were more 
concerned with their cultural Revolution policy and minimized their 
contacts with outside world at that time President Ayub sent delegation one 
after the other to China to give the impression that there was no "cooling 
off in Pakistan China relations. 
In October 1966 Foreign Minsiter Sharifuddin Pirzada paid a visit to 
China. However, Chinese, were suspicious about Bhutto's replacement by 
Pirzada. Within a week of Pirzada's assumption of office Chinese Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi said : 
The US imperialism and the Soviet modern revisionists do not like 
Sino-Pakistan friendship, nor do the Indian expansionists, they try to 
undermine the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two 
countries.^' 
... the United States and the Soviet Union are trying by every means 
possible to plot joint India Pakistan opposition to China; this is detrimental 
to China and is also harmful to Pakistan.^ ^ 
Peerzada assured Chinese that Pakistan would not change its policy 
towards China at the instance of the superpowers. He also made Chinese 
aware about the circumstances under which Pakistan was improving its 
relations with Soviet union and United States. October 1966 visit was 
significant also in the manner that it was aimed also at silencing the 
domestic criticism on account of Bhutto's dismissal. It also created an 
impression that Pakistan China relations had not cooled down. 
It was the time, when Pakistan was in thirst of arms from anyside. 
Both Soviet Union and United States were feeling the need of Pakistan and 
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it was good chance for them to divert Pakistan from China. Keeping in view 
Pakistan's anxiety to procure arms, Peking decided to increase its 
involvement with Pakistan in defence field. This was manifested in the form 
of an invitation to Vice Admiral A.R. Khan by vice chairman of Chinese 
National defence council to promote close contacts between the armed 
forces of the two countries. Above this there were two goodwill delegations 
in September October 1967 and in October 1968 sent to China by Pakistan 
to further strengthen the ties between the peoples of the two countries. 
Pak response to Chinese Rhetoric : 
Pakistani officials were cautious in responding to the Chinese 
rhetoric. Although they thanked Chinese for their role during the war, 
referred to historic links between the people of the tv^ fo countries and the 
obvious fact that the two are neighbour and asserted that both were peace 
loving and that their friendship and cooperation would promote peace in the 
region. But as a matter of fact the Sino-Pakistan friendship, was founded on 
their national interests and the desire of the two peoples to strengthen "good 
neighbour ties". They wanted to have friendly relations with all the 
countries" and especially with neighbours, they avoided any reference to 
revisionists or the imperialists. 
It is worth to mention that Pakistani officials even if remained 
reticent to refer the role of great powers i.e. USA and Soviet Union, they 
could not refrain themselves to negate the Tashkent declaration. For instance 
Ayub informed Liu in no uncertain terms that Pakistan did not consider the 
Tashkent declaration as a compromise of her stand on Kashmir. Nor has the 
declaration weakened our resolve to defend our independence and 
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sovereignty or to pursue a policy guided by the interests of our country", 
declared Ayub openly in a address, welcoming the Chinese president. 
Likewise Bhutto plainly told his guest that "we shall never abandon the just 
cause of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.^ '' 
In short, the impression the Chinese leaders got from their talks in 
Pakistan was that there was nothing in the Tashkent that China should be 
afraid of and that Pakistan considered the Tashkent declaration of intent, not 
a contract between India and Pakistan to settle their disputes, including the 
one concerning Kashmir. In the joint communique, issued on 31 March 
1966, the leaders of both the countries reiterated their earlier stand that "the 
Kashmiri people's right of self determination must be respected and that the 
Kashmir dispute must be settled in accordance with the wishes of the 
Kashmiri people.''^  However Ayub had not been very happy over the way in 
which his country was being gradually led by some of his close advisors to 
the orbit of china. He would have been really perturbed over the popular 
enthusiasm in Pakistan for the Chinese support during the war while he was 
aware of the reality. He thought that Pakistan's other allies can 
misunderstand our hobnobbing with China. He was suspecting that it might 
annoy great powers like USA and USSR who are having potential to help 
economically as well as militarily to Pakistan for repairing the war damaged 
country, Ayub therefore, had been in favour of following in future ago slow 
policy with regard to China and was opposed to any effort that would 
unnecessarily cause annoyance and displeasure in Moscow and Washington. 
As has been mentioned earlier by Ayub Khan during his visit to Washington 
in December 1965 that Pakistan had developed her intimacy with China in 
her own national interest and not for usina it as a lever against the west. He 
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further pointed out in Washington that the geo-political situation of Pakistan 
was such that it required the maintenance of very good relations with the 
Soviet Union as well as with China.^ ^ He was also keen to develop relations 
with Soviet Union at the same time. As he declared in November 1966 in 
London that ''Pakistan's relations with Russia was growing in depth". But at 
home Ayub faced considerable opposition from some of his critics who were 
against any move for bettering the country's relations with the big powers at 
the cost of Pakistan-China friendship. 
Begining of Strategic Collaboration : 
Throughout the sixties Sino-Pakistan relations continued to grow, 
China took a distinct Pro-Pakistan stand in India's war v/ith Pakistan in 
1965, although this support did not widen into an open commitment on the 
part of China to militarily engage with India. 
It is well known that during the seventies Sino-Pakistani relations 
assumed new dimensions. Pakistan became the secret conduit for 
normalization of relations between China and the United states which 
ultimately developed into a United Front including the US-led western camp 
and its followers, the PRC and Pakistan against the Soviet led socialist bloc, 
including the non-aligned India. Inspite of this anti-Indian and anti Soviet 
grand alliance between Pakistan, China and United States, the third Indo-
Pak war leading to the dismemberment of East Pakistan and the creation of 
an independent Bangladesh occurred in 1971. 
Two issues further cemented the anti-Indian element of Sino 
Pakistani relations. The first was changing posture on Kashmir, from one of 
neutrality to open support for the right of the people of Kashmir to national 
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self determination by supporting and reinforcing the Pakistani demand for a 
UN-sponsored plebiscite in Kashmir. 
The second issue which provided a further axis of convergence 
between China and Pakistan concerned India's peaceful nuclear explosion at 
Pokhran in 1974. It was severely criticized both by China and Pakistan. 
China began to support the Pakistan's call for a nuclear free zone in South 
Asia aimed at neutralizing India's putative nuclear programme. At the same 
time, PRC also began to secretly aid Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile 
programmes and increased substantively its assistance in conventional arms 
to Pakistan. Construction of northern routes was initiation of the Sino-Pak 
grand design. 
Karakoram Highway : The construction of the Karakoram highway 
vindicates the substantial content of Pakistan China relations. The two 
countries constructed the 800 kilometer Karakoram highway to link their 
territories together. However its exact length is not known. The stretch 
between Gilgit and Morkhun conformed to an agreement reached in 1966 
and built in 1969. Later the road from Morkhun and Khunjarab pass was 
built on the basis of another agreement concluded between them on 21 
October 1969.^ ^ It appears that soon after the conclusion of the Sino-Pak 
Boundary Agreement on 2 March 1963 the work of constructing these roads 
started while Pakistan and China observed secrecy about the construction of 
these roads. Reports about it began to appear in the Indian newspapers and 
some western newspapers as early as March 1964.^ ^ At a ceremony at Baltit 
in Hunza on 16 February 1971 the Karakoram Highway was declared open 
and said to have replaced Ihc old Carawan Silk route.^^ These agreements 
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made the Karakoram in Chou's words "the bonds of friendship between the 
Chinese and Pakistani peoples".^ 
The Karakoram highway for the first time made the great mineral 
wealth of Karakoram mountains accessible to Pakistan. Traditionally, the 
area north to Gilgit traded far more with Xinjiang than with the plains of 
Pakistan. Now the Karakoram highway carries Pakistan's manufactures and, 
perhaps more importantly, the Pakistan governments administration of this 
remote area. The mineral deposits of the area also travelling down to 
manufacturing centers in Pakistan. The Karakoram highway thus served 
important economic and political purposes for Pakistan.'' 
The Karakoram highway that run's through occupied Kashmir has 
immense implications for the security of India. Commenting on this, 
Mahnaz Isphani wrote : 
The Karakoram Highway (KKH) has interfered in the political 
military relationship between Central and South Asia. No single highway 
has run through such sensitive territor)' through an area, where the borders 
of Pakistan, India, China, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan come close 
together. By traversing these lands, the Karakoram highway and its 
associated routes have posed threats and presented opportunities to all states 
of the region. On the importance of third countries in India-China 
relations, Isphani continues -
These routes have balanced the Soviet Union's close relation with 
India with a stronger Sino-Pakistani tie. The KKH has been the geocentric 
place of Chinese economic and military aid to Pakistan... China's own 
broad political and military purpose in south Asia resulted in the 
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development of the Northern areas. China has used the KKH as a form of 
"stadium diplomacy" and simultaneously strengthened ties with the enemy 
of its enemy. Although the route has yet to be used in war time, Pakistan and 
China have used it to send strong messages to their rivals and neighbours. 
Especially as the stretch of the Morkhun Khunjerab Pass connects the 
occupied Kashmir road network with the Lhasa Sinkiang Highway it 
encircles the North western areas of Jammu and Kashmir. On account of 
this, Srinagar becomes vulnerable as China can rapidly move her forces 
from western Tibet to northern Kashmir during a military confrontation with 
India.^ ^ 
In view of the strategic concern over the Karakoram highway (KKH) 
the then Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh made a statement to the 
LokSabhain 1969. 
This road will help to extend the Chinese road network in the Tibet 
Sinkiang area into northern Kashmir. It will give easier access to Chinese 
troops from the areas under the legal occupation of China in northeast 
Kashmir and from Tibet into the Gilgit area in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir 
(P.O.K.) which lies to the North of the ceasefire line. The military 
significance of this road is therefore self evident.''^  Showing the concern 
over the construction of this highway the Chief Minister of Jammu and 
Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah stated that the KKH impinged on the National 
interests of India in context of Kashmir.^ '' Besides, he pointed out the need 
for concern'** over the another road, the Mustagh Highway from Skardu in 
P.O.K. to Yarkhand in Sinkiang. In September 1978, the then External 
affairs Minister A.B. Vajpayee speaking in parliament emphasized the 
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security problems resulting from the completion of the Mustagh Highway 
built form skardu in P.O.K. to yarkhand in Sinkiang.^ ^ the significance of 
the Mustagh Highway was that (like the KKH) Pakistan undertook its 
construction with Chinese assistance. 
It is already mentioned that the karakoram friendship highway was 
"Hewn out of rocky mountains", Pakistan does not claim exclusive credit for 
completing this extremely tortuous and hazardous feat of engineering which 
at many places passes over mountains more than 15,000 feet high. At the 
Baltit ceremony Gen Abdul Hamid, who represented the Pakistani side, 
conceded that the road could not have been built without China's "valuable 
assistance and cooperation".^" 
It is interesting that both Pakistan and China have emphasized only 
the economic importance of these roads, ofcourse there is no doubt in that 
but it does not stand to reason that Pakistan and China have moved by 
economic considerations alone. Infact, political and strategic considerations 
have overweighed with Rawalpindi and Peking. In the construction of these 
roads Pakistani policy makers must have seen a prospect of Chinese support 
against India during the course of a war with India in the form of military 
supplies through these roads and a physical pressure. These roads have, 
therefore, political value for Pakistan. For China these roads have strategic 
value. China has obtained an alternative source of supply for its garrison in 
Sinkiang and Tibet. China has been anxious to insure against any possible 
Soviet moves to intercept the military equipment or supplies into Sinkiang. 
Prior to the construction of these roads China was confronted with such 
logistic problems. Moreover China has strengthened its strategic and 
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political position in the Pamir's, where there is a concentration of interests 
of India, China, former Soviet Union and Pakistan and even Afghanistan. 
Although objectively the KKH may not be an ideal logistics route, it 
has been important to foreign and security policy makers. Its presence has 
put India on the psychological defensive in Kashmir, brought China into the 
Kashmir quarrel on Pakistan's side; and enhanced Sino-Pakistani military, 
cooperation. The decision to construct these northern routes and the angry 
responses of the former Soviet Union and India, suggests the regional 
political significance of the KKH. 
Indian's genuinely contend that the road links represented Sino-
Pakistan threat to their security. If, in the absence of these links, China 
wanted to put pressure on Indian Kashmir, she would either have to pull 
troops away from her border with the Soviet Union 220 miles south of 
Mintaka or from India's northern border hundreds of miles upto the Aksai 
chin road all the way to kashgar and then Southward to Mintaka pass. The 
distance involved had been reduced substantially with the building of the 
Morkund Khunjareb track linking the Tibet Sinkiang road with the Gilgit 
Sinkiang road. The Indian Government protested to the Chinese and accused 
them of pursuing a "diabolic policy" with regard to Kashmir. '^ The 
Karakoram highway has become an important life-line between Pakistan and 
China and has helped in the economic and social emancipation of hitherto 
backward regions. It has facilitated the development of natural resources in 
its vicinity. The distance between various cities of Xinjiang has been 
reduced with the building of subsidiary tracts linking the Tibet-Xianjiang 
road and Gilgit Xinjiang road. The Tibet Xianjiang Road through Aksaichin 
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has also been linked with the Karakoram Highway. The London based 
financial Times described the KKH as China's new Trade outlet to Africa 
and Middle East. 
In the current strategic Jargon, the Karakoram Highway is termed as 
"Chinese window" opening towards southern Asia. China used the highway 
to supply weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen via this route in the eighties. 
It was believed that the arms for Afghan mujahideen were routed through 
Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway. It has really strategic concerns for 
Indian security. 
On 16"^  may 1983, Pakistan and China opened the 4,620 meter high 
Khunjarab pass at the terminus of Chinese built Karakoram highway for 
regular Travel and Trade. Under a protocol signed in Islamabad in August 
1982, the Khunjerab pass was opened. Both Pakistan and China rejected an 
Indian protest, reiterating that they had no right to enter into an international 
84 
agreement over an area under the illegal occupation of Pakistan. 
th 
India voiced a fear when the pass was formally opened on 27 August 
1982, that the move would effect India's sovereignty and security as it 
involved setting up of additional border posts in the area. The terrain 
through Vk'hich the pass meanders is wide enough to accommodate two army 
tanks side by side. By way of comparison, the road that leads to Nathu La 
from Gongtok, Sikkim's capital, has been built inside the slopes of 
mountains that form like a canopy over a considerable length.^ ^ 
Pakistan and China agreed to provide transportation facilities to 
tourists in their respective areas. Three times before opening of the pass, 
India had protested to Pakistan over the Karakoram highway - first when 
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construction began in June 1969, a second time when it was inaugurated 
nine years later and finally in February 1982 on the highway being opened 
to foreign tourists upto Batura bridge; about fifty kilometers short of the 
86 
pass. 
The strategic importance of the Karakoram highway is very obvious. 
It links Xinjiang with Tibet through the Aksai chin as already mentioned. In 
case of an attack on Pakistan by sea, military aid from China can reach 
Pakistan through this route. The bridges on the KKH are capable of carrying 
light weight tanks. To protect the highway from subversion small military 
bases along the highway have been constructed. Despite the apparent 
vulnerability of the road, its usefulness in time of peace and war is 
conspicuously apparent. 
Managing Sino-US Detente : 
One of the important developments in the international strategic 
horizon in the early seventies was Sino-American normalization initiated by 
the Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in the summer of 1971 and the 
consequent emergence of strategic axis comprising of China Pakistan and 
USA. This triangular relation greatly impinged India's security. Pakistan 
was used as a conduit by the United States in its China opening. This 
coincided with the deteriorating in India's security environment. 
For the United States, their Pakistan China hook-up was of great 
importance. The United States was really not concerned with the problems 
of India and East Pakistan or with the suffering of 75 million people of 
Bangladesh. Kissinger was reported to have warned Mrs. Gandhi in the 
summer of 1971 that if there was a war in the sub-continent, China may not 
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remain aloof and the United states might not support India as it had done in 
1962.^ ^ 
Responding to the international situation and the US-Pakistan-China 
axis which was being forged, India signed a treaty of Friendship with Russia 
on August 9, 1971. this treaty brought immense psychological relief and 
strength to India. It was of great strategic value to India. The fear of that the 
Indian army had always at "war on two fronts", was set at rest. The treaty 
not only constituted a countervailing force to the Sino-American strategic 
designs, but also ably served India's security interests without 
compromising on its policy of non-alignment by acting as a deterrent against 
Chinese or American interference in the December 1971 war. 
East Pakistan crises 
The advent of the 1970's not only saw a change in the pattern of 
power politics at the international level, it had also witnessed a complete 
transformation in the very profile of south Asian security complex as a third 
most important power - Bangladesh had arrived on the scene. In south 
Asia the most important geopolitical change was the breakup of Pakistan as 
a resuh of the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971. For China, this had not 
only made India the most powerful country in the South Asia but nullified 
their unique leverage from two sides i.e. East and West Pakistan. Followed 
Indo-Soviet treaty and India's nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974, all this 
was to compel Beijing to enhance its indulgence with weakened West 
Pakistan as East Pakistan i.e. Bangladesh was now friendly to India. This 
was to result in China deciding to strengthen Pakistan and finally conceding 
nuclear weapons and missiles which was formalized in an agreement of 
September 1974.^ ° 
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The Bangladesh liberation struggle of 1971 was regarded by China 
purely as internal matter of the then Pakistan. It was regarded by China as an 
Indian attempt to find an excuse for intrusion in that country. China viewed 
with great concern the dangerous situation that arose suddenly between 
India and Pakistan. China claimed that the purpose of their issuing a 
warning was that the Sabre rattling indulged in certain quarters in India may 
lead Indian forces violating the frontiers of Pakistan as it would be regarded 
a victim of aggression.^' 
The crisis in the East Pakistan began during March 1971 when the 
Pakistan Army imposed martial law, arrested Sheikh Mujib and other 
Awami leaders, besides declaration of Press Censorship. As a result from 25 
March 1971, the influx of refugees in to India gradually grew into 
phenomenal proportions over the next few weeks. After the refugees crossed 
over into India it ceased to be an internal problem of Pakistan but instead 
amounted to an internationalization of the crisis.^ ^ 
In view of these developments that involved the making of the new 
nation of Bangladesh there arose a clash of interests between India and 
China viewed from the Indocentric perspective, the refugee influx from 
Bangladesh was a demographic aggression that enfeebled the economy so as 
to distort development plan. Mrs. Gandhi stated : "we feel it is a new kind 
of aggression. It certainly casts an unconscionable economic burden on us 
and has created political and social tensions endangering our security.^ "' 
Foreign Minister Swaran Singh also described the refugee influx as an 
unprecedented Civilian invasion, in a speech before the UN security Council 
Debate (12 December, 1971) he said that 10 million refusees had crossed 
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over to India and that the government had made an additional provision of 
Rs. 330 crores in its annual budget for 1971-72.^ '' 
In the process these developments had an impact on the Indian 
economy that in turn affected her national security. However, China held 
that the refugees fled from Bangladesh at Indian instigation.^^ China 
protested about Indian interference in Pakistan's affairs. It also accused the 
Indian Government about having a hand in the public demonstration to 
protest against Chinese support to Pakistan. The demonstration was held 
outside the Chinese Embassy on 29 March 1971 at New Delhi.^ ^ 
A few days later China clarified her commitment to Pakistan through 
an article in Peoples Daily that also criticized India, it stated : 
"The Indian reactionaries were making remarks over the Pakistan 
situation, the Indian government massed troops along the East Pakistan 
border and even instigated armed personnel to infiltrate into Pakistan's 
territory for disruption and harassment".^ ^ 
The Chinese probably realized the strategic and diplomatic 
importance of keeping Pakistan United against the Soviet Union and India. 
The geographical spread of Pakistan was of special advantage to China since 
the mainland of India lies between the two wings of Pakistan, China could 
create trouble for India in the west as well as in the East. In their longterm 
policy planning towards South Asia, the Chinese had visualized the 
importance of Pakistan right from the beginning.^ ^ 
For China the creation of Bangladesh meant the inability to pose a 
two front threat to India in conjunction with Pakistan. Even otherwise, 
China would have preferred a hostile rather than a friendly nation bordering 
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India. To that extent, the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent 
political entity went against Chinese foreign policy interests.^^ 
Though China would rather see the issue of Bangladesh movement 
peacefully resolved between the disputants at the initial stage, and therefore 
took no sides in the domestic scene in Pakistan, China was rendering strong 
verbal support to Islamabad. While support was being given as against 
India, at another level the Chinese were urging negotiations. The Chinese 
kept a low profile till India's intervention abruptly negated the prospect of 
prolonged struggle and the emergence of a Bangladesh under Indo Soviet 
assistance seemed to be in the offing. China's decision to lie low is 
evidenced by the fact that no arms were sent to Pakistan until October, i.e. 
until after the Indo-Soviet treaty. Also, the failure of Bhutto's military 
mission to China in November 1971 supports this.'°° 
Sheldon W. Simon offers on interesting argument about the Chinese 
rationale towards Bangladesh. Especially in the context of Sino-Taiwan ties 
the Chinese posture on the developments in East Pakistan were important to 
quote : 
Pekings insistence that the East Bengal issue was an internal affair 
paralleled its own conception of Taiwan. And the fact that both Taiwan and 
East Pakistan were populated by different cultural groups from their "home 
governments" rendered the isomorphism between the two cases painfully 
evident to Peking. Thus, approval of Bangladesh might later be turned 
against Pekings own claims on Taiwan.'°' 
In view of these considerations the potential for Chinese intervention 
existed. Both Pakistan and the US cautioned India about the possibility of 
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Chinese action in the northeast. This obviously created a problem for Indian 
security planners. 
In the beginning Indian anxiety arose from the Chinese prime 
Minister's promise to provide Pakistan all possible support against any 
threat from India. On 12 April 1971, Radio Pakistan referred to a message 
from Prime Minister Chou en lai to President Yahya Khan that stated : 
Should Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against 
Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support 
the Pakistan government and people, in their struggle to safeguard state 
sovereignty and national independence. 
Thereafter on 19 July 1971 Yahya Khan in an interview with the Financial 
Times (London) said : 
Pakistan will not be alone if India forces a war upon us. 
In what appeared to be a timely reassurance, the acting Chinese 
Foreign Minister vindicated the earlier policy of friendship with Pakistan. 
This was actually a part of media diplomacy. He told Bhutto at a banquet in 
Ekijing that: 
Should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese 
government and people, would resolutely support Pakistan." '^* 
It can be said that during the Bangladesh crisis, China's attitude had 
been of downright hostility. Even before the hostilities broke out on 3'"'^  
December 1971, China had sent, on Yahya Khan's request, 200 guerrilla 
experts in October to train Pakistan forces for which 20 training camps were 
set up in the jungle near Dacca. This was in addition to the various types of 
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weaponry that China had supplied to Pakistan for the latters use during the 
conflict. It was reported that during the war one hundred lorries loaded with 
military supplies for the advance depots arrived daily in Gilgit from 
Sinkiang. The commander-in-chief of Bangladesh army General Osmany 
told Washington post on 16 January 1975 that uninformed Chinese soldiers 
operated along with the Pakistan army during the war in training its 
personnel in several roles. 
China viewed the 1971 war in Bangladesh was an attempt on the part 
of India to deprive Pakistan of its eastern wing and thereby achieve its 
expansionist ambitions of adding more territory at the cost of Pakistan. 
China felt upset by the liberation of Bangladesh. It was angry because it feh 
impotent to stop the tide of events. When Bangladesh was lost by Pakistan 
Chou en lai himself had said that the liberation of Dacca was not a milestone 
to Indian victory but start of a long period of war in the subcontinent.'°^ It 
was held by some British journalist that the Chinese military advisers were 
assisting Pakistani troops with the strategy that the Chinese were known to 
I 07 
have used in Korea. China accused India of launching an invasion over 
East Pakistan and finally occupying it at the cost of the territorial integrity 
of Pakistan. After the end of Bangladesh war, the main object of Chinese 
criticism v/as Indo-Soviet treaty which according to Chou en lai had to serve 
some ulterior purpose. He was sure that India was bent upon waging war 
against Pakistan and if war broke out China would openly support Pakistan. 
In the end, India would taste a bitter fruit of its own making. "^ ^ 
After the Bangladesh's liberation China tried to keep India 
preoccupied with defence problems. It send second protest note over illegal 
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Indian incursions across the Sikkim border was no surprise for Indians. 
China was thinking that Bangladesh would soon develop friction with India. 
This coupled with pinpricks on the Sino-Indian borders would prevent India 
from deriving advantage of strategy or prestige from the military victory 
over Pakistan. 
In the U.N., the Chinese delegate branded India as an aggressor. 
China voted in the security council in favour of the US resolution asking for 
ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and posting of UN observers along the 
border. He also observed that the present armed aggression by the Indian 
government against Pakistan was carried out with the connivance and 
support of the Soviet Union. In the decolonisation committee, the Chinese 
delegate said that India had violated the U.N. charter principles by invading 
Pakistan and refusing to withdraw its troops from the occupied Pakistani 
territory.'" 
In the years after Bangladesh crisis China continued to insist that it 
'Would not waive its veto to the proposal of admitting Bangladesh as a 
member of the UN unless India fulfilled certain conditions. The conditions 
were withdrawal of Indian forces to the territory and release of all prisoners 
of v/ar and other civilian entrance in terms of the 1949 Geneva convention. 
In Chinese view it was with the Soviet support extended to India 
through the Indo-Soviet treaty signed in 1971 that Bangladesh could secede 
from Pakistan. India strongly rebutted this presumption. Mrs. Gandhi went 
so far as to say that it was the Chinese strategy and attitude that stood in the 
way of improving relations between the two countries (China and India). No 
other factors, much less the Indo Soviet Treaty of August 1971, had 
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anything to do with the developments in the east wing of Pakistan which 
resuhed in the latters dismemberment. 
When Bhutto gained power, he preferred to pay a visit which was 
arranged at his own initiative in February 1972. He briefed Chou about how 
his country was left weakened both militarily as well as politically and how 
to retrieve Pakistan's lost prestige in the subcontinent. China's ready made 
suggestion to him was to adopt a tough line against India. He maintained 
that China's friendship would be cherished in Pakistan. After Bhutto's visit, 
China supplied significant military economic assistance on very generous 
terms and pledged her support for Pakistan's integrity. China supported 
Pakistan in getting her prisoners of war released in 1973. 
After the liberation war the Chinese placed the onus of continued 
Indo-Pak tension on India and that they expected the latter to normalize its 
relations with Islamabad as a precedent to any improvement in its ties with 
China. China never accepted Indian view of its difficulties with Pakistan and 
why it had not allowed any 3'^ party to interfere in matters relating to its ties 
with its neighbours."^ 
China supported Pakistan in getting her prisoners of war released in 
1973. These friendly overtures were responded by Pakistan as well. The 
Chinese media warned about the endless struggle in South Asia implying 
that China would continue to foment trouble on Sino-Indian frontier."'* On 
17 December, the day India won the war, premier Chou en lai condemned 
India. He said : 
Indian reactionaries act of naked aggression... the Indian 
expansionists v^ i^eld ambition to annex Pakistan and bring about a great 
empire... Henceforth there will be no tranquility for the Indian people."^ 
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However Pakistan did not seem happy over Pekings role during the 
14 day war as it was in 1965 war with India. Pakistan was misled by 
repeated Chinese assertions of resolute support for Pakistan. However China 
gave excuse of existence of Indo Soviet Treaty of August 1971, which China 
described as a Treaty of military alliance. It also pleaded, by the 
concentration of Soviet forces on China's long borders Peking was left with 
no choice but to stay a passive on looker of the scene. Although it is 
generally acknowledged that the Indo-Soviet Treaty helped to keep the 
Chinese at bay at least militarily. But Dr. Subramaniam Swamy thinks 
otherwise."^ In his view this treaty did not really stymie Chinese 
intervention during the 1971 Indo Pak war. He argues that the Chinese 
invaded Vietnam in 1979 despite the existence of a USSR-Vietnamese 
Treaty. So the Indo Soviet Treaty could not have deterred china. So China's 
relatively mild reaction to the war of 1971 in comparison with the ultimatum 
it served in 1965 raises a question. Although China strongly criticized India 
for carrying out "interference and subversion", assured Pakistan of 
assistance in case of any foreign aggression" and supported the effort of its 
people to "defend their state sovereignty and national independence". 
However the Chinese assurance, revealingly enough, avoided any mention 
of the term "territorial integrity", which ruled out any possibility of Chinese 
1 I 7 
intervention in the war. It is fact that China offered liberally arms and 
equipment needed by Pakistan during the war. This was perhaps in return for 
the role played by Pakistan 'as an advance party for Nixon's trip to China 
which itself was arranged through Pakistan."^ 
Thus after the cessasion of East Pakistan, China continued to extend 
military and economic assistance to Pakistan to help it rebuild its armed 
forces and its economy, as well as its self-confidence. 
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Chapter - 4 
Strategic and JHllltafy Dlmcaslon la 
5lno-Tak ^Relations 
Chapter- 4 
STRATEGIC AND MILITARY DIMENSION IN SINO-PAK 
RELATIONS 
Maintaining strategic collaboration has been one of the main 
objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy. It was further strengthened when in 
the 1970's Pakistan signed with China various protocols on collaboration in 
defence, economic development and trade etc. China proved one of the most 
reliable sources of arms supplies to Pakistan at relatively reduced prices and 
generous terms. In addition to a continuous arms supplier, Beijing helped 
Islamabad in the local production of unspecified weapons and ammunition, 
and other heavy machinery' unlike western loans the Chinese aid 
programmes were often meant for defence industrial projects. China gave 
economic and military aid to Pakistan whenever it was badly needed and it 
continues to flow to this day on a regular basis. Ever since the war of 1965 
China was assisting Pakistan's arms buildup and it reached its Zenith in 
1979. The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan further cemented their 
friendship. 
China shared advanced technologies with Pakistan and always tried 
substantially to overcome its ally from perpetual dependence on the west for 
arms and technological development. Chinese assistance in arms has to a 
large extent contributed substantially towards Pakistan's self reliance and 
indigenisation of weapons capabilities. China was never constrained by any 
international arms control regime or international public opinion, in her 
arms export policies toward Pakistan. China's continued cooperation has 
contributed substantially to enhance the influence and role of Pakistan's 
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military within the decision-making structures which were already 
dominated by the armed forces^ Undoubtedly this multifaceted cooperation 
between China and Pakistan has to a large extent strengthened Pakistan's 
security vis-a-vis India and naturally endangered latters security. 
Until well into the 1970's by all accounts, China had nothing to do 
with the Pakistani nuclear programme. Even today, we do not know 
perfectly what kind of technical cooperation developed between them 
subsequently. What kind of transfers ? or designs ? words like "aid", "help", 
"collaboration" leave many question unanswered."^  But if we look at the 
different reports leaked from different quarters particularly American 
intelligence reports and even also the statements of the ruling Elites of the 
Pakistan and China and International public opinion we get persuaded to 
believe that some collaboration did take place, possibly over last three 
decades or more. 
Pakistan's desire to develop its nuclear arsenal arose out of the defeat 
of its forces in the war of 1971. It felt that in order to face India's challenge 
of conventional arms, the only option at its disposal was to attain the nuclear 
weapon status. Thus it started its nuclearisation programme since 1972 
under the guidance of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, though for reasons of financial 
constraints and diplomatic pressure, it could not make any headway. India's 
nuclear experiment at Pokhran in May 1974 infuriated Bhutto so much so 
that he was reported to have pledged that Pakistan would even eat grass but 
make a bomb."* 
Beijings motivations in transferring nuclear and missile materials and 
technology to Pakistan derive largely from the Chinese concerns about the 
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regional balance of power and is part of a Chinese effort to pursue a strategy 
of containment in its enduring riyalry with India. In supplying war material 
to Pakistan on a liberal scale, China pleaded that it had to meet the 
requirements of Pakistan to maintain its credibility as an ally.^  Within this 
context, it is important for our purposes to examine the defence, nuclear and 
missile dimension of Sino-Pakistan collaboration. 
Defence Cooperation : 
The most significant, controversial and perhaps fundamental feature 
of Sino-Pakistani ties during the last 3/4 decades has been a multipronged 
defence cooperation between the two states. Pakistan has consistently 
remained one of the top five recipients of Chinese arms during the seventies 
and eighties when Beijing supplied weapons for political and geo-strategic 
reasons.^ 
Over the last 35 years, Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation has been 
stimulated and sustained by the two country's, long standing problems with 
and common hostility to India. Especially for Islamabad, the search for 
security vis-a-vis New Delhi has been the single most important factor 
motivating it to strengthen its defence capabilities, a process in which 
Beijing has clearly played godfather. 
Pakistan's defence effort evolved in the context of its internal 
instability is a fact. Pakistan began seeking help to build up its armed forces 
from almost the time it was born and by the mid 1950's. In search of 
defence it had become an important member of various military alliances 
with western powers. These alliances included the Central treaty 
Organisation (CENTO) and the South East Asian Treaty Organisation 
171 
(SEATO). As a result, Pakistan began to receive a regular flow of weapons 
and equipment from western suppliers, who wanted to make Pakistan a 
partner in their containment of giant communist states - the Soviet Union 
and People's China. However repeated Arms embargoes by the United 
States, and the initial success of India's experiments with indigenisation and 
self reliance, pushed Pakistan towards China. Pakistan had begun to build 
defence ties with China as part of its effort to diversify its sources of 
weapons supplies, and indigenise production of its defence related 
equipment. This friendship was later strengthened by the Sino-Indian and 
Indo-Pakistan wars of 1962 and 1965, following which Beijing began to 
visualize Pakistan as its major ally in dealing with India. 
Genesis : 
American military assistance to Pakistan stopped when the Indo 
Pakistan war began in September 1965. US arms embargo of September 08, 
1965, by which Washington stopped all military supplies to both India and 
Pakistan was viewed by Pakistan biased, because it was the Pakistani forces 
that were completely dependent on US equipment. The realization that 
absence of American replenishments would have left Pakistani forces 
defenceless within weeks was the main factor behind Islamabad's search for 
alternate sources of weapons supplies. 
The western armament producing nations and the Soviet Union were 
all. in varying degrees, hesitant to sell arms to Pakistan for fear of alienating 
India.'^  So China became Pakistan's natural choice and the preferred source 
of weapons. This seemed appropriate since both countries had recently 
fought wars with India. China too was not so inhibited. Pakistan turned to 
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her even though her production and stockpile capabilities were modest as 
compared to those of the western powers or the Soviet Union Pakistan 
received a token supply of Chinese weapons during or shortly after, the 
1965 war, since then China has continued to be a major source of arms 
supplies to Pakistan. 
One of the dominating factors behind the Chinese encouragement to 
military build-up could be the reason that like Pakistan, the Chinese ruling 
hierarchy was heavily influenced by army personnel.'° It can also be held 
that more definite signs of Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation appeared 
during 1965, when immediately before and during the Indo-Pakistan war, 
China not only sided openly with Pakistan and put its armed forces at the 
Indian border on full alert, but also threatened India with dire consequence. 
Perhaps China would have played a more concrete role if India had lacked 
Soviet support." The first Sino Pakistani defence co-operation agreement 
was signed some time at the end of 1965. This was made public only on 
March 23, 1966, when on the occasion of Pakistan's National Day 
celebrations, the fly past was led by four Chinese MIG 19s flown by newly 
trained Pakistani pilots. Chinese T-59 Tanks were also rolled out as part of 
the parade. It was latter reported that Pakistan had already acquired from 
China 3,000 assault guns, 100 mortars, 5 T-59 MBTs, 40-60 MIG-19s and 
10 IL-28 bombers by May 1966. By this time, about 150 Pakistani pilots had 
received training for the newly acquired MIG-19s in China and had returned 
to active duty in Pakistan.'^ The Sino Pak joint ventures in defence 
production started with the setting up of a factory for the production of 
assault rifles at Ghazipur in East Pakistan. The contracts for this had been 
concluded by the middle of 1967, but were not made public until June 1968. 
[73 
The factory became operational in April 1970. Later, China also provided 
technical and financial assistance for setting up another ordinance factory 
near Dhaka. However all these factories were lost to the newly independent 
state of Bangladesh."" According to another estimate by January 1968 China 
had supplied to Pakistan 30 MIG-17s and 60-MIG 19s. An equal number of 
planes of undisclosed kind were to be delivered by the end of 1968. Besides 
this 7000 assault guns and about five hundred 60 millimeter mortars were 
given to Pakistan. China was reported to have established several secret 
guerilla training centers in East Pakistan, the Pak occupied Kashmir and on 
the mainland itself to train "trusted" Pakistanis as arsenists, propagandists, 
anti-paratroopers and Saboteurs.'"* The Chinese experts were giving training 
under the supervision of General Liu, who had returned from certain African 
countries, after organizing such guerilla training centers. It was reported by 
June 1966 that a full division of Pakistan army had received training from 
the Chinese. This division was equipped with Chinese weapons. Guerilla 
training was imparted to the Mujahids and Ansars and similar irregular 
formations.'^ 
The requirements of defence equipment have always been given top 
priority by Pakistan's military regime as is evident from the case of Taxila 
complex which was originally designed to produce complete plants for 
factories and sugar mills, earth moving equipment, low pressure boilers etc. 
But it was, however, decided later that the complex would be used for 
producing many kinds of heavy machinery and armaments of various 
types.'^ It is worthwhile to mention that the first public expression of China 
Pakistan strategic partnership came not from China but from Pakistan. 
Making his first well knov/n public proclamation, General Ayub Khan was 
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quoted by the Washington post of 12, September 1963 that "if India grows 
menacingly strong, Pakistan might feel compelled to enter into a military 
pact with China". This U turn was dramatic because until late 1959, he had 
been unrelenting in convincing India for a "joint defence" for the 
I 7 
subcontinent against the Chmese. 
Although Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation started in 1965-66, the 
real foundation for Pakistan's conventional weapons built through active 
Chinese collaboration was raised during the tenure of President Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto.'^ However, the emergence of Bangladesh also provided a great 
boost to Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation in terms of rebuilding the 
conventional weapons production sector of the remainder of Pakistan. Apart 
from his much publicized obsession with building a nuclear deterrent against 
India's conventional superiority, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was also equally 
determined to strengthen Pakistan's indigenous capabilities in conventional 
defence technologies. It was during his short tenure of five years, as 
Pakistan's supreme leader, that the foundations of Pakistan's defence 
facilities in conventional weapons were laid, with Chinese assistance. These 
involved the Heavy mechanical Complex (HMC); Heavy Foundry (HF) and 
a whole range of defence related Industries, the most noticeable of which 
was Pakistan's largest aeronautical complex at Kamra near Attak.'^ In terms 
of establishing formal channels of Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation, 
Eihutto signed a protocol on collaboration in defence production in May 
1974. This was followed by the setting up of a joint Sino-Pakistani military 
committee in 1976. This was not China's first enterprise in west Pakistan. 
It had also been working on other production lines, like one for the 
manufacture of recoilless gun ammunition at Pakistan's Wah Industrial 
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complex, which had been coming up near Karachi since the mid-1950's. 
This industrial base later emerged as the backbone of Pakistan's armed 
forces as three new ordinance factories were set up at Gadwal, Sanjwal and 
Havalian - all in the vicinity of wah. 
It is reported that by 1970, the tanks supplied by China already 
constituted 25% of the entire tank force at Pakistan's disposal. The aircraft 
supplied by China constituted 33% of the Pakistan's Pakistan's air force's 
270 planes, 65% of all the interceptor-bombers, and 90% of its first line 
modern fighter planes.'^ " After Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India, 
China took responsibility for rehabilitating the Pakistan army and equipping 
it with the most modern weapons systems. Pakistani diplomats believe that 
Chinese do not wish to keep Pakistan dependent upon themselves, their 
policy is to enable her to become self sufficient. In discussions with their 
Pakistani counterparts, they have repeatedly emphasized the theme of self 
reliance. For instance, they have helped Pakistan to develop the capability 
of servicing and overhauling MIG aircraft engines in her own workshops 
instead of sending them to China. Pakistani engineers, on their part, have 
made some needed adjustments to improve the performance and range of 
these aircraft and have been equally willing to share their findings with the 
Chinese."^ China was able to strengthen the Pakistan army by helping set up 
production lines at the Heavy Rebuild Factory (HRF) at Taxila. This would 
overhaul the Chinese type-59's and also start upgrading these tanks critical 
components, such as their fire control systems, ammunition and thermal 
cites and electronic systems. The HRF became fully operational by 1979-80 
and has since been not only overhauling, but also producing approximately 
100 T-59 MBTs and 250 T-59 tank Engines every year. Also, of the 11 000 
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total components required to build a T-59 MBT, over 8,000 are now 
manufactured locally. Infact, by the 1980s, the HRF had begun to license-
produce China's more advanced type 69 MBTs. A protocol has also since 
been signed to setup facilities for the licence production of Chinese type-69 
llMPs.^^ 
More significant from Pakistan's perspective has been the Sino 
Pakistani collaboration in the field of defence production. Some of the Arms 
production facilities established with Chinese assistance and weapons 
systems developed in collaboration with China include MBT Khalid, 
overhaul facilities for MI-8 helicopters, armoured recovery vehicles. Red 
Arrow-8 antitank missile, F-7P aircraft, production of K-8 aircraft. The 
ARV hulls, however, are still imported from China, along with armour 
plates, while other parts are manufactured in Pakistan under the Technical 
advice of Chinese experts. On the Chinese side, Norinco has since emerged 
as the main force in Sino Pakistani joint defence ventures. Among other 
things as already mentioned, China began to collaborate with Pakistan in the 
manufacture of the whole range of Chinese MBTs, from T-69 to T-85 II, and 
P-90 MBTs as well as the M-113 armoured personnel carriers.^^ 
The aeronautical complex at Kamara in which China helped Pakistan 
to establish it in a phased manner, comprises of the Mirage Rebuild Factory, 
the light Aircraft Manufacturing Factory and the F-16 (MIG 19) Rebuild 
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Factory. For the Pakistan Air Force, the Fighter-6 Rebuild factory was 
established as a turnkey project by China. It became operational in 
November 1980. In the past, F-6 aircraft needing overhaul used to be 
dismantled and sent to China by sea. This process, including their return 
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reassembly and test flight in Pakistan , took from 12 to 18 months. However, 
now, with these facilities available at the F-6 Rebuild Factory, the time 
n o 
needed for overhauling has become less than six months. Later, China also 
built overhauling facility for the F-6 for the manufacture of the Tumansky 
RD-9B-811 turbojet engines with over 7,000 other spare parts. The light 
Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (LAMF) was another turnkey project 
undertaken by China in June 1981. This was meant for producing complete 
air frames and eventual production of the light combat aircraft. By 
September 1983, this facility started licence-production of the SAAB Scania 
MF-I-17 (Locally known as Mushshak), which later became the first step for 
Pakistan's collaboration on the jet trainer Karakoram-8 with the Chinese. It 
also led to their collaboration in the super-7 fighter project. 
There are many other instances of defence related collaborations. A 
special mention needs to be made of the Heavy mechanical complex (HMC), 
which is the biggest undertaking of its type in Pakistan. It was set up at 
Taxila in 1979 with the help of Chinese expertise. Also, the Heavy Forge 
Factory (HFF) of this complex has played an extremely crucial role in 
Pakistan's other defence production projects. Over the years, this 
cooperation has yielded for Pakistan long range and anti-armour guns, 
communication equipment, F6, F-7 and Q-5 Fantan aircraft, CSA-SAM 
batteries, and various naval crafts including Romeo submarines'" ; Heavy 
Mechanical complex was a first industrial complex of its kind established by 
China in a non communist country. It is because of this that Pakistan began 
to produce ammunition and spare parts for Chinese equipments. The 
complex also houses the Heavy Forge Factory (HFF) and the Heavy Rebuild 
Factory (HRF) as already mentioned. Complex began with the facility to 
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overhaul Chinese type 59 tanks. Later, the facility was extended to upgrade 
critical components of the T-59s. In the eighties, HRF also started licenced 
production of Chinese T-69 tanks. The HRP has since expanded with 
Chinese collaboration. The factory now manufactures T-69 II BMPs, T 
85IIMBTs and M-113 APC's, although some of the components are still 
imported from China. '^ The foundation stone of the Heavy Electrical 
Complex to be buih with Chinese financial and technical assistance was laid 
down in April 1986 at Hattar in Haripur in the NWFP. It will produce 500 
KV power transformer and associated equipments.'' China has also been 
sending experts to Pakistan on training mission and a few licencees have 
also been granted for the production of Chinese weapons. These are 
commendable steps to make Pakistan self sufficient in defence products. 
Since 1965 all the three branches of the Pakistan armed forces have 
received Chinese weapons. The arms supplied in the 1970's were older 
models, but as production increased the design of Chinese weapons and 
aircrafts improved. The F-6 Fighters (MIG-9) were produced in large 
numbers than any of China's other domestically produced aircraft. " 
Pakistan received 24 F-6 with T-59 trainers form China in 1978. With an 
increase in China's air force strength, the production of F-7 (MIG-23) went 
up. Military assistance to Pakistan also increased in proportion to increase in 
China's defence products. The terms of assistance were reported to be 
generous. In 1981 China delivered 25 F-6 '^' bis to Pakistan and by the end of 
1982 the total number of planes delivered to Pakistan rose to 300. F-6 bis 
was specially built to meet Pakistani air force requirements. In 1985 China 
supplied 50 Q-5/A-5 fighters to Pakistan, and this was in addition to 60 
already in service. The Q-5 Fantan-A were first supplied to Pakistan in 1978 
and their deliveries continued at the rate of 50 a year.'^ 
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According to the London-based international institute for strategic 
studies, by 1982 Chinese weapons system formed the backbone of 
Pakistan's arsenal - about 75 percent of its tank force and about 65 percent 
of its military aircraft.^ ^ Early in 1983 it was reported that the ferry to 
Pakistan of the first squadron of Pakistan Air Force's A-5 close support 
fighter aircraft from China had been completed. It was also reported that 
Pakistan Air Force was planning to acquire three squadrons of this aircraft. 
In August 1984 Times of India carried the report of a book by an American 
Expert on China, professor John Copper, in which it was stated that Pakistan 
has been the largest recipient of China's military aid after North Korea and 
the erstwhile North Vietnam in the past. This report also said that China had 
also imparted training to Pakistani soldiers and that the Chinese leaders 
hoped to strengthen Pakistan military.''^  
United States Arms control and Disarmament agency in its report 
released in August 1985, revealed that during the years 1979-83 China 
supplied to Pakistan arms of the value of $ 390 million. It should be noted 
that during these four years arms received in Pakistan. From all sources 
were of the value of $ 1830 million.'' According to the Stockholm 
International peace research Institute, during the four years 1981-84 arms 
supplied by China to Pakistan included 200 T-59 tanks, 60 fighter ground 
attack Aircraft, 4 Huangfen class and 16 Hai Ying-2 class submarines.''^  It 
has been stated in latest survey of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies that in August 1984, Pakistan contracted to purchase from China 
100 fighter aircraft, of which 41 had been delivered by mid-1985.'" In 
November 1985 it was reported that the Pakistan ordinance factories at Wah 
had started, with assistance provided by China, production of 12.7 MM anti-
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aircraft guns."*^  Thus from the above data it is proved that China is the only 
country which has transferred to Pakistan modern technology in defence 
industry without reservations and restraints. 
Then there are many other defence related collaborations which have 
provided the basic materials for China-Pakistan defence joint venture 
project. 
China's Military Aid to Pakistan 1970-1982 
Year 
1970-71 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Tanks 
llOT-54/55 
lOOT-59 
lOOT-59 
-
159T-59 
-
50T-59 
50 T-59 
50T-59 
50 T-59 
(1000, 
ordered) 
50 T-59 
50 T-59 
Aircrafts 
MIG-19 
No. unavailable 
50 MIG-19 
TU-16 (n.U) 
1 squadron 
Shenyang MIG-19 
-
30F-6 
30F-6 
24F-4(MIG-17 
version) 
-
40 F-6 bis 
24 F-6 bis 
42 F-6 bis 
Navel vessels 
9 gunboats 
6 gunboats 
(Shanghai class) 
-
-
-
Submarines 
destroyers 2 
patrol boats (no. 
unavailable) 
-
3 patrol boats 
(Hainan class) 
-
2 submarines 
charters, 2 
"Romeo" 
submarines 
-
-
Other 
weapons 
20 
Batteries 
of SAM-
6 
Sources : Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) World 
Armament and Disarmament. SIPRI Year Books 1970-1977 (Stockholm: Almqvist 
Wiksell International) and SIPRI Yearbooks 1978-82 (London: Taylor & Francis); 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military balance 1982-1983 (IISS : 
London, 1982). 
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China's Military Aid to Pakistan 1983-91* 
Year ordered 
1983 
Not known 
1991 
Not known 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Year Delivered 
1986-90 
1986-88 
1988-90 
1990 
1992 
Aircraft 
12 F7 Fighters 
50 Karakoram 08 jet trainer 
05 Fantan A Fighters 
Jian Jiao 7P** Fighters 
Red Arrow-8 Anti Tank Missile 
Hong Ying-5 (50 nos) portable 
SAMs 
T-.69 MBT (20 nos) Armoured 
fighting vehicle (tank) 
M-11 
*SIPRI year Book 1991 
**China Aeronautics and Astronautics in news. 
A significant element of ongoing Sino-Pak defence cooperation has 
been China's willingness to help Pakistan on the road to self reliance by 
building infrastructure through turn key projects. This strategy, it seems, not 
only helps Pakistan but also provides China with long term advantage, for 
instance major joint ventures programmes between them are : 
Major Joint venture : The current joint ventures between China and 
Pakistan operate under the provisions of June 1990 memorandum of 
understanding which has been updated from time to time. This was an MoU 
for a ten-year cooperation in procurement, R & D , technology transfer and 
co-production. This also got Philip by the American denial of free flow of 
military equipment and technology to Pakistan under Pressler amendment. 
There are some Sino-Pakistani joint ventures in defence production : 
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(a) Al-Khalid MBT (Main Battle Tank) 
On October 1, 1988 Pakistan had formally announced its Al-Khalid 
project for the manufacture of a new MBT 2000 with Chinese assistance and 
in January 1991 China and Pakistan signed an agreement to jointly design, 
develop and manufacture this tank. The prototypes of the Al-Khalid, 
demonstrated in 1991, were said to have been manufactured in China even 
though the then Chief of Army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, claimed 
that it was fully manufactured in Pakistan.'*'^  Pakistan's manufacturing plant 
at HRF (Taxila) was completed in 1992 and it was to collaborate with 
China's Norinco industries, and when operational it was expected to produce 
about 200 vehicles a year. The Al-Khalid project was approved by the 
defence committee of the cabinet of Pakistan on January 16, 1990, and a 
formal contract was signed between China and Pakistan during May that 
year'*''. Production lines were established at the HRF and the primary 
prototypes as said above were produced in China, then sent to Pakistan for 
trials, by June 1991. Production is expected to start by the turn of the 
centur\' but reports suggest that it has run into difficulties because the design 
needs to factor in Pakistan's difficult terrain and very high temperatures.''^  
So repeated trials have shown a number of problems in the operation of the 
MBTs. In June 1997, in fact, it was announced that this MBT was sfill not 
ready for serial production, and that the heavy Industries Taxila may not be 
in a position to start producing Al-Khalid before the year 2000.'*^ However 
in recent past during Nawaz Sharifs weak long visit to China in February 
1998, Pakistan's Defence Secretary, Lt. General Iftikhar, was reported to 
having held detailed discussions with his Chinese counterpart on 
"modernization of facilities like Heavy mechanical Complex at Taxila" as 
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also on different aspects of building" MBT Al-Khalid''^ There are still many 
complications in the ongoing project and it is being thought that China is 
expected to directly contribute about major portion of components needed or 
it may start manufacturing it at its Norinco industries. 
(b) Karokoram - 8 Trainer/Fighter 
It is a joint venture between CATIC (China National Aerotechnology 
Import Export Corporation) and (Pakistan Aeronautical Complex) at Kamra. 
This project was christened as the Karakoram-8 after the mountain range 
forming part of the China Pak border. It is also said that Karokoram-8 jet 
trainer superseded Pakistan's Khunjerab-8 programme. Three prototypes 
w'ere built and test flown in China in the early 1990s and its production was 
then expected to start sometime from the early 1992. But just like their 
MBT-Al Khalid, its trials have shown some basic problems and even now it 
is also not expected to be rolled out from Pakistan's production facilities. 
Infact, by the time prototypes became ready by 1994, Pakistan had decided 
against having its own assembly line and two countries signed another 
agreement under which Pakistan agreed to purchase them in complete and 
only assemble them at their facilities. Accordingly, the first batch of six K-8 
jet trainers was delivered to Pakistan beginning from July 1994. Having 
completing trials and evaluation phase the K-8 trainers were finally inducted 
into Pakistan Air Forces. Basic flying training wing by Prime Minister Ms. 
Benazir Bhutto on 26 January 1995.^ ^ Pakistan has since assembled 30 more 
K-8 trainers (during 1994-96) and this has completely changed the profile of 
Pakistan's trainer fleet.^"^ Though the induction of K-8 may not make any 
great impact on the regional strategic balance in South Asia. Yet, this has 
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been projected as symbol of China's joint ventures with Pakistan. It has 
really provided a moral boost to Pakistan's air force and thus enhanced their 
confidence. 
(c) Super-7 (FC-I) Fighter 
The Sino-Pak collaborating in the development of the super-7 fighter; 
which was originally a joint project between the China Aerotechnology 
Import Export Corporation (CATIC) and the US Grumman Corporation. 
Following the Tiananmen Square incident (of June 4, 1989) Washington DC 
called off the deal. Since 1992 CATIC has been working with Pakistan 
Aeronautical Complex (PAC) as a junior partner in developing the super-7. 
It should be mentioned here that in 1991 after USA called of its partnership 
it was super-7 which was renamed as Fighter China-I (FC-I). However, the 
work on this fighter has continued ever since with little visible progress. 
This has also delayed Pakistan in finding replacement for its F-16 fighters 
which should have been phased out by the end of 1990's. But their exposure 
to costs and terms of FC-I have been making Pakistan reluctant to order 
procurement of the French Mirage 2000-5 which at $ 4 billion a piece 
remains too expensive to buy.^ ^ This has since become a contentions issue 
between China and Pakistan. The discussion on this joint venture on high 
level was lastly held during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s visit to China in 
February 1998. This was one of the elements in their discussion.^ ^ 
(d) Naval Cooperation ; 
Though there has not been any notable Sino-Pak joint venture in ship 
building, Pakistani sailors have been given occasional training in China's 
training facilities. However Pakistan's dependence on china's ship building 
capabilities is likely to increase in the coming years.^ '* It should be noted 
that Pakistani Navy has traditionally continued to rely on the western 
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powers for both equipment and training. During Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif s visit to China in February 1998, the Pakistani Navy was reportedly 
offered a number of Chinese frigates, to be given on soft loans, on the 
condition that they be built in both Chinese and Pakistani shipyards. 
Already, going by past experience, China has been the dominant supplier in 
the category of petrol vessels and missile crafts (see table). 
Pakistan's Naval Procurement from China (1970-1991) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Name of the weapon system 
Whiskey-class submarines (given as grant aid. 
China's first export of submarines) 
Shanghai-II class: Fast Attack Craft 4 
(converted into missile boats, currently with 
Pakistan's maritime security Agency. 5 kept 
by NSA for spares) 
Huchuan Hydrofoil (39-tons) 
Romeo-class submarines 
Luda-class Destroyers (China's first export of 
destroyers) 
Hainen-class Fast Attack Craft gun 
Romeo-class submarines 
Hegu-class : Fast Attack craft Missile 
(Equiped with 2 SY-1 missiles) 
Huangfen-class: Fast Attack Craft Missile 
(Equipped with 4 Hai Ying-2 missiles) 
Shanghai-11 class : Fast Attack Craft Guns 
(with maritime security Agency) 
Fuqing-Class AOR (carried on a SA319B. 
Alouette II helicopter) 
Type P58A petrol Craft (with National 
Security Agency) 
Type 312 Drone Mines weepers (can operate 
upto 5 kms with remote control) 
Time of 
transfer 
1970 
1972-
1976 
1974 
1976 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1980-83 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1990 
1991 
Nos. 
2-3 
9 
4-6 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
1 
4 
5 
Source : Military Balance (London : IISS), SIPRI year book (Stockholm: SlPRl), 
both over the years; Anne Gilk's and Gerald Segel, China and the Arms 
Trade (London: Croom Helm, 1985) and IDSA files. 
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WEAPONS PROCUREMENT 
Sino-Pakistan defence cooperation resulted in building an advanced 
defence production sector on the one side while another aspect of this 
relationship gave way to direct procurement of arms and weapons. The 
direct weapon transfers have proved more successful as compared to their 
joint ventures. The domestic production and direct procurement of weapons 
facilitated Pakistan's long standing quest for military parity with New Delhi. 
One important feature of Pakistan's weapons procurement from China is 
that while the other major suppliers resorted to arms embargoes during 
crises, Chinese assistance increased during Pakistan's conflicts with India in 
1965 and 1971.^^ Also, these weapons were very often given to Pakistan as 
grants, or at extremely low friendship price's or given on the basis of low-
interest long term loans. If we go by Pakistan's current arsenal, China has 
supplied Pakistan over 78 percent of its MBT, 63 percent of its combat 
aircraft and over 77 per cent of its petrol boats and missile craft. 
As mentioned earlier, China has been the Pakistan's largest and also 
the most reliable supplier of weapons and equipment during the last 35 
years. China which had assiduously courted Pakistan ever since the outbreak 
of Sino-Indian hostilities, decided to supply arms to Pakistan. The first 
agreement for military assistance of the value of $ 120 million was signed 
by Pakistan and China in July 1966. Going by military Balance, the annual 
publication of the London based International Institute of strategic Studies 
(IISS), the SIPRI yearbooks of the Stockholm, International peace Research 
Institute and other records on the subject, the 1965 and 1971 wars were the 
high points of China's weapons supplies to Pakistan. While China's share of 
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the total value of arms transferred to Pakistan during 1965 was only 21 per 
cent, it increased to 43 percent in 1966. Similarly, while the Chinese share 
in Pakistan's weapons procurement was only 19 percent for 1970, it shot up 
to over 83 percent for 1972, which marks the peak of China's weapons 
supplies to Pakistan. Within two years of the agreement China supplied to 
Pakistan 100 T-59 tanks, 80 MIG-19's (F-6) and 10 Ilyshin-28 bombers. By 
1970, as a writer puts it, the tanks supplied by China already constituted 25 
percent of the entire tank force at Pakistan's disposal.^^ The aircrafts 
supplied by China constituted 33% of the Pakistani airforce's 270 planes, 
65% of all interceptor-bombers, and 99% of its first line modern fighter 
planes".^'' It should be noted that after the India's nuclear explosion in 1974 
Pakistan received another instalment of 159 T-59 MBTs and a squadron of 
MIG-19 aircrafts. During the next four years, this was supplemented by 
deliveries of 60 more MIG-19's, 24 F-4s, 4 HU Chwan fast attack hydrofoil 
torpedo, 5 Shanghai-II motor gun boats and 2 Hai Nan large patron craft. 
More recently, deliveries of brand new MBTs. From China's Norinco 
include at least 200 Type-69 II P and at least 200 type 85 II AP MBTs. What 
is worth mentioning here is that many more countries have shown an interest 
in collaborating with the Sino-Pakistani weapons production joint ventures. 
In mid 1994, for example, the Chinese had supplied type 69 MBTs to 
Islamabad with 105 mm tank guns that were fitted with US GEC Marione 
Centure computerized fire control systems. According to media reports, a 
similar technology transfer is being worked out for China's type-85 MBTs.^^ 
Pakistan obtained credit from China for the purchase of defence 
equipment under an agreement signed between Pakistani defence Ministry 
officials and FLA officers in Islamabad on 04 December 1993. Pakistan and 
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China appeared to have boosted their defence technology relationship in 
1999 with the visit of Chinese defence Minister Chi Haotian to Islamabad on 
21 February. The decision in 1993 between the two allies to undertake tank 
development came to fruition six j^ears later in 1999. The same year 
Pakistan agreed to buy 50 Chinese fighter aircraft, was another milestone in 
their military technology relationship or defence cooperation. On a smaller 
scale Pakistan was able to launch a missile boat developed with Chinese 
assistance in 1999. Clearly this added punch to Pakistan's naval offensive 
capability. The Pakistan Chief of Army Staff also visited China and his 
Chinese counterpart Fu Quanyu stated that the military component formed 
an important part of their bilateral relations with Pakistan.^^ Thus Pakistan 
stands to gain from the Chinese policy of Inducting new weapons systems 
through higher imports. From the beginning of this decade, China has been 
modernizing its defence forces by buying weapons systems from various 
sources, including Russia (like SU-27 fighters and T-80U tanks). Given the 
Chinese expertise in "reverse engineering"; Islamabad could hope to get 
those weapons systems through China, incorporate them in its inventory 
and, over time, even start manufacturing them. 
Some scholars are of the view that Sino-Pakistani defence 
cooperation flourished due to several unique features. First, unlike the 
western suppliers, China continuously provided military hardware to 
Pakistan, and did not reverse this policy during difficult times. Second, 
China not only shared advanced technologies with Pakistan, but did not wish 
to perpetuate the recipient's dependence on its aid. Chinese assistance has 
thus contributed substantially towards Pakistan's self reliance and 
indigenisation of weapons capabilities. Third, unlike the Western states who 
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were subject to various international treaties or laws, international arms 
control regimes and also to domestic and discriminately international public 
opinion, China was never constrained by any of these limitations in her arms 
export policies with its numerous third world client states, including 
Pakistan. Moreover, the relatively cheaper price of Chinese weapons also 
contributed to the range and depth of this partnership. Finally China's 
continued cooperation has contributed substantially to enhance the influence 
and role of Pakistan's military within the decision-making structures already 
dominated by armed forces. The fact is that this defence cooperation has 
substantially increased Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India in addition to 
providing it with a much needed feeling of confidence and self worth. The 
civilian governments have, therefore, continued to increase rather than 
reverse these policies, knowing that these joint ventures and procurement 
deals often propitiate the influence of the armed forces within Pakistan's 
fragile domestic politics.^ *^ 
Swaran Singh also argues that Sino-Pakistan defence cooperation is 
likely to be limited by five factors.^' According to him these are : (a) The 
Sino-Indian relationship could replicate the Sino-Soviet relationship and 
Beijing might become sensitive to Indian protests against provision of 
weapons to Pakistan. This assumption is made in the backdrop of a 
perceived upswing in Sino-Indian relations, (b) China has over the years 
gradually begun to prioritise economics over politics and in the process 
commercial considerations are likely to substitute ideological ones. As a 
result, this is likely to adversely affect Sino-Pakistan defence technology 
cooperation. The Pakistani establishment's proclivity towards political Islam 
has a strong bearing on Chinese Xingiang region that borders Pakistan 
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occupied Kashmir and houses a large Muslim population. Given the 
resurgence of Islam linkages between fundamentalist elements in P.O.K. has 
the potential to destablise the Chinese province, (d) US pressure on China 
against the supply of sensitive technologies to Pakistan would have a direct 
bearing on Sino-US relations. The fact that Beijing cannot avoid to take 
Washingtons directives lightly could well be a consideration in Sino-Pak 
defence technology relationship, (e) China has since the 1990's prioritized 
development of military technologies and has relations with Israel in this 
sphere. In course of time wherever China emerges as a country with cutting 
edge combat technologies then it would not be inclined to generously share 
such weapon systems with regional nations in order to restrict its 
exclusivity. 
However, it cannot be denied that China served as a secure source of 
arms supply when other potential sources could not be relied on for 
continuous unimpeded access to their arms markets which is evident from 
the preceding tables. Obtaining arms from China was considered a vital 
achievement of Pakistan's China policy in the light of the flow of Soviet 
modern weapon system and technology to India especially since the latter 
has not been threatened by embargo as have Pakistan's arms supplies from 
the west on various occasions. Following the US arms embargo, as 
mentioned already, sizeable amount of Chinese equipment arrived in 
Pakistan. Over the years China became Pakistan's principle arms supplier. It 
may be noted that after the Tashkent conference, the Soviet Union had 
agreed to sell arms to Pakistan, while she was already supplying arms to 
India and her influence in India was rapidly growing. The Chinese, 
therefore, had a cause to worry not only about strengthening of Soviet India 
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ties but also about a developing Soviet rapprochement with Pakistan. The 
Soviet Pakistan arms deal, however, did not go through probably because 
the Russians were afraid of Indian sensitivities on this issue and were not 
prepared to take the risk of annoying India. 
Afghanistan Crisis and Arms Supply : 
One of the matters which has greatly worried Pakistan during the 
eighties has been the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Premier zhao 
fully backed Pakistan's stand on this issue. He said on June that the Chinese 
government and people supported the decisions of the Islamic summit 
conference and the General Assembly of the United Nations that the Soviet 
Union should withdraw from Afghanistan. He declared that Afghanistan's 
independence and non-aligned status should be restored; the people of 
Afghanistan should be allowed to determine their own future, and a 
congenial atmosphere should be created for the return of the Afghan 
refugees to their homes. Chinese scholars Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross 
observe, "Afghanistan's real strategic significance to China derived from its 
lengthy borders with Pakistan and Iran, two states China valued as 
bulwarks' against Soviet expansion. China believed that Moscows move into 
Afghanistan has part of the historical Russian push toward the south, 
foreshadowing increased pressure on Islamabad and Tehran to acquiesce in 
the expansion of Soviet influence. China also v/anted to demonstrate its 
reliability as an ally to Pakistan and maintain solidarity with Washington." 
It is important to note that China increased its military assistance to 
Pakistan soon after the Soviet armies entered Afghanistan. Besides, China 
fully agreed with Pakistan that the Afghan people were entitled to have the 
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right to determine their own destiny. Whether China was supplying arms to 
Mujahideen (freedom fighters) is not known. Some western journalists, 
however, had reported seen Mujahideen using Chinese mortars and rocket 
launchers in 1981. In subsequent years more sophisticated Chinese weapons 
were seen such as 82 mm recoilless rifles and antitank cannons.^ '* 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt Beijing supported Pakistan's efforts to find a 
political solution to the Afghan problem and gave military and non-military 
aid to Pakistan as a part of her broader international strategy to prevent a 
superpower Russia from exercising control over a neighbouring state. 
Pakistan's Afghan policy was premised on the belief that a friendly 
Afghanistan could provide it 'strategic depth' in a potential future conflict 
with India. A strong military sense of geopolitics among its largely military 
rulers also led to the need to gain control over Afghanistan. The notion of 
'strategic depth' emerged even stronger after the socialist revolution in 
Afghanistan and became an obsession after the Soviet intervention in the 
country. Islamabad hoped to obtain such 'strategic depth' as a reciprocal 
gesture for its active support to the Afghanistan during their struggle against 
the Soviet occupation when the Pakistan army had established strong 
linkages with powerful Mujahideen factions. 
Hassan Askari Rizvi writes, "support to Pakistan's security was the 
major feature of China's Afghanistan policy because they wanted to honour 
their often repeated commitments. Further the goal of thwarting Soviet 
expansionism could not be achieved without harmonizing policies with 
Pakistan and seeking the cooperation of other states, especially the United 
States"." 
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Pakistan and China coordinated their strategies to deal with the 
situation arising out of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan... 
China's foreign Minister, Huang Hua, on a visit to Islamabad in January 
1980 expressed solidarity with Pakistan and condemned the Soviet military 
move into Afghanistan in the stronger terms. He told the International 
community to provide assistance to Afghan people and their resistance 
forces as also to its neighbouring countries that faced the threat of Soviet 
aggression. To quote K. Subrahmanyam : 
A nuclear Paksitan will be able to defend itself against 
Soviet inroads without posing threat to China itself. 
Chinese held that as Afghanistan is our neighbour 'the Soviet armed 
invasion' of that country posed a threat to 'China's security'. Furthermore 
Chinese felt that the Soviet move threatened the security and internal 
stability of their long-term ally Pakistan. 
By 1980-1 there were high level reciprocal visits betweeri Chinese 
and Pakistani leaders. Every new Pakistani and Chinese leader assigned 
priority to establishing contact with each other. Such visits often produced 
agreements for Chinese assistance to Pakistan in economic, technological 
and defence fields. 
Zia-ul-Haq's visit to Beijing in May 1980 produced a unanimity of 
views on Afghanistan crisis. China's premier Hua Guo-Feng described 
Soviet Union as 'a threat to the security of the South Asian countries' and a 
serious danger to the 'peace of Asia and whole world. China's prime 
minister Zhao Ziyang who became the Prime Minister in September 1980 
undertook his first trip to Pakistan in May June 1981 for consultation on 
regional security and political affairs. 
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The exchange of visits of senior civilian and military officials also 
increased in the wake of their shared perceptions on Afghanistan. China 
supplied weapons and military equipment to Pakistan and thus bolstered 
Afghan resistance by diplomatic support and limited weapon supply. There 
were several important visits during 1982-83. Chinese Vice Premier, Ji 
Pengfi, led a good will mission to Pakistan in march 1982 which included 
among others Han Nienlung, Vice Minister for foreign Affairs, and Zhang 
Zehan, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Army. Pakistan's Foreign 
Minister Yaqub Ali Khan in march 1982 paid a visit to China and met Deng 
Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Huang Hua and got assurance from them of 
continued support. Chinese leaders assured Pakistan that in case of foreign 
aggression the Chinese people and government would stand by Pakistan. 
Although China has not broken diplomatic relation with Kabul, it had 
recognized the organization of Islamic conference as an important force 
against the Soviet advances.. China which has a large Muslim minority was 
in favour of a powerful Islamic movement. The purpose of support for the 
organization of Islamic conference and the Islamic movements was to 
counter the influence of USSR and its allies in Asia.^ ^ It should be noted 
here that the interaction between the military establishments of the two 
countries increased after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. 
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Chapter- 5 
NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA 
AND PAKISTAN 
Looking back, we find that Pakistan started formulating plans for 
development of nuclear energy as early as the mid fifties. In framing their 
programme Pakistan have kept in their mind how to catch up with the Indian 
nuclear programme. Reacting to the news of Indian nuclear test of May 18, 
1974 at Pokhran, Prime Minister Bhutto told the Pakistan National 
Assembly that it was a nuclear blackmail on the part of India and that 
Pakistan would not submit to the nuclear blackmail of India. He sent his 
foreign secretary to Peking for consultations over Indian nuclear test and for 
persuading the Chinese leaders to denounce India.' Even before the Indian 
explosion of 1974 Z.A. Bhutto was at his wits end when Homi J. Bhabha 
then Indian nuclear scientist broke the news that India could detonate a 
nuclear device within eighteen months. It was the fime when China 
exploded its first nuclear weapon. Reacting to this news Z.A. Bhutto pleaded 
for Pakistan acquiring nuclear capability but president Ayub Khan at that 
time was not in favour of it. In view of the intensification and expansion in 
Sino-Pak cooperation in various fields between 1963 and 1965, Bhutto was 
hopeful of getting Chinese assistance in the nuclear field too. There is 
possibility to think that Bhutto's enthusiasm for nuclear capability might 
have impelled him to sound Chinese leaders about Sino-Pak cooperation for 
development of nuclear energy. Bhutto was also talking of building Pakistan 
as "the best fighting army in Asia". He was nursing thoughts of revenge 
against India for dismemberment of Pakistan. In February 1973 Pakistan 
started negotiating with France for the purchase of nuclear reprocessing 
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plant and a couple of years later it decided to acquire uranium enrichment 
technology through Dr. A.Q. Khan.^  In the mean time India carried out its 
implosion test in 1974 just after Bhutto's China visit. As mentioned earlier 
Pakistan termed it as a "move to blackmail Pakistan". Islamabad was 
expecting that Beijing would soon condemn Indian nuclear blast. But China 
reacted after a lot of persuasion by Bhutto. To embarrass India and to tarnish 
its image Pakistan denounced that 'as a concrete manifestation of its 
commitment that its nuclear installation and entire nuclear programme 
v/ould be international inspection under the IAEA system of safeguards and 
submitted a resolution in the UN General Assembly for the creation of a 
nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia limited to the Indian subcontinent, 
i.e. excluding China. This move suited China very well and hence it 
supported Pakistan's proposal. A Chinese foreign office spokesman on 26 
June 1974 reassured the people of Pakistan that China would continue to 
lend full and resolute support to Pakistan in its just struggle against foreign 
aggression and interference, including nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail. 
The spokesman reiterated China's consistent position that "nuclear weapons 
should be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed and that, as a first 
step, countries possessing nuclear weapons, pledging in particular not to use 
them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear free zone.^  In the UN forum, 
too, China backed Pakistan's stand on nuclear issues. Thus on 02 October 
1974, China backed Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear free zone in South 
Asia, in UN General Assembly. Once again, on 4 November 1974, China 
reiterated its stand on the issue in the General Assemblies first committee. 
Chinese delegate said his government welcomed Pakistan's initiative^ for 
denuclearization of the South Asian region. 
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Washington did not immediately share Pakistan's concern over Indian 
nuclear test, nor did it support the proposal of nuclear weapon free zone in: 
South Asia for a couple of years. While the US arms embargo was lifted, 
Pakistan was not given sophisticated weapons. To restrain Pakistan from 
going ahead with its nuclear weapons programme, Washington took some 
measures, including pressure on France to cancel the nuclear deal. Li's 
Pakistan visit at this juncture was very meaningful for that country. He 
declared China's support "to the people of South Asia in their struggle 
against hegemonism and expansionism, to the proposal of Pakistan 
government for a nuclear free-zone in South Asia and the struggle of the 
o 
people of Kashmir for self-determination. Bhutto was so much happy over 
Li's statement that he described the Sino-Pak friendship higher than the 
Karakoram and deeper than the ocean's. Following Li's visit Beijing became 
more responsive and sympathetic to Pakistan's defence requirements. China 
increased collaboration not only in conventional defence production but also 
agreed to help Pakistan in its nuclear weapons programme. 
Bhutto's Engagement of China: 
In view of the special affection of the Chinese leadership towards 
Bhutto as the architect of the "special relationship" and the politically fluid 
situation in china after the demise of the Mao, it appears that China 
continued to look favourably on Pakistan's quest for nuclear capability, in 
line with its perception of permanent interests in the sub-continent. Perhaps, 
the first pointer to the existence of a secret deal between Pakistan and China 
is contained in the last testament of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which contains two 
significant excerpts : 
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"... In the light of the recent developments which have taken place, 
my single most important achievement which I believe will dominate the 
portrait of my public life is an agreement which I arrived at after an 
assiduous and tenacious endeavour spanning over eleven years of 
negotiations. In the present context the agreement of mine, concluded in 
June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and contribution to the 
survival of our people and our nation". 
"... Now we have the brain power, we have the nuclear power plan at 
Kashmir. All we needed was the nuclear re-processing plant. We were on 
the threshold of full nuclear capability".^ 
Bhutto's testament would indicate that negotiations with China began 
in 1965. At that point in time Pakistan's relations which China had become 
cordial as evidenced by the Chinese ultimatum to India during the Indo-Pak 
war of 1965. Earlier, in October, 1964, China had conducted its first nuclear 
weapon test. It is, therefore, possible that Bhutto had sounded the Chinese 
leadership on a possible Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation while he was a 
Minister in the Ayub government.'° The events of 1971 namely the Indo-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, the dismemberment Pakistan and consequent 
emergence of Bangladesh, brought Pakistan and China much closer. These 
ties could have been further consolidated by the Pokhran explosion of May 
1974 because of the Chinese belief that India had gone or was about to go 
nuclear. 
Soon after coming to power Bhutto personally took charge of atomic 
energy affairs and started taking steps to accelerate Pakistan's nuclear 
programme. He lunched an ambitious programme of recruiting scientists. In 
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1972 and 1973 Pakistan concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with 
Canada. In 1973 Bhutto initiated talks with France for the purchase of 
nuclear fuel re-processing plant. In 1972 he was reported to have convened a 
meeting of scientists and defence experts to discuss Pakistan's nuclear 
options." It shows that Bhutto was determined to acquire nuclear weapons 
and with this end in mind, he pursued all options available to Pakistan, 
taking direct responsibility himself for the Atomic energy department 
between 1971-1977. He conceptualized Pakistan's weapon as a Islamic 
Bomb and sold this notion to radical Islamic leaders who were persuaded to 
provide cash strapped Pakistan with large sums of hard currency, in the 
initial years of Pakistan's no-holds barred efforts to steal or buy nuclear 
equipment, materials and technology from all corners of the world. It is no 
exaggeration to describe Zulfikar AH Bhutto as the architect of Pakistan's 
nuclear programme. As regards China's help Bhutto can similarly be 
credited with having laid the foundation of Sino-Pakistan nuclear 
cooperation, which he had worked out with relentless zeal during his three 
visits to Beijing in February 1972, Septe;mber 1974 and April 1976. 
The strong strategic consensus between Pakistan and China 
commonly referred as "special relationship" appears to have survived the 
internal turbulences as well as changes in leadership in both countries. It is 
known that a high level military cum scientific delegation led by Bhutto's 
and including Dr. Abdus Salam, who was then Bhutto's Scientific Advisor 
visited Beijing from may 26 to 30,1976. Soon thereafter, in the first week of 
June, a high level Chinese scientists team visited Islamabad. It would 
therefore, be obvious that Bhutto's reference to a June 1976 agreement 
related to China. It was during this very visit of China, that the first 
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important Sino Pakistan nuclear agreement was put into black and white, 
although details of this compact are still not available. According to scholars 
in this field, this agreement either provided Pakistan with a nuclear 
assurance or umbrella, or the promise of assistance in developing its own 
nuclear devices. "" It was this agreement also that seemed to lay the 
foundation for Sino-Pakistan nuclear axis. Here we need to repeat Bhutto's 
writing in his last testament which describes the significance of this 
agreement like this : "In the present context, the agreement of mine, 
concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and 
contribution to the survival of our people and our nation.''' 
The conclusion as to whether or not the above statement by Zulfiqar 
All Bhutto was indeed alluding to their nuclear cooperation with China can 
be substantiated by reexamining events that preceded and followed it. And, 
with the advantage of hindsight, the following circumstantial evidence 
seems to support the aforesaid interpretation of President Bhutto's 
contention. 
Firstly, Dr. Abdus Salam, Bhutto's scientific Advisor, had been part 
of Bhutto's team during his third visit to Beijing. The Nobel Prize winner of 
1977, Dr. Salam was the first most important brain behind Pakistan's 
nuclear efforts until Dr. A.Q. Khan replaced him and later came to be known 
as father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. 
Close on the heels of Bhutto's China visit, a high level team of 
Chinese scientists had visited Pakistan. According to another recently 
released report by the US defence intelligence dated May 14, 1975 
"sometime before October 1974, the PRC assigned in developing its nuclear 
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science".'^ In March 1977, another team of Chinese scientists toured 
Pakistan and held meetings with Pakistani scientists. 
*&^ 
Thirdly, towards the close of 1975, Dr. A.Q. Khan had returned from 
Netherlands to start an ultra-centrifuge enrichment project known as project 
706. Considering later reports that Khan had been successful in stealing 
some of the important blueprints from those laboratories. The Chinese, who 
provide help to Pakistan had been working on centrifuge technology based 
on the European nuclear consortium's (URENCO) design. 
Fourthly, on January 29, 1977, China signed a protocol with Pakistan 
on scientific and technical cooperation. Chinese assistance for development 
of nuclear energy was implicit in the protocol. But there were speculations 
of similar pact on nuclear cooperation for purposes of nuclear deterrent 
though it is difficult to establish the truth in most of these reports. Their 
persistence and final outcome though should lend credence to their 
preordained sequence.'^ 
Interestingly the joint communique issued after Bhutto's visit to 
China made a rather pointed reference to the nuclear situation in the 
subcontinent. The Pakistan Prime Minister thanked the Chinese Prime 
Minister for China's firm support to the proposal of the Pakistani 
Government for a nuclear free zone in South Asia and expressed gratitude at 
China's willingness to assume appropriate commitments arising therefrom.''' 
While the commitments remained unspecified it involved important 
implications for Indian security and also sums up the nature of Sino-Pak 
nuclear relations. The import of the communique emerges in the context of 
the Indian nuclear explosion which Pakistan perceived as a threat to her 
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security and therefore mooted a proposal for zonal non proliferation. Apart 
from support for the proposal it underlines Chinese willingness to safeguard 
Pakistan that is vulnerable to nuclear aggression. In other words, it implies 
that China would not hesitate to confront India were she to use nuclear 
weapons against Pakistan. 
Post Bhutto Period : 
At that time Pakistan persuaded China to provide her with nuclear 
technology and planned a test explosion during December 1977. But six 
months before that General Zia ul Haque took over from Bhutto and the 
1 R 
proposed nuclear project was put on the backburner. Referring to China-
Pakistan friendship, Late President Zia said : 
It is as old as the life of Pakistan and it has stood the 
test of time. We attach very special attention to pur 
relationship with China... This relationship did not 
come about overnight. Both our countries have shed 
blood to cement this relationship between us.'^ 
However, China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan was to remain 
extremely piecemeal and was not to produce any quick results. As for 
China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, after the departure of Bhutto was to be 
serious setback as this was to result in Beijing temporarily suspending its 
nuclear assistance. However, strategic scenario once again tilted in favour of 
Pakistan and created a position where the world leaders for non-
proliferation, the US, had to overlook and thereby encourage China's 
continued assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes.^ ^ It is 
well known that the 1979 economic and military aid cut off was made on the 
basis of the 1977 Glenn-Symington Amendment. This amendment mandates 
the termination of assistance to any state that imported uranium-enrichment 
208 
equipment or technology of 1977 and refused to place its nuclear 
programme under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. Pakistan 
contravened these provisions in 1979, by importing equipment for its secret 
uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. 
However, it was only in December 1980 that the well known British 
author Edgar 0'balance, claimed that in 1976 "Pakistan persuaded China to 
supply nuclear technology and apparatus". According to him china had 
suspended nuclear cooperation with Pakistan after the overthrow of Bhutto 
in 1977. But after the Soviet assisted coup in Afghanistan in April 1978, 
China suddenly became more friendly with Zia's regime in Pakistan and 
some nuclear laison was resumed". At that time there were press reports 
including the report in Nucleonics Week, regarding Chinese offer of nuclear 
cooperation following Geng Biao's visit to Islamabad in June 1978. In 
1981, in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the United 
States, for six years, suspended the application of the uranium enrichment 
sanctions provisions of the Glenn Symington Amendment to Pakistan and 
provided military and economic assistance to it. 
General Zia visited Beijing in August 1980. Close on the heels of this 
visit, reports appeared on the likely Pak-China collaboration on a nuclear 
test. The London based Labanese magazine, urubaval-Arabi, reported that 
China had "responded positively" to a Pakistani request to conduct a nuclear 
test on China's soil. The Arab-owned Days magazine also reported that 
following General Zia's visit, Chinese nuclear experts had arrived in 
Pakistan to "speed up Pakistan's first peaceful nuclear explosion".^ •^  The 
positive features of such an arrangement would have been that test was 
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going to be conducted clandestinely, so that it may appear as test was 
Chinese. Buy that Zia's assurance, which he had given to President Reagan 
would appear to be honoured and the $ 3.2 billion US aid package would not 
be damaged. 
On the nature of China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan, a spate of 
reports have been appearing in the media in the last couple of years, most of 
them originating from US intelligence sources. In September 1982, the New 
York Times reported that the suspension of talks on the then proposed US-
China nuclear cooperation agreement was because of American suspicion of 
Chinese nuclear help to Pakistan and that it was related to uranium 
enrichment. Subsequently, the President of Washington's Nuclear Control 
Institute, Dr. Paul Leventhal stated before congress that China had 
transferred "sensitive nuclear weapon design information" to Pakistan.''* 
General Vernon Walters, former deputy Director of the CIA and US 
ambassador-at-large, specially flew to Beijing to seek assurances from 
Chinese leaders in regard to Beijing's assistance to Pakistan but he received 
no convincing assurances. On February 23, 1983, Howard B. Schaffer, 
Deputy Assistance Secretary of State, confirmed before the House Foreign 
Affairs, Asian and Pacific subcommittee the existence of a "nuclear 
relationship" between Pakistan and China. The House foreign affairs 
committee was given a closed-door briefing by US intelligence agencies on 
the extent, of Sino-Pakistani nuclear collaboration. 
As late as June 1984, the New York Times quoted US officials as 
saying that the US was in possession of "some evidence" to show that China 
had provided Pakistan with a Bomb design in 1983. They also said that the 
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design was "similar to the fourth type of bomb" exploded during the 
Chinese testing programme. London's Financial times front paged a report 
on July 17, 1984, again quoting American intelligence, saying that Chinese 
nuclear scientists were working at Pakistan's Kahuta centrifuge facility and 
that China had also passed on substantial quantities of enriched uranium to 
Pakistan, provision of test data by China was also reported. 
It is significant to note that nowhere in his 200 page document listing 
out all his achievements did Bhutto refer even once to the super secret 
'project-706' (the Uranium project) that he initiated and which was maturing 
by the time he was ousted. The paragraphs from his testament quoted 
earlier; if it was meant to be an oblique reference to this project, would have 
made the entire episode less mysterious. But he referred to the agreement of 
June 1976 as the one which would ensure the survival of Pakistan as a 
nation was it because Bhutto regarded the Chinese connection more crucial 
than anything else for the success of project-706.^'' 
It needs mention here, although US was showing concerns about the 
possible nuclear axis between China and Pakistan but after the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan it felt the need of Pakistan, who also played a 
willing conduit in supply of weapons to the Afghan mujahideen. As a 
consequence, Islamabad obtained a special consideration from both the US 
and China in building up its nuclear facilities. 
US concerns at this time were summarized in a 1985 declassified 
state department assessment of Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. In 1986, 
China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with 
Pakistan. That same year, Chinese scientists began assisting Pakistan with 
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the enrichment of weapons-grade-uranium, and China also reportedly 
transferred 'tritium' gas to Pakistan that could be used to achieve fusion in 
hydrogen bombs and boost the yield of atomic bombs. According to media 
reports the amount transferred was enough for making 10 nuclear 
weapons.^ ^ After that, China supplied Pakistan with a variety of nuclear 
products and services, ranging from uranium enrichment technology to 
research and power reactors. China allegedly involved Pakistani scientists in 
a nuclear test at its Lop Nur test site in 1989. With the assistance of Chinese 
nuclear scientists at Kahuta, Pakistan's nuclear weapon efforts picked up 
momentum. According to Pakistan's former Army Chief, General Aslam 
Beg, the US administration had from 1987 to 1990 facilitated Sino-Pakistani 
collaboration by continuously issuing misleading certifications to the US 
Congress about Pakistani nuclear explosive capability, thus, permitting 
Pakistan to continue to receive economic and military aid. The fact that the 
Americans knew of the Sino-Pakistani collaboration was latter corroborated 
by Paul leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute of the US. He pointed out 
that the Chinese had conducted a nuclear test at Lop Nur in Xingjiang in 
May 1983, in the presence of the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Yakub Khan . 
Both the US administration and Soviet officials have severally 
asserted that China had definite role in Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
programme. Leslie Gelb, who held an important position in the Carter 
administration as also in the US intelligence services, is on record saying 
that China had provided Pakistan with the design of its fourth nuclear 
weapon test, which weighed less than a ton and could easily be carried by an 
aircraft like the Mirage III/V, F-16 or any of Pakistan's modern missiles. 
Similarly, in the Moscow World Service Report (English) of August 26, 
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1984, it was stated that China had "... made a direct contribution to the 
development of Paicistan's nuclear potential". 
In connection with Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes, China 
has been accused by India, US and other western countries for not only 
transferring the nuclear and missile technology but the missiles too. 
However both China and Pakistan have been refuting these allegation. 
Although, Pakistan had signed an agreement with China in September 1986 
on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This agreement includes the design, 
construction, and operation of nuclear reactors. Other sources confirmed 
that the Chinese had supplied Pakistan the original design of their fourth 
nuclear bomb model, which was tested at Lop Nor in 1986. It was also 
reported that Pakistan had latter carried out "one cold lest in September 
1986 in the hills west of Chagai in order to verify the Chinese design."^ ^ 
According to a survey conducted by the International Hirald Tribune during 
late 1991, US officials described. Pakistan as the largest importer of China's 
nuclear technologies. It concluded that by this time, China had supplied 
Pakistan with enough weapons grade uranium to produce at least two 
nuclear devices, and Islamabad was possibly in possession of at least one 
nuclear bomb weighing only 180 kg.^ "* During 1990's western powers were 
concerned with its nuclear scientists, blue-prints, materials falling in the 
hands of irresponsible actors. This resulted in efforts being made to plug all 
loopholes which China had used since early 1980's in supplying nuclear and 
missile blue prints, materials, equipments to Pakistan. This increased 
Pakistan's dependence on China, which even today continued its long 
standing 'special nuclear relationship' with Islamabad. Accordingly, despite 
Chinese promotion of non-proliferation, Beijing has continued to assist 
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Pakistan nuclear weapons programme. These were reports that on December 
31, 1991, China signed a contract to build the Chasma 300 MW nuclear 
power reactor for Pakistan.^ ^ As China pledged to only transfer materials to 
safeguarded facilities, Pakistan signed on IAEA safeguards (limited scope) 
agreement for the reactor at Chasma. Since 1993, China National Nuclear 
Corporation has been working on a 2300 MW power plant at chasma. 
When completed it will be the first example in the world of a non-western 
and developing country exporting a power reactor. 
Nevertheless, China did not at once desert Pakistan completely and 
there were reports in 1995 of China supplying a 40 mw heavy water research 
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reactor for Pakistan's secret enrichment facility at Khushab. This breaked 
Pakistan's role dependence on its Kahuta enrichment facility. Moreover, 
adding to Pakistan's conventional approach for uranium bombs, this new 
facility was to produce plutonium and tritium which made possible for 
Pakistan to develop more advanced compart plutonium warheads for their 
missiles.^ ^ 
A major proliferation controversy regarding Chinese nuclear trade 
with Pakistan includes the late-1995 export of about 5,000 specially 
designed ring magnets from the China Nuclear Energy Industry corporation 
(CNEIC) to an unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear laboratory, which was 
allegedly involved in the nuclear weapons work. No sooner President Bill 
Clinton has signed on the Brown Amendment Act of 1996 that the 
Washington times and the Washington post published reports about new 
evidence on how Chinese firms had continued to assist Pakistan's 
unsafeguarded uranium enrichment programme. In early February 1996, 
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these newspapers reported, citing US intelligence sources that China had 
supplied 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan which were said to have been sold 
to A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta in 1995. And this time 
round, unlike their standard denials, when it came to China's assistance to 
Pakistan's nuclear programme, representatives of China National 
Corporation (CNNC) told US diplomats in Beijing that they "could not 
confirm" the allegation that Chinese firms were assisting Pakistan's fissile 
material production." 
This show of innocence was scoffed at by China specialists in 
Washington, who believed that not even a pin could be exported from the 
people's Republic without the permission of the authorities in Beijing. A 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the reports "groundless" and 
warned the United States not to impose sanctions based on 'rumours'. 
Pakistan also denied that any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology had 
taken place.'" 
However, in the talks with US officials, China eventually conceded 
that the sale had taken place, but argued that China should not be penalized, 
for two main reasons. First, China insisted that China Nuclear Energy 
Industry Corporation (CNEIC) had arranged the sale without the knowledge 
or consent of the central government. Second, China argued that the ring 
magnets were not magnetized, and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) 
Trigger list only covers ring magnets magnetized at a specific tolerance.''^ 
Throughout, China continued to declare that it was a responsible state and 
did not support or encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
According to experts, these magnets were said to be used in special 
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suspension bearings at the top of a spinning chamber in the high-speed 
centrifuges which could double their capacity to enrichment uranium for 
weapons purposes. 
The resolution of the conflict came on 10 May 1996, when the US 
state department announced that it would not impose sanctions on China in 
exchange for a Chinese pledge not to provide nuclear assistance to 
unsafeguarded facilities, its reaffirmation of non-proliferation 
commitments'^ ^ (which places now severe restrictions on its nuclear 
collaborations with non-NPT signatories.) and its agreement to consult with 
the United States on export control and proliferation issues. On 11, May 
1996, China publicly made this pledge, and informally confirmed that its 
pledge covered the future transfer of ring magnets. However, the resolution 
of the ring magnet controversy did not end US concerns regarding the Sino-
Pakistani nuclear connection. Concerns remain about Chinese assistance in 
the construction of the Khushab reactor, and in August-September 1996 it 
was further reported that China had agreed to sell a special industrial 
furnace and high technology diagnostic equipment to a Pakistani nuclear 
facility, equipment which reportedly can be used in the construction of 
nuclear bombs.'*'' China denounced reports of the sale as "groundless", and 
US officials indicated that they were satisfied that China was making a real 
effort to comply with its 11 May 1996 pledge, and that these was not enough 
evidence to establish that China was in violation of that commitment. 
However going by reports about the aforesaid transfer of ring 
magnets, China seems to be partially using camouflage of these non-
proliferation regimes while continuing with its proliferation activities. Other 
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argument put forward is that China may have supplied Pakistan with enough 
materials, components and blueprints to ensure that its nuclear weapons 
established can now operate independently. This may be one explanation to 
China's rapprochement to Washington in recent years where Beijing has 
repeatedly pledged not to supply these sensitive technologies to either Iran 
or Pakistan. 
Some evidence suggests that China may have made limited direct 
nuclear transfers to Pakistan since the late 1990's. But the most likely 
explanation for this shift is not that China has accepted non-proliferation 
norms, but rather that Pakistan no-longer needs much assistance, as it has 
already acquired an operational nuclear force, thanks principally to previous 
transfers from China. Current transfers seem to be confined to dual use 
items in the missile technology area, which gives China the possibility of 
claiming that it is not directly violating its regime commitments.'*^ 
A 1997 report by the Director of Central Intelligence stated that 
China was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology 
to Pakistan during the second half of the 1996. Since then, the United States 
has urged China to end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan entirely. The 
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in its 1997 and 1998 
annual report on arms control compliance, stated that based on Beijing's 
long standing nuclear ties with Islamabad, it was unclear whether Beijing 
had broken off its contacts with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons program.''^ Nevertheless the US concerns about Sino-Pakistani 
nuclear cooperation persisted throughout 1998 and into the new millennium. 
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The continued collaborations of China and Pakistan in civilian 
nuclear technologies can be held as another camouflage to continue China-
Pakistan nuclear weapons cooperation. China has recently been involved in 
building Pakistan's second 300-megawatt Chasma nuclear power plant, 
south of Islamabad, which could be used as camouflage for supplying of 
materials and components for the weapons programme. In recent years, 
China has supplied to Pakistan a 30,000 KW stabilizers and 30,000 KW 
streamers, as also large quantities of heavy water which have been suspected 
of being diverted to other unsafeguarded facilities, like the Khushab 
plutonium production reactor.'^'' Similarly, China's official news agency 
Xinhua had reported of China exporting Pakistan a sophisticated simulated 
nuclear power plant control Room which it said was aimed at training 
Pakistani technicians."*^ China remains determined to supply nuclear power 
technologies to Pakistan, as also to build a second 300-megawatt nuclear 
power plant at Chasma. And confirmation of China's intent have come from 
the highest level since President Jiang Zemin's visit to Islamabad in 
December 1996.''^ This cooperation is vital for Pakistani to develop its 
civilian nuclear industry in the context of its refusal to safeguard all its 
facilities upto IAEA standards and regimes. 
The US Defence Department (DoD) has described Pakistan's 
capability to produce a nuclear reactor indigenously as "limited" in its 
Military Critical Technologies List. The DoD report noted that Pakistan 
would probably require assistance in obtaining or producing key nuclear 
materials, such as beryllium, boron, carbide, hafnium, zirconium, lithium, 
graphite and high purity bismuth. The report also found Pakistan's nuclear 
components, including furnaces, multi-stage light gas guns, transient 
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recorders, oscilloscopes, flash X-ray equipment, capacitors, pulse 
generators, high speed computers, and sophisticated electronics. 
Sino-Pakistani collaboration was evident in the visit to China by a 
Pakistani delegation immediately after the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests. 
The delegation hoped to gain Chinese nuclear guarantees and politico-
military backing. Nothing could have established the truth of China's 
assistance to Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 28 and 30, 1998. The glowing 
tribute that Pakistani leaders paid to China in their statements following this 
made Chinese-Pakistan nuclear cooperation far more obvious. Although the 
precise outcome of the meeting was not clear, it is believed that China was 
not opposed to Pakistan conducting nuclear tests in response to the Indian 
tests.'^' Also, as first step towards preparing for nuclear tests, soon after 
India's tests on may 11-13 (1998), Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Shamshad 
Ahmed, undertook an unannounced visit to Beijing. This was followed by 
Pakistan conducting its nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, 1998 the details 
about which remain inconclusive. To make the China Pakistan links further 
clear the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s address to the nation after the 
tests can be held as evidence. In his address he sounded so much grateful in 
describing their 'time-tested' relations with Beijing and said that "our 
friendship has been further strengthened"" China, Pakistan's main arms 
supplier, is widely assumed to have been Islamabad's key supplier of much 
of the clandestine technology used to establish it as a nuclear power in 1998. 
From the Chinese side, the coverage and condemnation of India's 
tests far exceeded China's response to Pakistani nuclear tests. The strongest 
words for Pakistan were that China "deeply regrets" its tests while India was 
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blamed for seeking "hegemony" in the South Asian region and flaunting 
international consensus for nuclear non-proliferation." What China seems to 
completely ignore is that for variety of reasons Pakistan's weaponisation can 
prove far more dangerous and difficult proposition for all the non-
proliferation regimes. But what is worse is these weapons may unleash 
destruction without being actually used. The fact that China chose to ignore 
much of all this clearly betrays their bias in perception and policy. 
New insights into the level of Chinese assistance to Pakistan came 
about in early 2004 as a result of on-site investigations into Libya's nuclear 
weapons program, following Muammar al-Qadhdhafi's dramatic reversal on 
WMD programs in late 2003. As part of disarmament inspections, early 
Chinese nuclear weapons designs were handed over to IAEA inspectors by 
Libyan scientists, wrapped in plastic bags bearing an address in Islamabad. 
The possession by a third party of complete step-by-step instructions for a 
workable implosion-type bomb raised a new concerns over China's 
proliferation history with Pakistan, as notes included in the package of 
documents reportedly suggested that China continued to mentor Pakistani 
scientists on the finer point of bomb-building over several years following 
the technology transfers. Both China and Pakistan have refused to admit any 
knowledge of the transfer.'^ Times of India reacting to this shocking news 
placed it on the front page with title "Pakistan N-bomb has a Chinese tag" 
US) has evidence of China Mentoring Pak on Finer Points. China's actions 
'were irresponsible and short-sighted, and raise questions about what else 
China provided to Pakistani's nuclear programme", David Albright, a UN 
weapons Inspector in Iraq, said "these documents also raise questions about 
whether Iran, North Korea and perhaps others received these documents 
from Pakistanis or their agents.^^ 
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The fact that Pakistan is continuously moving from one crisis to 
another has surely made Chinese alive to changing ground realities which 
has guided China's apathy towards Pakistan in recent years. Following the 
India and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, new signs emerged that China had 
permanently curtailed its military nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. In 
remarks to a seminar in New Delhi on Sino-India relations, China's 
ambassador to India Zhou Gang reiterated that China has not assisted 
Pakistan's nuclear programme, stating "non-existent is the issue of China's 
nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan" and that "all cooperation 
between China and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy is under 
International Atomic Energy safeguards". Zhou acknowledged that China 
was aware of India's concern's regarding China's nuclear assistance to 
Pakistan and that Beijing had taken "a positive, flexible and pragmatic 
approach and made proper readjustment of certain policies concerned.^^ In 
the relaxed atmosphere of the nineties in China, Chinese scholars became 
more articulate and have admitted in private discussions that China did 
provide assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear sphere during the cold war 
years and it was a 'mistake'. This "mistake" viewed in the context of the 
current state of Pakistan with its fractured political system, failing economy, 
a society riddled with Islamic fundamentalism and heaven of International 
terrorism and sponsor of cross border terrorism, has turned out to be a grave 
error.^^ 
However if we look at the new developments in context of Sino-Pak 
special relationship with the end of the century, we will see that there is still 
life, for example Pakistan's Chasma nuclear power plant, which Chinese 
firms built, was commissioned began fuel loading in November 1999. The 
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300 MW power plant, modeled on the Chinese-design Qinshan-I, was the 
result of a 31 December 1991 agreement with China and was expected to get 
connected to the National power grid in the summer of 2000. Construction 
was begun n 1992 and will require annual shipments of one ton of low 
enriched uranium. On 27 September 2000, China National Nuclear 
Corporation formally handed over the Chasma nuclear power plant to the 
Pakistan Energy Commission. In March of 2003, China and Pakistan signed 
a MoU to construct phase 2 of the Chasma facility - a second 300 MW 
power plant^^. On November 4, 2003 Musharraf the President of Pakistan 
secured a wide range of agreements with Beijing during his trip to China, 
these agreements include a $ 500 million loan, a preferential trade 
agreement and a formal extradition treaty. However, the most expected 
agreement between the two nations - a deal for the peoples Republic of 
China to participate in the building of a nuclear plant in Pakistan - was 
never finalized. Chinese foreign ministry officials say that consultations 
'\vere continuing". The first stage of the deal, as already mentioned, had 
already been completed with China helping Pakistan to build the first part of 
the Chasma nuclear power plant in the Punjab province, which is located in 
Eastern Pakistan and borders India. If completed, it would allow Islamabad 
to produce enriched plutonium while maintaining its status as a non-
signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the agreement between 
the PRO and Pakistan was never signed, China sfill supplies Pakistan with 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. However Chinese foreign Ministry 
spokesman Liu Jianchao told reporters in Beijing on November 18 that 
"China is not engaged in proliferation of nuclear technology. He said the 
cooperation between China and Pakistan in the nuclear energy cooperation 
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is purely for peaceful purposes and does not violate any non proliferation 
obligations or China's export controls. We are also willing to have the 
international Atomic Energy Agency safeguards". But Beijing officials also 
admit that the government cannot fully control what individual firms sell to 
countries like Iran and Pakistan, although it says steps have been taken to 
educate these firms of missile related export regulations, such as a national 
training course on export controls in February 2003. Nonetheless, 
Washington has imposed economic sanctions on a number of Chinese firms 
accused by links to Pakistan, Iran and North-Korea.^° 
Despite the veil of secrecy, a considerable number of distinguished 
scholars have documented China's help to Pakistan. This has included the 
provision of nuclear weapons design information, test data, heavy water and 
the sitting up of enrichment facilities.^' China is having full knowledge of 
the fact that its sale of sensitive technologies to Pakistan is seen by India as 
a hostile action and a major threat to its security. 
One explanation for China's continuing role in Pakistan's nuclear 
programme is that in exchange for their help the Chinese have been given 
access to Pakistan's imported CANDU reactor technology, transferred to it 
by Canada, as well as access to the blueprints stolen by Dr. A.Q. Khan from 
URENCO in the Netherlands. Pakistan has succeeded in acquiring a vast 
range of equipment and technology, clandestinely and otherwise, from a vast 
range of sources - sources which China may have had difficulty in tapping, 
particularly in the seventies and the early eighties. The continuing Sino-
Pakistan collaboration confirms Indian suspicions that Chinese hostility to 
India is not over. US-Senator Connie Mack alluded to this when she stated 
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on the senate floor on June 16, 1998, that "China may be too preoccupied 
today to directly threaten India, but they need only employ Pakistan as a 
surrogate belligerent to jeopardize India's security. 
According to Robert Ross, China continues its support for Pakistan 
by supplying nuclear and missile technology because "China views a 
credible Pakistani deterrent as the most effective way to guarantee the 
security of its sole ally in southern Asia against Indian power". China views 
its relationship with Pakistan as somewhat similar to the U.S. relationship 
with Israel.^"' 
Further Peking may have realized that when Pakistan was getting 
nuclear apparatus from other countries there was no point in not offering it 
what China could spare. The difference, however, lay only in the context to 
which China could go. The other nuclear powers observed some reservations 
in their dealings and China tried to bridge the gap which they left 
unattended. In return, China found in Pakistan an ally who was prepared to 
go a long way in helping it with all diplomatic support on issues on which it 
often found itself isolated. Moreover, China was the only nuclear power 
which was not barred by any of the conditions that governed nuclear 
exports. Also China was not a member of the London based nuclear supplier 
group, nor was it a party to the non-proliferation treaty^'' until 1992. 
Missile Collaboration ; 
The end of the cold war and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan changed the region's geo-strategic map. Not withstanding these 
changes, Pakistani aspirations remained unchanged and Sino-Pakistani 
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military co-operation deepened. The two countries cooperated closely in 
missile development, otherwise a forbidden sector in the global arms bazaar. 
The history of Pakistan missiles development can be traced back to 
the formation of the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission 
(SUPARCO) in 1961.^^ China has been viewed as the most critical partner 
in building Pakistan's delivery systems for its nuclear weapons, especially 
its missile inventories which have made an impressive progress since late 
1980's. In 1988, the Chinese are believed to have helped Pakistan developed 
the Hatf I and Hatf 2 missiles, with 80 kilometers and 300 kilometers 
ranges, respectively. Starting from 1989 when Hatf I and II were displayed 
in the national parade, China has been known for having assisted Pakistan 
with their guidance systems. On February 05, 1989, a few months before the 
first test firing of India's Agni Missile, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Gen. 
Aslam Beg^*', announced the testing of two types of missiles, called hatf. A 
Section of the western media believes that work on these missiles was 
started in the early 1980s but there is proof that it began in 1974^^ when 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was Prime Minister of Pakistan. Hatf I was a Ballastic 
Missile with 80 km range, its development was based on French technology. 
A report in 1992 suggested that the Hatf-IA, with a range of 100 kms, was 
also being developed. The launch weight of Hatf-I is assumed to be around 
1,500 kg. The missile can carry a payload of 500 kg. The Pakistani 
authorities describe the Hatf-II as a ballistic missile with range of 300 kms. 
The weight of the Hatf II is believed to be 5,500 kg at launch and the 
payload capacity is estimated at around 500 kg. The Hatf-III is believed to 
have a range of 600-800 kms. It has a guidance system which is not very 
sophisticated. In December 1990, when the Pakistan Army chief stated that 
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Pakistan had tested a long-range ballistic missile, it was widely believed that 
this was the Hatf-IIl''^ In 1997, Pakistan claimed that it had tested the Hatf-
III^'', but many in the International strategic community voiced doubts that 
such a test had been successful. 
Because of Pakistans weak scientific base, it had to rely heavily on 
outside help. Several studies and reports held that foreign involvement in 
Pakistan's missile developments started after the formation of space and 
Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). Infact it were 
western countries which provided the critical support in the beginning. It is 
being held that some of the technologies acquired for the SUPARCO were 
transferred to the development of the Hatfs. Apparently sensitive and 
prohibited material which led to the Pakistani development of missiles at its 
earliest was flowing from western countries including the U.K., Norway, 
France and Germany. ^^  However China has been Pakistan's most important 
and predominant source of foreign technological support for its missile 
development effort. 
Thereafter the two countries - Pakistan and China - signed a 
memorandum of understanding with each other in 1989 and entered into a 
10 year tie-up involving military procurement, R and D technology transfer 
and co-production. In September 1990, China concluded an agreement to 
supply M-II missile technology and components to Pakistan. China 
encouraged Pakistan to develop its own guidance system for the Hatf-II , 
though its standard was extremely poor, as admitted by General Aslam 
Beg." In 1989, Pakistan officials informally acknowledged that 30 per cent 
of the components for the ANZA system v/ere being fabricated with Chinese 
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help.'"' In 1990, there was a report that Pakistani scientists were being 
trained by Chinese scientists.'^ Also in 1990, there was news that China 
wanted to sell its M-9 missiles, with a range of 600 km, to Pakistan. The 
news was based on a US navy report. In March 1991, it was disclosed that 
China had supplied M-11 missiles to Pakistan'^. The supplied items were 
mobile launchers and dummy missile frames'^ . Besides China has directly 
supplied missiles and, reports about supply of M-11 missiles which breached 
china's commitment to missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have 
persisted despite being constantly denied by both sides. Occasional, US 
intelligence leaks to the press and repeated US sanctions on China and 
Pakistan on this account have been the most visible evidence of this axis. In 
opposition to these deals the US government in June 1991 slapped Missile 
Technology control Regime (MTCR) sanctions on two Chinese companies -
the Great Wall Industries Corporation and Precision Machinery Import 
export corporation - for a two year period. But these sanctions were revoked 
only eight months later in February 1992, with China proclaiming to 
conditionally adhere to the MTCR policy guidelines. In this context, the 
Chinese foreign Ministry stated that: 
It would only sell weapons intended to build-up self 
defence capabilities and would prohibit sales of arms 
that would endanger regional stability or used to 
79 
interfere in the affairs of these countries. 
Besides, both China and Pakistan have occasionally conceded to their 
missile cooperation though these admissions remain invariably sporadic, 
indirect and belated. In May, 1991 China confessed to the US under 
Secretary of State, Robert M. Kimmit, that it had sold ballistic missile to 
Paksitan.^ ^ 
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China was believed to having contracted Pakistan during 1980's to 
supply it about three dozen (36) M-11 missiles as also to build a missile 
Q 1 
manufacturing facility. Throughout China took the precaution of not 
stating that the missiles transferred to Pakistan had crossed the parameters 
laid down by the missile technology Control Regime (MTCR). The 
Pakistanis were optimistic about overcoming American resistance to these 
arms transfers. They unofficially maintained that the supply of M-11 would 
go on uninterrupted. Much later, in 1994, the President of Pakistan, Farooq 
Leghari, officially confirmed that Pakistan had purchased missiles from 
China, though he contended that missiles were within MTCR parameters. 
In January 1992, it was reported that China had transferred to Pakistan 
guidance units to be used for flight control of the M-1 Is. In 1993, Mirza 
Aslam Beg stated that the M-11 could be the best carrier for Pakistani 
nuclear weapons. In August 1993, as there was definite evidence of the 
transfer of M-11 missiles, the US imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan 
under category II of the MTCR. The Chinese reaction to this latest US move 
was that the MTCR being a bilateral and not an international understanding 
between them (i.e. US and China) would not possibly apply to China-Pak 
relations. However, the sanctions against China were lifted in November 
1994. There was no waiver for Pakistan. 
The real danger to India from the M-11 missiles positioned in 
Pakistan would be considerations involving its range. The M-4 being a 
liquid fuelled missile incorporating additional components can extend its 
range to 1500 km. Moreover the absence of any credible anti-ballistic 
missile defence system makes a target country extremely vulnerable to such 
an assault. 
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There have been press reports about China having supplied anywhere 
between 34 to 84 M-11 missiles and Chinese technicians having visited 
Sargodha and Tarwanah missile facilities to unbundle and assemble these 
missiles as also to train Pakistani personnel to handle these. These reports 
were first published in Wall Street Journal in 1994. However, former CIA 
officials now claim that Clinton administration avoided heavy sanctions at 
that time to avoid to prevent US-China bust up. 
On 25 August, 1996, an American newspaper published a news item 
that in early 1995, China had again sent missile parts to Pakistan. The 
transfer of blueprints and equipment to a facility in Tarwanah in 1996 was 
also brought to light.^ ^ According to the Congressional Research Service 
Issue Brief, the construction work for the Tarwana missile facility was 
started in 1995 and was expected to be completed by 1997. According to a 
1997 Time report, the CIA has concluded that China helped Pakistan 
establish a factory to manufacture M-11 SRBM's (Short Range Ballistic 
Missiles) near Rawalpandi in addition to supplying 30 ready to launch M-
11's that are stored at the Sargodha air base near Lahore. These missiles 
delivering a payload of 1,100 ponds (500 kg) to a range of 185 miles (300 
km) could be ideal for Pakistani nuclear weapons and can be targeted on 
Indian cities near the Pakistani border.^ ^ 
Analysis of different reports indicates that the deal between Pakistan 
and China was struck sometimes in the 1980's. Most reports indicate that it 
was in 1988. On august 22, 1994, it was reported that Pakistan was ready to 
pay $15 million to China as partial payment for its contract with the China 
go 
precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation. In 1992, when China 
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had supplied actual missiles and some M-11 components, Pakistan paid yet 
another installment of $85 million^*'. The total cost of the M-11, according 
to one source, is $ 185 million. Besides, Pakistan is believed to have paid 
$516 million to China for the supply of missile technology.^' 
Undoubtedly, the information regarding the transfer of Chinese 
missiles to Pakistan is largely based on US intelligence reports leaked out by 
the American media. However, there are other evidences as well, like 
statement of leaders of the China and Pakistan on the transfer of missiles, 
and to assist Pakistan in different countries for sensitive missile materials, 
suggests that missiles were indeed transferred from China to Pakistan. 
Moreover, the resemblance between the technical characteristics of the M-
11 and the Hatf-II further establishes this fact.^ ^ 
Pakistan had relied on the outright purchase of Missiles because its 
indigenous missile development programme failed to take off. It can be held 
that perhaps initial supply of missile technology and components would 
have been for an indigenous missile development programme. But when 
Pakistan failed to develop it began to take it readymade. It is said that most 
of the missiles transferred to Pakistan are complete systems. It is also 
possible some of these missiles are to be assembled in Pakistan so as to 
reduce detection risk and avoided the complications of transporting 
complete systems. It is also possible that by getting Pakistan to assemble the 
missiles, China is fulfilling the terms of the contract according to which it 
was supposed to tram Pakistanis in the art of making missiles ". 
In 1997, when Pakistan claimed to have test launched the Hatf-III, no 
one in the strategic community believed that Pakistan could have tested a 
230 
missile with a range of 800 km, when it had failed to test or launch missiles 
in lesser categories. Actually the, Hatf-III is nothing but the M-9 missile of 
China. The Indian and western media have reported many times that the M-9 
has been transferred to Pakistan.^ "^ 
In 1997, when Pakistan claimed to have test fired the ANZA and 
Baktar Shikan, the Indian strategic community refused to accept the claim 
and maintained that they were basically Chinese missiles with Pakistani 
names. In the same year, the American office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
reported that the market for Chinese cruise missiles had expanded in the 
previous two years. Pakistan was marked as China's favourite customer.^^ 
Since 1998, Pakistan reportedly received China's support in serial 
production of the Shaheen-I SRBM and Shahen-2 MRBM, including 12 
shipment of missile components and the building of a second missile plant.^^ 
These supplies seem to be occupying even as Pakistan and India have been 
engaging in nuclear Saber rattling. China has continued these activities 
despite the conclusion of many analysts that the possibility of nuclear war in 
south Asia has increased since 1998. 
On 6 April 1998, Pakistan successfully tested a new medium range 
surface to surface "Ghauri" missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers. 
Washington is examining any role China may have had in the development 
of "Ghauri" missile in violation of China's commitment to abide by the 
MTCR guidelines. There was little doubt that the technology for the missile 
system came from China. Infact, soon after the test of the Ghauri missile 
system came from China. Infact, soon after the test of the Ghauri missile, 
Pakistan media reported that the missile was developed with Chinese 
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technology and some of the reports quoted the western diplomats as saying 
initial technology" for the weapon came from Beijiing. Moreover there 
was a brief controversy over the source of technology, with Islamabad 
saying it was indigenous, with China denying the any assistance to Pakistani 
missile development programme and some American reports hinting at the 
North Korean connection. However it was soon believed that Washington 
has been trying to whitewash the Chinese connection in view of the 
scheduled US-China Summit in Beijing in June this year (1998). The fact 
remains that even if there was a North Korean angle to this issue, China's 
hand would surely be involved in such a deal. 
If one were to believe various experts than the Chinese collaborations 
with Pakistan's missile programmes has never really been completely 
halted, only slowed down sporadically. According to intelligence leaks in 
US media as late as 2001, China National Machinery and Equipment import 
and Export Corporation. (CMEC) had been supplying missiles components 
for Pakistan's Shaheen-I and Shaheen-2 projects.^ ^ Infact so many studies 
have continued to reenforce the thesis of a sustained co-relation between 
occasional successes of China's new missile development projects or their 
abandonment) followed by Islamabad announcing the successful 
development of similar missiles.^ ^ 
One most intriguing element of Pakistan's missiles development 
programme has been the fact that Pakistan has never had any failures in its 
missile tests. This remains a mystery, unless these have been pre-tested 
technologies by a third country i.e. China'°° In that case, Pakistan's 
confidence in these pre-tested technologies remains particularly critical as 
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all of these happen to be nuclear capable missiles technologies. On June 10, 
1998, Raja Zafarul Haq, the leader of the House in Senate and the minister 
for religious affairs, informed the Pakistani Parliament that Pakistani 
missiles has been tipped with nuclear war-heads'*'' Mr. Haq's statement has 
vindicated India's decision to develop a credible nuclear deterrent of its 
own. The final provocation for India's tests, however, was the test-firing of 
the Hatf-V or Ghauri missile. Soon after the test, the Indian defence 
Minister described China as the mother of the Ghauri. Some commentators 
voiced fears about the start of a nuclear arms race in South Asia in the wake 
of Pakistan's missile testing, which they felt was conducted as a response to 
the Indian tesfing."'^  
Circumstantial evidence indicates to China as only ally which 
Pakistan may be willing to rely on so strongly. Besides, China may have 
also directly or indirectly facilitated Pakistan's missile cooperation with 
other countries like North Korea which has been another major subject of 
debate in recent years. Reports appeared in October 2002 suggesting that 
Pakistan had been transferring nuclear materials and technology for uranium 
enrichment to North Korea since 1997. In return, Pyongyang has supplied 
Pakistan with Nodong MRBMS. Pakistan offers North Korea the best 
possible source for nuclear technology, given Islamabad's need for missiles 
as delivery system for its nuclear weapons. China's direct job in the North-
Korea- Pakistan relationship remains unclear, although some speculate that 
China tacitly approves these transactions. U.S. made C-130 transport 
aircrafts used in barter deal between North Korea and Pakistan, have made 
stops at Chinese air bases on their trips between Pakistan and North Korea. 
Strong evidence also indicates that the Nodong MRBM is a copy of the 
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Chinese CSS-2 missile, suggesting that the i^ ey source of North Korean 
missile technology was China.'°'* There have also been various reports China 
having charged Pakistan sums of money - varying from $ 200 million to 
$500 million - for passing on missile technologies'"^ And as these cash 
payments have gradually become more important part of these deals thus 
forcing Pakistan to look for alternatives like North Korea. 
It seems that Beijing's motivations in transferring nuclear and missile 
materials and technology to Pakistan derive largely from Chinese concerns 
about the regional balance of power and are part of Chinese effort to pursue 
a strategy of containment in its enduring rivalry with India. A more 
convincing explanation is that China wants to limit India's power 
capabilities to South Asia and thereby constrain New-Delhi's aspirations to 
become a major power in Asia. India's emergence as a peer competitor in 
Asia would upset China's pre-dominant position in the region. However, if 
acute conflict and an intense arms race between India and Pakistan persist, 
India would continue to be bracketed with its smaller regional rival Pakistan 
and not with China. Hence Sino-Pakistan collaboration has altered the 
balance of power in the region and above it, the clandestine nature of Sino-
Pakistani transactions has promoted a culture of disbelief and mistrust 
among the countries in the region. The continuing contradictions in Chinese 
non-proliferation policy are caused by the Tensions that exists between 
China's regional interests in South Asia and its global power aspirations.'*^^ 
Countries in the region will be now suspicious of signing any arms control 
or disarmament agreement with China, who, although an adherent of the 
MTCR, shows nothing but disdain for the treaty. It will now be difficult to 
sell the India public opinion and security arrangement which does not 
include fool proof verification provisions. 
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For all practical purposes, China has intervened in South Asian affairs 
by supplying nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan, and has tried its 
best (till now) to alter the strategic balance in its favour and its long term 
ally Pakistan to undermine India's natural predominance in the region. John 
Graver is right in writing that China wants to keep Pakistan independent, 
powerful, and confident in order to present India with a standing two front 
threat. If India subordinates Pakistan, its position against China would 
become much stronger, reducing China's power in South Asia.'°^ The 
Chinese calculation appears to be that, while India is preoccupied with 
Pakistan, New Delhi may not be able to develop long range military' 
capabilities, especially to missile and naval systems, to match those of 
China. This is a short-run calculation, however, as Chinese assistance to 
Pakistan seems to be having a galvanizing effect on India's determination to 
develop capabilities that can match those of China. 
It can be held that China's continuing large support for Pakistan's 
national development efforts and the continuing transfers of technology for 
conventional/Nuclear Arms building is most likely part of a larger game 
plan. It is possible that China has been demanding certain strategic 
concessions from Pakistan in exchange for the transfer of forbidden items. It 
is also possible that Pakistan is being used as a base by China. Nevertheless, 
Sino-Pakistani cooperation in defence and military, nuclear and missile 
technology needs to be understood with its strategic impact on India's 
security. 
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about the influx of refugees from East Pakistan to India and the belligerency 
of the Government of Pakistan and finally the outbreak of war in December 
1971. Evidences are now available as to the manner in which Chinese and 
the American's supported Pakistan against India in the winter of 1971. 
India's response to the Sino-American strategic challenge came in the 
form of a strengthening of its relationship with the former Soviet Union. The 
Indian decision makers felt an optimum response to the complex challenges 
to the country's security resulting from the coming together of China-
Pakistan and the United States, required not only adequate defence 
preparedness, but more importantly forging a strategic relationship with an 
external power friendly to India. Soviet Union which was feeling encircled 
by the Sino-American strategic understanding turned out to be the ideal 
choice - the result was famous Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of August 
1971. The treaty not only constituted a countervailing force to the Sino-
American and Sino-Pak strategic collaboration but also served India's 
security interests, without compromising on Non-Alignment , by acting as a 
deterrent against Chinese or American interference in the December 1971 
war. 
The Indian security position improved considerably after 1971 
following the establishment of its prominent position in the sub-continent; 
the Simla Agreement with Pakistan, the attainment of Nuclear Status 
resulting from the peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974, the Kashmir 
Accord with Sheikh Abdullah, the integration of Sikkim with Indian Union 
and finally the ambassadorial relations with China. Perhaps the only source 
of concern to India's policy makers was the vigorously pursued re-armament 
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programme by Pakistan in the post 1971 period, coupled with its quest for 
nuclear capability which according to evidences now available started in the 
early part of the seventies itself. 
The nuclear action approach complemented India's strategy to seek 
security through a modern military machine to defend and deter 
conventional military threats from Pakistan and China. India's defence 
policy received attention after the Sino-Indian border conflict. India's 
concern for adequate defence preparedness was reflected in : the gradual 
increase in its defence budget.'* Setting up of a MIG factory in 1963 with 
Soviet assistance in order to carter to the country's defence needs, and the 
inauguration of the first five year defence plan in 1964. The accent on 
defence preparedness was not only as a consequence the lessons that country 
learnt from the 1962 war, but was also a response - a very significant 
response indeed to the arms transfers of external powers to Pakistan. The 
1975-76 report of the Defence Ministry' shows that Pakistan was the biggest 
recipient of Chinese military aid amongst the non-communist countries and 
that it had made the war losses suffered in 1971.^  
The attitude of Pakistan worried the government and the people of 
India and there was a lurking fear that Pakistan and China may combine to 
throttle Indian defence from all sides. To meet these contingencies missions 
were rushed to various countries in the west as also to the Soviet union to 
obtain arms and equipment required essentially for the defence and security 
oflndia.^ 
On the Chinese Arms transfers to Pakistan, the Indian concern was 
summed up, on 8 August, 1966, by the Defence Ministers statement: 
246 
"We have given Pakistan repeated assurances, yet, 
Pakistan is arming at a frantic rate and in this it has 
been assisted in a very large measure by China. This 
action of Pakistan constituted a grave threat to our 
security". 
Pakistan was convinced that Chinese help would be decisive and 
Q 
forthcoming in wresting Kashmir for Pakistan from India. The threats at 
contiguous level from China and Pakistan closely engaged the attention of 
policy makers in India. China became a source of military strategic threat 
largely on account of its growing defence strength, placing of missiles in 
Tibet, the building of network of roads and communication in Sinkiang 
region.^  
India's softness over the western presence in the Indian ocean is 
largely by India's security and political considerations then prevailing. The 
quest for multilateral security guarantee later appears to have been at the 
root of India's soft and less vocal Indian ocean diplomacy. Nehru at that 
time perhaps believed that the presence of the US seventh fleet would be 
deterrence against the possible future attacks on India from China. As India 
was anticipating a two front threat on its security. The possibility of the two 
front threat dilemma for India was illustrated in the tension in Kashmir in 
early 1990. India is reported to have been forced to pull back nine army 
divisions from the Sino Indian border for redeployment to Kashmir.'° 
PROJECTING INDIA HEGEMONIST : 
Both China and Pakistan try to project India as a hegemonist state 
with the intentions of bossing over the smaller states in South East Asia and 
South Asia region. This stance has two implications. One is to create a fear 
psychosis among the adjacent smaller states, and other is to legitimize 
interference and even presence of the unipolar power in the region. 
Despite of having gifted thousands of square kilometers of Indian 
territory to China in J & K Islamabad boasts of having resolved all border 
disputes with China. And China's building of Karakoram Highway through 
illegally occupied territory, Beijing portrays India as hcgcmonist state. 
Pakistan's and China's involvement in the North East of India, 
sanctuaries for insurgent groups in Bangladesh etc. are major concern to 
India. Due to the high economic and diplomatic cost of an all out war, an 
overt/covert lower level of warfare of the kind Pakistan is waging with India 
aimed at continuously bleeding a nation, is an easier option for forces 
inimical to India. The trends of such low level conflicts is likely to continue 
as both China and Pakistan have vested interests in mobilizing India's small 
neighbours against it. Indian security can be seriously threatened if Pakistan, 
China and Myanmar coalesce to encourage a proxy war in Jammu and 
Kashmir and North East India. 
Pakistan and China have ever tried to manipulate the India's 
neighbours and their policies by making in roads, into Nepal, Myanmar and 
Bangladesh. By this they want to keep the India's growing power in check. 
The Pakistani support for Indian insurgencies results in high burdens for 
India in the nature of economy, defence etc. 
All this has given rise to a strategic schism in the South Asian region 
which is naturally inimical to Indian interests. 
It is ofcourse, reiterated again and again that India has remained a 
common factor behind the China Pakistan nexus. The nexus has proved 
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clearly a strategic fire cleverly stoked to encircle as well engulf India and 
marginalize it as a sub-continental power to dominate Asia, China contained 
India within the sub-continent boosting the capabilities and hatered of 
Pakistan and other South Asian and South East Asian neighbours of India to 
limit Indian influence in these regions and also in central Asia. 
For instance China overtly supports monarchy in Nepal to gain geo-
economic access there with the help of Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence 
(ISI)", it covertly funds the maoist rebellion which is inimical to Indian 
interests. By signing in January 2003, a new defence agreement with 
Bangladesh, where Pakistani influence is growing rapidly, China now 
intends to create Pakistan-II on India's East. To counter India's growing 
influence in Indian-ocean Beijing uses Myanmar's international isolation to 
further encircle India. And it is not coincidence that Pakistan has also been 
cultivating. Myanmar against India with Beijing's active support'" and 
cooperation. In December 2001, it came to light that two Pakistani nuclear 
scientists (Sulaiman Asad and Mohammad Ali Mukhtar) had moved over to 
Myanmar a month earlier when the US intelligence officials were 
investigating the involvement of Pakistani nuclear scientists with the Al-
Qaida network. This report assumes greater significance as Myanmar has 
officially confirmed in January 2002, that it is building a nuclear reactor."* 
Besides occupying a large portion of north-eastern Ladakh in the 
western sector of India, the Chinese have always treated Arunachal Pradesh 
in the eastern sector as an integral part of China. Consequently they 
protested when Arunachal Pradesh was conferred statehood within the 
Indian union in 1986. When Indian army units were deployed in 1986-7 in 
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the Sumdorong Chu valley in Amnachal Pradesh, China in a retaliatory 
move, also stationed its troops in the valley, which raised the prospects of a 
Sino-Indian war. India's major military exercise through operation 
checkerboard in 1987 and Chinese attempts to reinforce the border kept the 
relationship between the two countries tense.'^ China has always been 
equally concerned about the status of Sikkim and Tibet. 
India is apprehensive of China's role in Kashmir, Tibet and North 
East India on following counts, first China has been holding on to a part of 
Kashmir's territory since 1962. The Sino-Pak understanding on Kashmir has 
obviously had security implications for India, which needs to hold on to 
Kashmir to press its claims over the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh and ward 
off any threats to the Punjab. The aid to Pakistan and deployment of IRBMs 
(Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) in Tibet has underscored. China's 
military presence on India's doorsteps. As mentioned earlier Myanmar has 
been a beneficiary of Chinese military aid since the advent of the military 
dictatorship in Yangon in 1988.'^  Both Myanmar and China have been 
abetting the insurgency in the north-eastern parts of India. China also has a 
defence supply and training links with Bangladesh. Taking note of the 
presence of China in different sectors of the Sino-Indian border and growing 
Sino-Pakistan friendship, India has strived to contain the individual and 
joint actions of Pakistan and China that could jeopardize its security 
interests. 
Asymmetrical India and China's Balance of Power Politics : 
India tend to be deeply apprehensive regarding China. Chinese on the 
other hand, tend not to perceive a serious threat from India, and find it 
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difficult to understand why Indian's might find China and its actions 
threatening. 
Major basis for Indian fear of China is the close China Pakistan 
strategic partnership. Most important thing about this which India perceives 
is that the emergence of the Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership remained 
intact from the many events which took place after the disintegration of the 
USSR. 
India's concern's regarding China's defence cooperation with 
Pakistan, its assistance to Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme and the 
sale of missiles and sophisticated weapons system by it to Pakistan, were 
conveyed to the Chinese side. The progress that China has made in the 
recent years in augmenting her nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities will 
continue to have adverse impact on Indian security. 
Upgradation of Pakistan's logistic capabilities all along the India-
Pakistan border, strengthening of Pakistan's air operation capabilities, and 
navy shows that China is trying to eliminate the balance which is in favour 
of India in South Asian region. The 1997-98 Indian Defence reports says 
that China's assistance to Pakistan directly affects Indian security. 
By keeping Pakistan militarily strong, China tries to keep Pakistan 
free from Indian domination and confident enough to pose a continual 
challenge to India. The depth and durability of the Sino-Pakistan entente 
cordiale compels Indian defence planners to consider the possibility that 
China or Pakistan will enter any large scale conflict between India and the 
I Q 
other. By doing this Beijing has compelled India to split its military forces. 
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In effect, the Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale confronts India with a two front 
threat. 
India unsuccessfully resisted the creation of the existing status quo of 
the China and Pakistan relations. India's leadership right from the beginning 
hoped to use India's friendship with China to persuade Beijing to keep its 
distance from Pakistan. 
India exerted considerable national effort in 1965 and 1971 to punish 
and diminish Pakistan. In neither cases did Indian military victories 
translated into durable gains. In both cases China helped Pakistan to rebuild 
its shattered military power and confidence (as did the United States). 
Pakistan's 1971 defeat did indeed threaten to overthrow the structure of 
power in South Asia. But it is the hard reality that Pakistan revived from its 
catastrophic 1971 defeat and within 20 years constituted a greater than ever 
threat to India. 
This policy of Chinese strategic calculations needs India to strengthen 
itself as an emerging global power. Since the US too is interested in 
bolstering the entity of Pakistan what came to light when Pakistan was being 
made member in the coalition against terrorism in post September Eleven 
epoch. In brief Mr. Fernades is not wrong in identifying China as a threat 
(major future threat) to India despite much confusion being created 
thereafter about this accusation.'^ 
China at this stage has almost two decades lead over India in the 
nuclear field. Since Sino-Pakistan nuclear understanding against India is not 
an improbability in the future, therefore if India does not restructure its 
foreign policy suitably, it would become highly vulnerable to Pakistan's 
nuclear blackmail. 
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As has been pointed out in the preceding chapters that Sino-Pakistan 
relationship was also strategically strengthened by the construction of 
Northern routes especially Karokoram highway. This arms supply route 
would remain undisturbed in any future contingency and thus has potential 
to pose a more serious threat to India's security than any quantum of 
armaments that Pakistan may receive. These roads were demonstrations of 
China's firm commitment to consolidated and perpetuate its close ties with 
Pakistan.^° Pakistan by itself however can never be a major threat to India's 
security. If China share with Pakistan a common hostility towards India, 
only then India's security is seriously threatened by Pakistan. 
India has a strategic balance against Pakistan, but imbalance 
continues with China. It is believed that India's nuclear deterrent is credible 
against Pakistan, and not China. Yet it can be said that ambiguity about the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of India's nuclear capability will create 
psychological fear for China '^ to launch a nuclear strike. China has played 
and can play an intrusive role in Indo-Pakistan politico-strategic issues with 
the objective of keeping India under constant strategic pressure. China is 
believed to be working towards not only creating Pakistan as a viable 
counterweight to India's power in South Asia, but to tilt the nuclear balance 
in Pakistan's favour". This assessment may be inaccurate and motivated. 
However, this shows that how critical can be the Chinese help to Pakistan's 
nuclear and missile capabilities vis-a-vis India and tilting the balance against 
India. 
India fears that Pakistan's capabilities in nuclear warheads and 
missile delivery systems are being beefed up with Chinese and also North 
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Korean help." It believes that "the asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces is 
strongly in favour of China which additionally has helped Pakistan to build 
missiles and nuclear capability. Some reports have speculated over the 
Pakistani ballistic missile superiority which may have left India militarily 
vulnerable. 
To nullify this, requires that Indian leadership be astute, and alert to 
any possibility of a rupture in Sino-Pakistani relations and then to seize it 
when it obtains. This will test Indian political leadership's street smartness 
in the International affairs. 
To what extent do Chinese nuclear and missile supply attitudes and 
practices in regions of conflict effect India's security? Indian Sinologists 
usually tend to ignore this aspect of India's strategic calculations. China not 
only posed a physical threat to India because of its geographical proximity 
and power, but also that the issue was not simply the distribution of military 
power. Rather, it laid in the nature of the enemity and the strategic dilemmas 
it created for India.^ ^ 
Strategically speaking, India has long border with China, a sizeable 
boundary with Pakistan, and an enormously long coastline Indian's have in 
the last five decades seen military action on all three fronts : in 1962, on the 
China-India border; in 1965, on the Pakistan border and in 1971 on its 
coastal seas. A Chinese direct intervention on behalf of Pakistan in 1965 and 
1971, however did not occur for fortuitous but unforeseen reasons. India 
was twice lucky by unrelated internal developments in China" which have 
prevented a joint China-Pakistan operation against India. But no nation can 
structure its strategic perceptions and options on the presumptions of such 
luck obtaining every time. 
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Chinese motives, behind the arms supply of all kinds to Pakistan 
seems to have concerns about the regional balance of power in South Asian 
region. China wants to keep India engaged with its smaller rival Pakistan by 
feeding their acute conflict and arms competition. 
In South Asian region Chinese policy shows its highest level of 
contradictions. Chinese involvement in nuclear proliferation in South Asia is 
long standing. As a military ally of Pakistan and an adversary of India, 
China's help to Islamabad to build its nuclear and missile capability is a way 
on the part of China to balance India militarily and politically. It has always 
tried to keep India limited to a regional power status (that too very 
reluctantly) and prevent its recognition as a major power. Balance of power 
and containment considerations vis-a-vis India are important factors behind 
the Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus. As India is country with the potential and 
inclination, to balance the China and challenge its status as the "Asia-
Pacific's sole middle kingdom". 
In this view the possible rise of India as a challenger can be prevented 
through the deliberate propping up of the regime surrounding India -
especially Pakistan - and the pursuit of policies that would reinforce the 
perception that India is weak, indecisive and on the verge of collapse".^^ 
The main plank of this strategy of balancing Indian power has been 
military support for states neighbouring India. Chinese arms sales go to the 
states bordering India. China has argued that its alliance with Pakistan has 
been in response to what it views as "Indian imperial tendencies to annex 
and develop territory, which Beijing deems too close to its own borders. As 
for the Chinese support to Pakistani nuclear and nuclear technology is 
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concerned, it can be analysed that "China views a credible Pakistani 
deterrent as a most effective way to guarantee the security of its sole ally in 
southern Asia against Indian power". For Beijing its strategic relationship 
with Pakistan has helped it to get a foothold in South Asia, a pillar of 
China's strategy of limiting India, and a means of contesting Russian 
dominance over Central Asia. China has allowed Islamabad to maintain a 
rough nuclear parity with New Delhi. The essential glue of the Beijing 
Islamabad entente has always been anti Indian. From Beijing's perspective, 
India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat 
to China by itself, and it can be easily countered, but Beijing must be wary 
of increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some 
hostile major state. To counter these contingencies, China has long pursued 
a classical balance by supporting Pakistan. Pakistan is China's Israel °, the 
largest beneficiary of the Chinese aid, and a recipient of its nuclear and 
missile technology. For China, Pakistan is the perfect ally. Support for 
Islamabad balanced out soviet and Indian power (and initially, U.S. power) 
and Pakistani criticism of China has been muted. 
The above analysis indicates that without any doubt China plays as an 
uhimate security blanket over Pakistan, but if one looks at Indo-Pak wars of 
1965 and 1971 one finds shortcomings in China's role in protecting Pakistan 
from humiliating defeats. It is said that China's motives are far more 
complex than is generally acknowledged and they go beyond the desire to 
'balance' India by strengthening Pakistan.^' 
China may v/ell have transferred nuclear knowhow and technology to 
Pakistan for the purpose of "balancing India"; but it is likely that China's 
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calculations were far more complex and went well beyond tethering India 
strategically. By transferring Nukes and missile equipment to Islamabad. 
Beijing has skillfully transformed the India-China nuclear debate into an 
India Pakistan contest so that world body pressures can be exerted on India 
and Pakistan to join the NPT and CTBT. 
Nuclear threat Environment: 
The Sino-Pakistani military relationship, especially its nuclear 
component, has, had an impact on Indian security and policies. To India the 
Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan, which continue even after 
Beijing acceded to the NPT and pledged to abide by Missile Transfer 
Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, demonstrate that a nuclear weapon 
state can blatantly violate its commitments and get away with it.^ ^ Barring 
some occasional protests on the part of U.S., the international community by 
and'large has remained silent on the Chinese violation of NPT. The irony is 
that International Community is pressurizing India to adhere to the NPT and 
abandon its nuclear programme. The Indian elite have viewed the Chinese 
nuclear/missile relationship with Pakistan as a deliberate containment 
strategy by Beijing designed to deny India a leadership role in the regional 
and global order. China has a strategic investment in Pakistan since the early 
sixties and is Pakistan's most reliable strategic partner. Pakistan is not being 
considered a threat by China while India is Pakistan is also reliable in 
Beijing's estimation and its motivation vis-a-vis India. 
Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation contributed to India's decision to 
accelerate its nuclear weapons programme and conduct open nuclear tests in 
May 1998, following a period of virtual limbo after the 1974 nuclear test.'^ '^  
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The 1974 test itself was partially the result of Indian concerns about China's 
nuclear programme and the US Chinese alliance with Pakistan during the 
1971 Bangladesh war. It was only in response to Pakistan's accelerating its 
nuclear programme with the aid of China that Prime Minister Rajive Gandhi 
initiated an Indian weapons program around 1988.^ ^ A shift toward more 
capable and transparent Indian nuclear posture could also come about 
simply as a result of the same contingency. The steady transformation of 
India's nuclear posture in the direction of continued weaponization will be 
driven to a significant extent by the growing perception among Indian policy 
makers that while Pakistan represents a "clear and present danger" to Indian 
security today, China could readily evolve into a similar threat over the next 
two decades.^ ^ At the moment, the rationale for the current shift in India's 
strategic posture is grounded primarily in prudential reasoning that seeks to 
create a deterrent aimed to insulating India against either Pakistan or 
Chinese nuclear coercion. However the pressures on India to create a large 
and diversified deterrent may well prove overwhelming if the future 
behaviour of both Pakistan and China is transformed in the direction of 
active militancy with respect to their territorial claims. 
Pakistan has acquired the ability to reliably target most Indian fixed 
assets at great distances from the frontier, and this capability will only grow 
over the years, thereby reducing the size of the Indian sanctuary even 
further. Both Nuclear weapons and Ballastic missiles are treated seriously 
as military instruments of deterrence in Pakistan because Islamabad's fears 
about the Indian intentions and its dread of the large and diversified Indian 
military industrial complex are seen as leaving it no other choice but to 
urgently develop a range of war fighting systems that possess both high 
survivability and high penetrativity vis-a-vis its principle adversary India. 
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In contrast, India's traditional reliance on air breathing systems for 
nuclear delivery, its robust separation between the uninformed military and 
the civilian nuclear establishment, its insular decision making with respect 
to the nuclear programme, and its lack of institutionalized mechanisms for 
managing nuclear strategy are viewed by many knowledgeable analysts as 
placing New Delhi at somewhat of a disadvantage with respect to 
Islamabad. There has been a steady and progressive momentum m 
enhancement of nuclear capability and delivery systems in Pakistan with the 
military in control, the prognosis for the future is the same. When china 
went nuclear in 1964, it declared that it had gone nuclear to break the 
monopoly of the western powers, Pakistan's programme, however, is 
directed at India without any ambiguity. 
The nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is threatening to use nuclear 
weapons in times of hostilities and if necessary to use it first. It has not 
subscribed to the "No first use doctrine unlike China and India, the other 
two nuclear powers in the region. A majority of analysts feel that nuclear 
weapons may give requisite confidence to Pakistan and alleviate her fears of 
India's conventional superiority. There are indications however, that the 
nuclear threat is being linked with Kashmir. Pakistan feels that due to the 
nuclear threat, India is not likely to take tougher measures against Pakistan 
and that it could now carry out its operations in Kashmir with impunity. It 
may also project a high probability of use of threat to the world in order to 
internationalise Kashmir issue and bring about external mediation.'^^ As it 
wishes to resolve the Kashmir problem by showing the same as flashpoint 
for the use of nuclear weapons. 
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Beijing has also committed to "no first use" and "non-use against 
non-nuclear powers". This, on the face of it, should end nuclear 
confrontation between China and India, if both sides are committed to that 
without ambiguity. Does, for example, China's "no first use" declarafion 
prevent its use on its "own territory", or in the Sino-Indian context, in any of 
the 'disputed' territories, e.g., Arunachal or Asai Chin. The answer is clearly 
no. Thus it is possible for China to launch a pre-emptive first strike, using 
tactical nuclear weapons against Indian counter force targets in a disputed 
region without violating the letter of declaration of 'no first use'. There is, 
of course, i^n addition the possibility that China could launch a massive 
nuclear first strike against strategic targets in India because India had 
launched a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan. This, china could hold, is not 
"first use".'^' 
Munir Akram, Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations defended 
his country's right to use nuclear weapons even in a conventional war. He 
said: "India should not have the licence to kill with convendonal weapons 
while Pakistan's hands are tied regarding other means to defend itself."*^  
Therefore, Pakistan will not be able to subscribe to a "no-first-use" 
policy because that is the only means by which it can deter an Indian 
aggression. This gives the impression of a hair-trigger readiness to use 
nuclear weapons in case of a conventional strike by India, against Pakistan. 
Given the increasing conventional asymmetry between the two countries, 
Pakistan has used its conventional inferiority well to sell to the world its 
justification for the first use of nuclear weapons.''^ 
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Pakistan perceives its nuclear capabilities as providing, among other 
things, the requisite strategic cover with which to immunize it against any 
military counteraction in the context of some ongoing unconventional 
conflict with India. New Delhi will face strong pressure to shift its overall 
nuclear posture to cope with the challenges of nuclear coercion. 
While Pakistan's exploitation of its nuclear capability and growth in 
the size of its arsenal would be the two critical factors affecting India's 
traditional nuclear posture. India's larger and more significant nuclear rival 
will have even more consequential effects on India. There is little doubt that 
Chinese nuclear capabilities are more significant than India's. As early as 
1988, a senior Indian military officer analyzed in some detail how the 
Chinese missile deployments supposedly occurring in Tibet could undercut 
larger Indian defence strategies in the region.'*'' In 1989 the then Indian 
Defence Minister K.C. Pant affirmed that China had infact deployed 
missiles in Tibet oriented primarily against India. China has currently a 
comprehensive nuclear weapons capability against India. 
While India has never factored in the evolution of China's nuclear 
policy planning, China casts a large shadow on India's decision to build 
nuclear weapons. Right from the beginning India's shift towards building 
nuclear weapons was largely conditioned by the perceived security 
challenges posed by the existence of China's nuclear weapons and later their 
proliferation among other Indian neighbours especially Pakistan. It was only 
when India exploded its first atomic device in May 1974, that it featured in 
China's nuclear planning. Even after that China has adopted only an indirect 
approach which is apparent in its growing interests in Pakistan's nuclear 
capability. 
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In the long run, however, China has since continued to be the single 
most influential external factor in the evolution of India's nuclear 
programme and planning. Nevertheless, various other events which are 
mentioned in the last few chapters were equally responsible for the overplay 
of China's role in Indian security Analysis. There were India's loss of face 
in its border war with China in November 1962, the Indo-Pak wars of 
September 1965 and December 1971, and finally the Sino-Pak special 
relationship that has since become the single most difficult factor in Sino-
Indian relafions. During Pakistan's wars against India in 1965 and 1971, 
Pakistani leaders were heard making public pronouncements on the 
likelihood of Chinese military intervention on their behalf. ^ 
However, India, if committed to the no first use doctrine, remains far 
too vulnerable, because it doesn't as yet possess a 'second strike' capability. 
While as China is having second strike capability. This means that India's 
nuclear assets may all be destroyed during the decapitating 'first strike' 
making its nuclear pasture futile. This has also to be seen in the light of the 
fact that Pakistan - which has evolved its nuclear deterrence clearly aimed 
at India has expressed its un-willingness to make the similar commitment to 
the no first use doctrine. The most important thing about Chinese nuclear 
doctrine which directly affects India's security interests. The general belief 
that China does not regard use of its nuclear weapons on what it considers to 
be its own territories as breach of this doctrine.''^  Here one needs to note that 
China and India both continue to have overlapping claims on large part of 
their territories. Each side claims expanses which the other controls or 
possesses and administers. India is in full administrative and military control 
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over the state of Arunachal Pradesh which China claims. China is in 
possession of north-eastern Ladakh (Aksai chin) which India claims. 
Pakistan felt safe behind its newly demonstrated nuclear shield, and 
sought to invite international intervention over the long standing Kashmir 
dispute by raising the spectre of a possible nuclear war, in early 1999 when 
it launched its incursion into the Kargil region of Indian Kashmir. The 
Kargil war brought it with a nuclear threats from both sides. 
According to one study, high level leaders on the two sides 
exchanged at least a dozen nuclear threats during the Kargil war. 
Pakistan's official internet page warned that Kashmir was a "nuclear flash 
point".''^ While Pakistan's decision to take military advantage of India in the 
Kargil-Dras sector was not entirely consequent to the nuclearisation of the 
two countries, the factor of deterrence that was perceived to have come into 
play between the two countries had a crucial role in Pakistan's decision to 
initiate that conflict, especially once the military leadership in Pakistan 
changed in October 1998. 
The Kargil war suggested that with the acquisition of nuclear 
v^ e^apons Pakistan was more confident than in the past of engaging India 
militarily in a limited war. In other words, Pakistan saw its nuclear weapons 
capability as an 'equaliser' against India's conventional military superiority. 
It was after the Kargil experience, which cost India heavily in men and 
material, Indian defence planners seem to be preparing for the prospect of 
fighting a 'limited war'. The concept of "limited war was put forward at a 
seminar in New Delhi in 1999, which also included a paper by the then 
Indian army chief, General V.P. Malik.''^ 
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The demise of the conventional "balance-imbalance" has led Pakistan 
to place greater reliance on nuclear deterrence to compensate for its 
conventional inferiority. Pakistani defence planners believe that their 
nuclear tests have levelled Indian superiority in conventional weapons and 
this situation can only be maintained if Pakistan retains the option to launch 
a pre-emptive nuclear strike.^ ° Islamabad adoption of nuclear deterrence as a 
means to counter conventional superiority is also contributing to the 
emergence of an inherently unstable nuclear deterrence between India and 
Pakistan. Unfortunately, clarification of India's and Pakistan's nuclear 
stance, together with the ongoing augmentation of their missile delivery 
systems, is undermining what stability nuclear weapons have brought to the 
sub-continent. 
Defence Dilemma 
Indian defence and security policies seek to deal with the Chinese and 
Pakistani threats and challenges on both military and diplomatic fronts. 
India has military superiority over Pakistan and is capable of winning a war 
on its own. But India's success against the Chinese threats both on the 
diplomatic and the military fronts is suspect. '^ 
At the twilight of the 20 century, there has been a steady increase in 
the Indian defence budget in the last several years. There was a big jump in 
the budget in 1997, by about 24.4 percent. The next big jump was in 2000-
01 when it was increased by 28.2 per cent to $ 13.62 billion. It increased by 
about 13 per cent for the fiscal year 2001-02. Last year, 2002-03, it 
increased by 4.8 percent. The defence budgets are partly reflective of 
India's military modernization programme. There have been several new 
acquisition in India for modernization programmes. 
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As far as Sino-Pakistan relations are concerned, this imposed a heavy 
defence burden upon India. The overall strategic perspective, the danger 
from China and Pakistan, had to be taken into account. Though government 
proclaimed that it stood, 'firmly' by its policies of non-alignment and 
peaceful cooperation'', the Defence Ministry could not relax in its efforts 
and kept revising and updating its defence plans. It was stated that Defence 
production was to be "more technology oriented rather than product 
oriented and there was no scope for reduction in the numbers and strength 
of the armed forces. Accommodating the changed concepts of warfare, it 
was felt necessary to take into consideration the External threats, self 
reliance in Defence production. 
Through 50 years of efforts, India now boasts a mighty army, in the 
light of strategic needs, since the early 1990s focused on developing its 
naval force. Indian military behaviour from 1974 to 1998 revealed a 
profound shift towards the use of conventional military power to deter and 
contain Pakistani and Chinese military pressures and to study the nuclear 
question in the context of India's security environment and Indian strategic 
planning. The defence deterrent dilemma existed in Indian thinking in this 
period. Internal and international conditions upto the 1990's did not allow 
the Indian government to resolve this dilemma. However, a military culture 
emerged during this period; it took the armed forces to the margin or the 
sideline of the Indian nuclear question. The suggestion is not that the Indian 
armed forces became participants in an advocacy to built the bomb or to 
demonstrate an atomic explosive capability.^ ^ The armed forces remained 
preoccupied with the development of Indian defence mechanism in relation 
to Pakistan and China. Indian defence budgets and annual reports of the 
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Indian ministries of defence and external affairs upto 1997 showed a pre-
occupation with conventional defence capabilities and threat perceptions. 
This period saw the growth of thinking within the Indian armed forces about 
the implications of the nuclear question for Indian security. 
India's military requirements have been formed in reaction to the 
arms procurement programmes of its traditional adversaries. Because neither 
China nor Pakistan was able to obtain technologically advanced weapons 
systems in the 1970s and 1980s, India was able to close the gap through a 
policy of military self reliance, especially with advanced weapons system 
from the Soviet Union. While this period gave the Indian military 
technology base a period of grace in which to develop competitive systems, 
that interval may have come to an end without India adequately exploiting 
it. The end of the cold war has changed these circumstances somewhat, and 
India's rivals are in a good position to modernize their forces with imports 
from desperate arms producers.^^ 
For India conventional defence versus nuclear detterence dilemma 
was settled by Pokhran II, but the process or the preparation for this 
outcome took shape during the 1970's to 1990's period. The China factor 
grew in important in Indian strategic calculations among other factors during 
this period but India avoided engaging China in an open competition; it did 
not challenge the PRC's provocative activities against Indian strategic 
interests and it did not create a situation whereby the PRC had to take India 
seriously. China pursued a deceptive strategy vis-a-vis India in this period. 
Its public line highlighted the importance of a foreign policy of peace 
because China sought peaceful economic development and claimed it 
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wanted peace in its neighbourhood; its military modernization, it claimed 
was its lowest priority. It claimed that it wants tranquil borders with India 
and good neighbourly relations. In fact since the late 1980's, it engaged 
India in border talks and the two sides agreed that the concept of the line of 
Actual control (LAC) should be the basis of a border settlement. Both sides 
also signed agreements concerning border trade, economic, and scientific 
cooperation in 1996-97.^ ^ But other realities impacted the Indian strategic 
psyche. China had always said that it had no conflict with Pakistan but it had 
one with India. 
Sino-Pak Factor in Pokhran II : 
It is well known that Pokhran first brought Indian defence 
establishment into the picture. The decision to test was political, because the 
test was of peaceful nature. It was not the decision of Indian military. The 
Indian military became engaged with the nuclear deterrence, in the early 
1980's. This occurred in the context of nuclear developments in Pakistan 
(1970s onwards), the emergence of the Sino-Pakistan military relationships, 
and the tolerance of Pakistani nuclear weapons activity by the U.S. 
The Indian military showed concern's and interest in nuclear 
questions after the India's conventional defence mechanism had been 
modernized and the Indian military felt secure about its ability to wage a 
conventional war against Pakistan and China, and after China's and 
Pakistan's nuclear developments and their implications for Indian security 
en 
developed a salience in Indian professional and public opinion. By early 
eighties, New Delhi saw its relative position vis-a-vis Pakistan and China 
rapidly deteriorating. The United states which had moved closer to both of 
India's adversaries, appeared to an additional threat. 
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New Delhi attempted to meet this situation by increasing its 
dependence on Moscow and remarked on the largest arms-buying spree in 
the sub-continent's history. India was fully aware of the Islamabad's nuclear 
weapons program and Delhi may have contemplated a direct action against 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons facility, Kahuta, in the mid-1980's, and it is 
very likely that the Brasstacks crisis was conceived in part to provide cover 
for an attack on Pakistan before its nuclear program reached fruition.^ ^ The 
threat of war, as epitomized by the Brasstacks crisis, only accelerated the 
Pakistani nuclear programme there was also a brief confrontation with China 
at Somdurong and this confrontation raised the issue of what response was 
available to the Indian army if the Chinese threaten to use tactical nuclear 
weapons in the Himalayas, of course there was no ready response from 
India. 
Thus even before the fall of Soviet Union there was frustration among 
Indians expectations whether it will emerge true dominant unchallenged 
power of South Asia. The another clamity before the breakup of India's 
steadfast friend Soviet Union was the outbreak of insurgency in Kashmir, 
which came after the several years of struggle with Sikh and Naga 
separatists, drove home the lesson that India's internal security problems 
had become acute. 
India's security environment seemed worse than it was after the 
breakup of Soviet Union India was expecting that after Soviet's breakup 
China and United States may abandon Pakistan. The latter infact reduced its 
commitment to Islamabad after the end of the Afgan war, but the Chinese 
remained Pakistan's good friends. All this enhanced India's potential for 
nuclearization. 
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The Ghauri Test on April 6, 1998 (a medium range missile) by 
Pakistan was also highly provocative. The test invoked sharp reactions in 
India. On the day following the test, a statement of the Indian Ministry of 
Defence said : 'we are aware of constant outside assistance to Pakistan in 
this field despite the existence of multilateral export control, regime, 
unilateral declarations of restraint and supply restrictions on producer 
countries... India will draw appropriate conclusions from these 
developments and take a resolute steps to meet army threat to its national 
security.^ ^ There was little doubt that the technology for the missile system 
came from China. Reacting to the Ghauri missile test, Defence Minister 
George Fernandes said that India's missile programme is well tuned to meet 
our security needs", and made note of three versions of the prithvi missile, 
including a new 217-mile range naval version, all of which can target any 
part of the Pakistani territory.^° Although Prime Minister Vajpayee made it 
clear at that time that Ghauri test would not lead to a nuclear race in South 
Asia. No nuclear race will be started due to firing of Ghauri.^' However 
foreign Secretary K. Raghunath reportedly told visiting US diplomat Bill 
Richardson that India would take all possible steps to meet its security 
concerns arising from arms policies in neighbouring Pakistan and China and 
that India would match its neighbours weapons. The Ghauri missile is said 
to be capable of carrying nuclear payloads, and has the range to hit targets 
throughout India except in the northeastern part of India. The case for an 
Indian nuclear deterrent appeared reasonable to some extent after the test of 
Ghauri. It is logical that if a rival is having nuclear weapons, then one has to 
think about the deterrence. That is what India did, in 1998 when it justified 
its nuclear tests and the subsequent calls for weaponisation citing Sino-
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Pakistani nuclear 'axis'. Threat to its security there is nothing ambiguous in 
India's claim because it is known to every one that India views both China 
and Pakistan as threats to its territorial integrity. Then it is obvious the 
degree of cooperation between the two countries (China and Pakistan) on 
nuclear weapons is also a threat. Ghauri test reinforced prior perceptions in 
India about the deterioration of India's immediate security environment. In 
1997 under the United Front government, the Ministry of Defense's Annual 
Report had expressed considerable misgivings about China's support for 
Pakistan's nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as China's own 
growing ballistic missile capabilities. In any case, the Ghauri test provided 
the BJP led government a useful rationale for carrying out nuclear tests. On 
May 8-10, 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee instructed key 
ministers and the highest ranking bureaucrats as well as the three service 
chiefs of his decision to proceed with the nuclear tests.^'' 
However Ghauri test or Sino-Pak relations were not the only factors 
which led India to go for the tests. These two factors infact accelerated the 
program, with the period of the Soviet security guarantee providing an 
interlude. There are many foreign and several Indian political commentators 
who dismissed the security imperatives underlying the Indian nuclear 
weapons as well as Indian tests. However there is enough evidence which 
suggest that India's security misgivings did play an important role in the 
evolution of the program as well as in precipitating the nuclear tests of May 
1998. 
Indian Defence Minister, George Fernades citing of China as most 
powerful threat to India also shows how far Indian tests were motivated to 
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Chinese threats. Fernades called China the number one potential threat to 
India, this statement infact invented and borrowed further threat for India.^ ^ 
Subsequently, Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, in a letter to President 
Clinton, justified India's tests largely because of the 1962 Indo-Chinese war, 
China's own nuclear weapons policy, and Beijing's support for the Pakistani 
nuclear program.^ ^ 
In Vajpayee's letter to Clinton, there are clear references to the 
"threats" from China and Pakistan. (If what happened in 1962, 1965 and 
1971 with China and Pakistan constitute a continuing threat in 1998 as 
Vajpayee pointed out). The letter cited China as the major reason for its 
nuclear explosions. Wrote Vajpayee "... we have an overt nuclear weapons 
state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against 
India in 1962. Although our relationship with that country has improved in 
the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the 
unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust, that country has 
materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear 
weapons state". This irritated China further. 
Indian analysists believe that China has been pursuing a strategy of 
simultaneous containment of, and engagement with, India. The Chinese 
containment strategy involves alliance with Pakistan and a gradual military 
build-up in the Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal region through establishing 
military bases in places such as Myanmar. The Chinese containment policy 
towards India has been noted by western analysts as well. China has 
developed commercial and military presence in Myanmar (Burma) through 
Hunnan and also has a military presence in Coco and Hyunghai Islands, 
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which gave China a military platform in Bay of Bengal. China has 
established a long range, low frequency facility in the coco Islands", to use 
for submarine activities and also to monitor Indian missile tests.^ ^ According 
to an Indian assessment; China is taking Indian missile capability into 
account while formulating its missile and nuclear supply policy with 
Pakistan.^ ^ 
Whatever the role domestic politics may have played in the final 
decision, and whatever the views one may hold on the wisdom of the new 
Indian nuclear policy, there is no denying the fact that the China factor -
made even more pressing by the Sino-Pak cooperation in this field - has 
been the most important ingredient in the Chain of events which culminated 
in India's nuclear tests of 11 and 13 May, 1998.''° 
The Triangular dimension of India-China-Pakistani was important 
aspect in the overall regional context. It can be analysed or summed up that 
contrary to the common perception of an Indian-Pakistan nuclear contests, 
China could be held the most important actor to induce India to exercise its 
nuclear option. As India's nuclear and missile capabilities owe much to the 
dynamics of Sino-Indian rivalry. It is the adversarial nature of Sino-Indian 
relationship which has driven the Indian and, in turn, Pakistani nuclear 
weapons programmes uncompromising attitudes and deep suspicion of each 
other's intentions have led to a situation where each has sought to negotiate 
only from a position of absolute strength. Contingent with this distrust have 
been feelings of mutual insecurity. India's defence policy has always been 
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based on "keeping one step ahead of Pakistan and on a par with China. In 
sum there were numerous reasons for India's decision to go nuclear and 
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China was very important factor in overall Indian security calculus. A close 
perusal of Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter points out to the fact that it "did 
not explicitly name, China, but the implications were clear. It dwelt first and 
longest on the threat from China. Sixty eight words targeted China, 
77 
compared to 48 addressing the Pakistani threat to India. 
By analyzing the above facts we ofcourse anticipate the impact of 
China and Sino-Pak collaboration on India's nuclear programme. In contrast 
Pakistan's nuclear behaviour is influenced by and directed towards India. 
While as India's nuclear posture is directed if not against the Pakistan but 
certainly is formulated to have some deterrent against China, and China-
Pakistan nuclear threat together. 
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Conclusion 
CONCLUSION 
The external threats to India's security have very much centered 
around Pal^ istan and China and the strategic linicages between them. 
The factors that underpin the strategic collaboration between China 
and Pakistan are the mutual interests. The aim of both was to contain the 
expansion of Indian influence in the region and to counter any threat that 
India may pose to either China or Pakistan. 
The security dimension of Sino-Pak relations vis-a-vis India 
developed soon after the conclusion of Panchsheela agreement between 
India and China. The understanding which China showed with Pakistan's 
membership of SEATO was clearly against the national interests of India. 
Because by this China supported Pakistan in a way to bring the cold war 
politics to the doorsteps of India. China's help and cooperation to insert a 
clause in "ten principles'" which were adopted in Bandung conference 
upholding Pakistans right to join the military pacts for self defence against 
foreign aggression China not only exonerated Pakistan from the charge of 
conspiring aggression against India in particular but also dealt a heavy blow 
to the policy of non-Alignment. This was a direct affront to India who was 
fighting courageously to defend its foreign policy. China's support to 
Pakistan in this case in a way branded India as an aggressive country. The 
Pakistan's membership of military pacts was utilized as an instruments of 
pressure against India. 
During 1962 war between India and China, India had to take into 
consideration the probable joint Pakistan-China pressure on the border. As 
was evident from the Pakistan's no response and non-seriousness on the 
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Chinese aggression over India. Inspite of helping India, Pakistan made 
causatic comments against it. Pakistan's propaganda against India declaring 
"Chinese aggression no more than a border warfare and restricted to the area 
under dispute" added an insult to the injury of India. Because of the Sino-
Indian war and Pakistan's black mail India was compelled to seek some 
security guarantee and consequently it began to move towards superpowers. 
The Sino-Indian war was really a watershed in the growth of joint Sino-
Pakistani threat to Indian security. This brought the convergence in their 
interests to undermine India. 
The conclusion of Border Agreement between China and Pakistan 
surely made India exposed to severe implications. The agreement enabled 
China to promote Pakistan against India. The agreement further heightened 
the hostility between china and India. Because before this agreement 
China's posture over Kashmir was somewhat non-commital. After the 
signing of Agreement, Chinese came out fully supportive of Pakistan's 
stance on Kashmir. This agreement obviously vitiated the atmosphere of 
Indo-Pakistan talks, which ultimately resulted in failure. It was a clear 
interference in India's sovereignty over Kashmir. What the agreement had 
done was to place the Chinese formally and firmly on record that Kashmir 
did not belong to India. And further, more there was the territorial loss to 
India by Pakistan's surrendering of Indian territory to China. 
So the agreement turned a new leaf in understanding, and friendship 
between China and Pakistan. There was no looking back thereafter as Sino-
Pak ties went from strength to strength and India was being viewed as a 
common enemy. 
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What became more startling to Indian policy makers was the Chinese 
offer of military protection to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack. This, 
created tensions for India that there is really some secret understanding 
between the China and Pakistan which will be effectively used to bully 
India. Pakistani leaders became confident of military cover of China in the 
event of any crisis with India. They had many times threatened India of 
severe consequences if it did the mischief of attacking Pakistan, as Pakistan 
involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia. This 
without doubt had detested India in settling scores with Pakistan which is in 
possession of its territory and infact had gifted some land to China also. It 
was not difficult for India to get its land back from Pakistan but Chinese 
cover possibly would have changed the Indian policies. 
More than making China an active player in the Kashmir question 
was significant the India's turn on Kashmir question. As India was agreed to 
formally propose ceasefireline to be made as the international border in 
Kashmir and accepted the Anglo-American mediation in India-Pakistan talks 
on Kashmir. Both China and Pakistan viewed this shift from Indian side as 
an indication of weakness which infact made Pakistan more and more 
confident and ambitious on Kashmir and finally led it to get Kashmir 
through the use of force in 1965. 
Pakistan continued to pursue war as a prolongation of politics through 
different means. While China on its part choose the threat of war as an 
equally effective foreign policy posture against India. 
The supportive role that China played to promote Pakistan's interests 
against India during the second Kashmir war caused considerable concern to 
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India though China did not participate in the war but her diplomatic support 
was sufficient to highten security tension in India. Chinese sympathy and 
moral support to Pakistan was not infact a mere expression or lip service 
towards its ally but there was a surfeit of arms supply and strong 
unequivocal political support also. India was compelled to mobilize its 
troops along the Assam and NEFA borders. India had to retain five of her 
seven mountain divisions on her northern borders. Chinese policy created a 
widespread apprehension of a general war in Asia. 
Chinese involvement also curtailed the role of India's friend Soviet 
Union at that time which could not side openly with India, it was detested to 
put pressure on Pakistan. Moreover Chinese policy of linking the Sino-
Pakistan and Sino-Indian dispute was against the Indian interests. Because it 
made China an active player in the politics of subcontinent. 
The study reveals that the 1971 war between India and Pakistan had 
come when China was completely obliged to Pakistan for its role in Henry 
Kissingers secret mission to Beijing. India's security was completely under 
threat by the emergence of Sino-US detente. All this forced India to sign a 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship with former Soviet Union. India had to 
accept the world criticism on joining the hands with a power bloc for 
security guarantee because of the changing security environment. 
The Treaty with Russia became a refuge and brought psychological 
relief and strength to India. The fear that Indian army had to face war on two 
fronts" was set at rest. The treaty not only constituted a countervailing force 
to the Sino-American strategic design, but also ably served India's security 
interests without compromising on its policy of Non-Alignment. 
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The Indian foreign policy makers felt an optimum response to the 
complex challenges to the country's security and thought for adequate 
defence preparedness. Security of the country was improved considerably 
after 1971, following the establishment of its prominent position in the sub-
continent. The Simla Agreement with Pakistan, Integration of Sikkim with 
Indian Union, the Kashmir Accord and finally the attainment of Nuclear 
status resulting from the peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974. 
The construction of Karakoram Highway that runs through Pakistan 
occupied Kashmir greatly effected India's security. It has a strong message 
for India and Soviet Union. This Highway, by connecting Gilgit with 
Sinkiang, provides China with the scope of intervention in the event of any 
major crisis. On account of this, Srinagar becomes vulnerable as China can 
rapidly move her forces from western Tibet to northern Kashmir during a 
military confrontation with India. 
One important stage of this ongoing Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale 
has been the support that China extended to Pakistan's arms programme. 
This was detrimental to India's security because it narrowed the gap that 
was existing between the Pakistan forces and Indian forces, to a great extent. 
It is the long standing problems of China and Pakistan with India that has 
without any doubt stimulated and sustained their defence cooperation. In 
Islamabad search for security and parity vis-a-vis New Delhi, China had 
certainly played god father. China had certainly taken the responsibility for 
rehabilitating the Pakistani army and equipping it with the most modern 
weapons systems it had available. As a military ally of Pakistan and an 
adversary of India, China has helped Islamabad to build its nuclear and 
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missile capabilities. China has used this assistance to Pakistan as a way to 
balance India militarily and politically. 
The domestic production, direct procurement of weapons, and the 
existence of joint ventures has surely facilitated Pakistan's long standing 
quest for military parity with New Delhi. It also substantially contributed 
towards Pakistan's self reliance and indigenisation and consequently 
brought about a feeling of confidence and self worth in Pakistani Army. 
All the Developments in Pakistan's armament by Chinese help can 
possibly erode many advantages India might had in strategic depth. 
Apart from this, China and Pakistan's holding of intimate relations 
with the other neighbouring countries of South Asian region exhibit their 
policies of encirclement against India. It can be a major factor in 
militarizing the south Asia with their military aid programmes besides the 
diplomatic support the two extended towards these countries. The bilateral 
disputes that exist between India and its neighbours are skillfully being 
exploited by China and Pakistan. 
For this India had to adopt the soft policies towards its smaller 
neighbours so that their fear of dominant India get lost from their psyche. 
India has to built the confidence of its South Asian neighbours so that they 
may not come under the diplomatic influence of external powers. Pakistan's 
and China's involvement in the North-East of India, sanctuaries for 
insurgent groups in Bangladesh etc. are a major concern to India. Due to the 
high economic and diplomatic cost of an all out war, an overt/covert lower 
level of warfare of the kind Pakistan is waging with India aimed at 
continuously bleeding a nation is easier option for the forces inimical to 
India. 
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The most important security dimension of China-Pakistan relations 
vis-a-vis India is in their nuclear cooperation. The nuclear alliance between 
the two has been detrimental to India's security by raising the possibility of 
a two front nuclear confrontation and by allowing Islamabad to achieve 
strategic parity with India. So it is a disturbing revelation for India to have a 
two nuclear weapons states at its door that too hostile to its very existence. 
The combination of nuclear and conventional capabilities provided 
the Pakistan's a strong shield from behind which they could unleash a 
campaign of destabilization against India without undue worry that it would 
escalate into full scale war. 
Sino-Pakistan nuclear understanding makes it imperative for India to 
restructure its foreign policy suitably otherwise it would become highly 
vulnerable to Pakistan's nuclear blackmail. 
It seems that Beijings motivation in transferring nuclear and missile 
materials and technology to Pakistan derive largely from Chinese concerns 
about the regional balance of power and are a part of Chinese efforts to 
pursue a strategy of containment in its enduring rivalry with India. China 
wants to limit India's power capabilities to South Asia and thereby constrain 
New Delhi's aspirations to become a major power in Asia. As India's 
emergence of a peer competitor in Asia would upset China's predominant 
position in the region. 
China wants to make Pakistan confident and powerful enough to 
present India a standing threat. It wants to keep India busy with Pakistan so 
that it may not be able to develop its military capabilities on modern lines 
which can match Chinese military strength. 
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The progress that China has made in the recent years in augmenting 
Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities will continue to have an adverse 
impact on Indian security. The upgradation of Pakistan's logistic capabilities 
all along the Indo-Pakistan border, strengthening of Pakistan's air operation 
capabilities, and many shows that China is trying to eliminate the balance 
which is in favour India in South Asian region. Chinese strategic 
calculations aim at boxing of India into the geographical confines of South 
Asia to stultify its stature as an emerging global power. 
In order to overcome this difficulty it became imperative for India to 
modernize its defence in all spheres. Sino Pakistani nuclear cooperation thus 
forced India's decision makers to accelerate nuclear weapons programme 
and to conduct open nuclear tests in May 1998. By the same contingency 
India shifted towards more capable and transparent nuclear posture. All this 
brought India on the path of continued weaponisation. It was prudent for 
India to create a deterrent to insulate itself against Chinese or Pakistani 
nuclear coercion. 
Following the nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 by India and 
Pakistan, Chinese statements confirmed that Sino-Pak strategic cooperation 
remained unaltered. China has shown little inclination to restrain Pakistan, 
largely because the Chinese policy towards South Asia is driven by balance 
of power and containment considerations. 
For variety of reasons Pakistan's weaponisation can prove for more 
dangerous and detrimental to Indian security because in Pakistan it is the 
military which controls the nuclear button and not the elected 
representatives of people. There is also apprehension that Pakistan's nuclear 
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weapons are likely to be slipped into the hands of terrorists which will be 
more dangerous for India. As Pakistan has been sponsoring insurgency in 
India's Punjab, Kashmir and North Eastern states from last few decades. 
Moreover Pakistan's unstable nuclear posture that maintains the option of 
first use of nuclear weapons covers the high risk of accidental and 
miscalculated use of nuclear weapons by it. Pakistan has already inflicted 
four wars upon India. In case Pakistan persists with the development and 
deployment of nuclear weapons India will be constrained to review her 
policy to meet the threat. More importantly Sino-Pakistan collaboration has 
created a nuclear threat environment in Indian sub-continent. Pakistan's 
repeated threat of use of nuclear weapons against India is a matter that has 
to be taken seriously. Pakistan wishes to utilize its nuclear capability to its 
advantage for political survivability. It also wishes to resolve the Kashmir 
problem by showing the same as flashpoint for the use of nuclear weapons. 
Thus India has legitimate grievances about Strategic Collaboration 
between China and Pakistan which had made the security condition for India 
very fragile in the region and had without any doubt imposed a heavy 
defence burden upon India. 
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